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ABSTRAC'
This thesis describes the evolution of the Small Cities Ccmunity
Development Block Grant Program and its competitive system for selecting
grantees, and then develops a framework for interpreting that evolution.
The framework for analysis considers the limitations of linear weighted
allocation formulas, ambiguity in program design, organizational require-
ments, and the role of copetition in the allocation of funds.
The following trends are noted: 1) a shift away fron allocation
fornlas based on need taward selection formulas based on program impact
and quality; 2) accretion of new program and organizational goals by
means of additional formula factors, with consequent "formula drift" away
fram the block grant concept; 3) shifting of formula design to the center,
and constraint of HUD area office discretion in order to reduce unexpected
outcxcnes and to legitimize discretionary selection of grantees; 4) a
continuing process of HUJD adjustment of the formal allocation process in
response to the limitations of linear weighted allocation formula; and
5) responses to those adjustments based on polarities or tensions in goals,
that is, program participants attempting simultaneously to pursue con-
flicting goals.
The thesis concludes that the Small Cities Program formal allo-
cation process has evolved predictably and that HUD has responded to un-
expected results of that process in a way that has increased its accept-
ability. However, while the outcomes of the Small Cities Program
allocation process are progressively more predictable and acceptable, this
evolution does not imply convergence toward an "optimal" allocation system.
Finally, the Small Cities CDBG Program' s competitive selection system
is incompatible with the block grant formula allocation approach.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Joseph E'erreira, Jr.
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and .Planning
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4CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
5INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the need-based Project Selection System (PSS)
used to allocate community development aid to the nation's smaller commun-
ities and rural areas by the Small Cities Community Development Block
Grant Program of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Since the Small Cities Program's inception in 1975, HUD has made numerous
1
adjustments to that formula allocation system. This thesis provides a
policy analysis of those adjustments. I will focus particularly on the
cycle of problem diagnosis and system adjustment by the central office of
the program. In doing the analysis I will consider the pursuit of multiple
objectives by participants in the system, the requirements placed on the
system by the block grant approach, and other demands, both internal and
external, on the administering agency of this discretionary grant program.
Using these elements as a framework of analysis, I will interpret HUD's
adjustments to the program's discretionary allocation system, and then
draw tentative conclusions about the effectiveness of these adjustments
in managing the dilemmas that a competitive block grant program presents
to participants in its allocation system and the extent to which such ad-
justment patterns are to be expected of other block grant programs using
formula allocation strategies.
Why Examine Block Grant Programs?
In 1974, Congress created the Community Development Block Grant
Program to replace eight categorical grant and loan programs under which
Prior to 1978, the program was called the general purpose discretionary
grants portion of the Community Development Block Grant Program.
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communities applied for funds case-by-case for project categories. In
the new program all of these are replaced by a system of block grants. As
in the past, communities must apply for federal funds. For larger commun-
ities, the amount for which they are eligible, to which they are "entitled",
is determined by a formula based on measures of community need. Smaller
communities must compete for funds through an application process that con-
siders community need and capacity, past performance and merit of the pro-
jects proposed. The use of need-based allocation formulas to distribute
urban aid grants for physical improvements and housing development reflects
a growing trend towards distributing federal aid through a block grant ap-
proach.
The analysis of block grant allocation systems is important for a
number of different reasons. These programs comprise a large and increas-
ing portion of federal aid activities both in numbers of programs and in
dollars. Legislators and public administrators have increasingly relied
on need-based allocation formulas to divide up limited aid dollars among
competing purposes and interest groups. For 1978, the Congressional Re-
search Service identified 107 programs that used formulas including popu-
lation as a factor to allocate federal funds. 3
2Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-
383) replaced the Model Cities Program, urban renewal, water and sewer
grants, grants for open-space, urban beautification, historic preservation,
neighborhood facilities, and loans for housing rehabilitation.
3Subcommittee on Post Office and Civil Service, U.S. House of Representatives,
"The Use of Population Data in Federal Assistance Programs", Committee
Print, December 1978, cited in John Goodman, Jr., Federal Funding Formulas
Population Redistribution During the 1970's and the 1980 Census, Washington
D.C.: The Urban Institute: April 1980.
7Some of these programs are large: General Revenue Sharing $6.9 billion
(estimated Fiscal Year 1980 expenditures), Social Services $5.5 billion,
Comprehensive Employment and Training (CETA) $6.8 billion, Federal/State
Highway Construction and Maintenance $7.6 billion, Elementary, Secondary
and Vocational Education $7.3 billion. 4
Block grant formulas are used more and more to achieve the goal of
decentralization of government decision making. The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 received its initial impetus in the decentralizing
proposals of special revenue sharing by the Nixon administration.5
These block grant programs have become the focal point of the pol-
itical debate on the proper way for the federal government to aid the
economic and local development of the nation's states and communities.
While the debate about formula allcation of grants has cut across all areas
of federal aid, grants-in-aid to cities have been the object of particular
controversy and continual Congressional and administrative program revision.
These aid programs have become a major source of funds for public par-
ticipation in the community development process. And the political debate
absorbs major outlays of time and resources of legislators, program ad-
ministrators and designers, and public and private evaluators of the pro-
grams.
4The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981 in Goodman:
April 1980.
5U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs. Community Development Block Grant Program: Staff Report of the
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.
8Why Are Block Grant Programs Problematic?
Implementation of public programs is always a difficult task.6 Yet
block grant programs present special difficulties: they almost inevitably
require a convenient allocation formula that focuses attention on conflicts
and inconsistencies in the allocation process.
Several problematic features distinguish block grant allocations
systems such as the Small Cities Program. First, the legislative mandate
to the agency is complex and, when considered as a whole, vague. Not only
are the program goals complex, but many take the form of constraints on
agency discretion in the interest of increasing recipient's control of pro-
gram aid. Since the program shifts to grantees major portions of the
responsibility for the design and management of local activities funded by
the program, the agency must rely on the administrative capacity and good
political judgment of program grantees.
Additionally, the use of a need-based formula approach introduces
new rigidities in implementation, rigidities that produce unintended errors
in the distribution of aid. Also, the formula allocation process must
operate in a dynamic system with changing goals, an evolving understanding
of needs, and with a universe of eligible communities whose characteristics
constantly shift. While all public programs operate in the context of
such a system, the block grant approach particularly reduces the agency's
ability to adjust to changes in its program environment.
6For a revealing analysis of the travails of implementation in one feder-
al program, see Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
9For policy makers and administrative staff in the agency, the im-
plementation of a block grant allocation system is fundamentally an ex-
ploratory process, with imperfect knowledge of goals, uncertain means to
achieve the goals, and a constantly shifting terrain. Nevertheless, the
arguments used to justify specific formula choices never address this col-
lection of issues, but look only to illusive need measures.
Legislators, public administrators, mayors, governors and citizens
groups all want to select the best way to allocate federal aid dollars.
In the debate over that choice, policy makers seek to discover a proper
balance between legitimate need and administrative efficiency, between
theoretical merit and political feasibility, between local priorities and
national objectives. Formula block grants provide an increasingly popular
technique to attempt to reduce the complexity of finding that proper bal-
ance.
However, in providing federal aid to local communities by means of
need-based formula allocation systems, agency policy makers and staff con-
front an infinite series of trade-offs (choices among conflicting set of
program benefits) and of dilemmas (choices among set of program costs both
unattractive and unavoidable). When the agency acts to resolve one problem,
they create new ones. As priorities and conditions change in a complex
system, yesterday's solution to the program allocation problem no longer
satisfies. For both the agency central office planner and branch office
administrator, identifying the sources of dissatisfaction with program out-
comes and predicting participant response to adjustments in the alloca-
tion system become critical; "making things better" means quickermore re-
liable, more informed reactions to the most recently perceived problem in
the allocation process.
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During the last seven years of federal experience with the use of
formula allocation systems to distribute block grant aid to urban and rural
communities, identifying misspecification of the linear allocation formu-
las (the incorrect choice of the formulas' factors and weights) as the
cause of misallocation (dissatisfaction with who gets how much money for
what projects) has directed energy and attention away from more fundamental
sources of dissatisfaction.
In particular, the interplay of three features of these systems
confound facile diagnosis and treatment of their problems: first, the
inevitable ambiguity and complexity in initial program purpose and design;
second, the divergence between the conditions necessary for linear weighted
allocation formulas by themselves to distribute aid dollars predictably and
the conditions actually present in most program settings (divergence in
the nature of need, in its measurement, in participant response to the for-
mula allocation system); and third, the functional requirements of an
agency such as HUD that administers a block grant aid program.
A better understanding of these features can inform agency efforts
to improve program performance and manage the trade-offs and dilemmas
the agency faces between need and merit, efficiency and equity, accounta-
bility and local choine, and administrative costs and the costs of admin-
istrative errors.
Why Analyze the Small Cities Program?
This thesis grows from preliminary work on the Small Cities Pro-
gram for a national evaluation of the program by Urban Systems Research
and Engineering, Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts. That work introduced
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me to the Small Cities Program, and offered the opportunity to hear first-
hand the reactions of HUD and local officials, and of program administra-
tors, to the program's allocation process.
The Small Cities Program provides a useful case for a policy analy-
sis of formula allocation systems: it combines elements of allocation by
formula and discretionary grant award in its competitive Project Selection
System; HUD was given greater discretion in design of the allocation pro-
cess than in the entitlement CDBG program--the use of that discretion to
make adjustments in the process provides valuable information on HUD's
capacity and constraints in making such systems work better; the recent
completion of the national evaluation of the program presents a rich
source of data on the workings of the system; recent proposals to trans-
fer responsibility of the program to the states and rely more on block
grants to distribute federal aid make the analysis especially timely.
My approach differs from that of other analyst's of the CDBG alloca-
tion process. Most have searched for the "right" formula by testing dif-
ferent community need measures and factor weights. Others have evaluated
the outcomes of various formulas by simulating the allocation process, by
comparing formula results with simple need indices, or by analyzing the
role of community characteristics in the allocation process.
Organization of the Thesis
The thesis consists of five chapters and several appendices. Chap-
ter I has introduced the thesis. In Chapter II, I describe how the Small
Cities Project Selection System has evolved. I develop my framework for
analyzing the PSS in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, I use that framework to
12
interpret the evolution of the PSS. I conclude the thesis with Chapter V.
The appendices give greater detail to diverse aspects of the Small Cities
Program. characteristics of allocation formulas, legislative issues, pro-
gram outcomes and evaluations.
13
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
- FOR THE SMALL CITIES PROGRAM
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT SELECTION
SYSTEM FOR THE SMALL CITIES CDBG PROGRAM
In 1974, Congress set in motion a new allocation process with the
passage of the Housing and Community Development Act. This thesis examines
the development and implementation of the innovative hybrid allocation Dro-
cess for community development aid to the nation's smaller cities since the
passage of that Act. This Project Selection System (PSS) combines the ele-
ments of formula allocation based on need and administrative choice of ap-
plicants in a competitive grant process for small cities and rural areas.
In this chapter, I will provide a detailed history of that allocation
process. For each program year, from 1975 to the present, I will describe
the adjustments that HUD has made in the Small Cities allocation system,
as reflected in program regulations, annual program reports and other doc-
uments. The material in this chapter provides the primary source of data
for the interpretation of those revisions in later chapters.
First, I give a brief summary of the current form of the PSS. Then,
I describe the changes in the PSS since 1974, through four stages of devel-
opment.
STAGE I A NEED-BASED SELECTION SYSTEM
STAGE II CENTRALIZATION OF SYSTEM DESIGN AND LEGITIMIZATION
OF DISCRETION.
STAGE III REFINEMENT
STAGE IV DECENTRALIZATION
I conclude by identifying the major problem areas in the allocation
system and HUD's responses to those problems.
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CURRENT FORM OF THE SMALL CITIES
PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
The Small Cities CDBG Program provides federal aid dollars on a
annual or multi-year basis to local communities for activities designed to
meet community development needs, principally for the benefit of low and
moderate-income persons. Those activities must be directed to the broad
national objectives designated by Congress in 1974 and reaffirmed in 1977:
1) to eliminate slums, blight and deterioration where
such conditions or needs exist;
2) to prevent blight and deterioration; and
3) to provide improved community facilities and pub-
lic improvements, and supporting social services
where necessary and appropriate. 1
Units of local general government in urban and rural areas which are
not eligible for so-called entitlement CDBG funds on a formula allocation
basis may apply for Small Cities Program assistance. Generally speaking,
cities that are not central cities of Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (SMSAs), cities with population under 50,000 and county governments
not meeting the population and powers tests for entitlement status are
eligible to compete for these funds.
Each year a portion of the total CDBG appropriation is set aside for
rural and urban areas.2  Two pools of funds, one for non-metropolitan
1 95th Congress House of Representatives. Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development,
Community Development Block Grant Program: Staff Report. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, February 1977, p. 5.
2 Three kinds of discretionary funds have been designated: Metro and Non-
Metro Discretionary Balances, considered here, the Financial Settlement
Fund for urgent community development needs, and the Secretary's Fund
for diverse designated purpose.
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areas and the other for metropolitan small communities, are divided into
state balances using needs-based allocation formulas counting extent of
substandard housing, poverty and population. In 1975, the amount available
for non-metropolitan areas was $199.3 million, while the SMSA Balances Fund
for metropolitan small cities was $59.7 million. By Fiscal Year 1979, the
Non-Metropolitan balance had increased to $562.6 million, while the fund
for metropolitan small cities grew to $241.6 million. 3
Within states, eligible units of local government compete for the
Small Cities aid on an annual basis. Rural areas have a separate contest
from urban areas.4  Communities that have designed comprehensive programs
to meet many needs over several years have a competition separate from com-
munities with programs to meet a single need in one year.
HUD Area Office personnel use a nationally determined point system
to rate and rank the program preapplications of communities trying to win
grants in the separate contests in each state. The guidelines developed
by the HUD central office for this point system instruct Area Office staff
in their evaluation of Small Cities preapplications and specify:
o threshhold requirement for a community to be eligible
to compete
o preapplication contents
o numerical weights to use in assigning points for
-- community-wide need based on census data
3HUD. Community Development Block Grant Program: Fifth Annual Report.
Washington, D.C.: GPO, no date, p. 1-5.
4 Rural communities and counties compete for "Non-SMSA Balance" funds,
while urb'an small cities compete for the "SMSA Balance" for the state.
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-- extent of program benefit to persons of low-
and moderate-income
-- program impact in a target area
-- related community effort to provide low-income
housing and equal opportunity
o factors to consider in determining grant amounts
Thus, the Project Selection System guides HUD Area Office staff in
their use of independent judgment to award scarce Small Cities CDBG funds
to eligible communities in a manner consistent with the national objectives
of the Housing and Community Development Act, and with HUD's administrative
requirements in interpreting those objectives. The point system, with its
carefully prescribed and weighted quantitative terms, is designed to bal-
ance "central office funding priorities and area office discretionary
power." 5 The following figure and chart summarize the allocation process.
During the evolution of the system, two major legislative issues
have arisen: the needs of "hold-harmless" communities and the appropriate-
ness of the entitlement CDBG program's "dual" allocation formula for dis-
tributing Small Cities Program funds to the state pools.
The "hold-harmless" issue arose in the 1977 legislative hearings.
Communities with temporary "entitlement" status wanted to retain that status
rather than lose it, as provided in the 1974 Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act. Congress did not extend "hold-harmless" status beyond the orig-
inal schedule, but did revise the Small Cities Program to better meet the
needs of "hold-harmless" communities.
5 Andrew M. Isserman, Allocation of Community Development Funds Among
Small Cities: A Partial Evaluation. (Draft) p. 1.
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CHART 1.1
USE OF THE POINT SYSTEM
The point system is used to provide a yes/no decision for each appli-
cant, to win or lose in a competition. For example, suppose five cities choose
to apply for a state allotment of Single-Purpose funds of $500,000, as deter-
mined by the formula allocation to state pools (dollars in thousands):
Cities
A
B
C
D
E
$ Proposed
300
100
400
250
200
HUD Area Office staff rate the preapplications using the point system
and rank the cities according to their point totals.
Cities
D
E
C
A
B
$ Proposed
250
200
400
300
100
Points
840
600
450
200
150
Area Office raters determine that City E does not have the capacity
or experience to administer the grant it proposes. HUD decides to award a
grant half the size.
$ Proposed
250
200
400
300
100
Points
840
600
450
200
150
$ Awarded
250
100
150
0
0
Since $500,000 is available, City C receives only $150,000. Cities
A and B lose in this competition.
Cities
D
E
C
A
B
20
The second issue is also reflected in the current form of the PSS.
In 1977, Congress revised the entitlement allocation formula for large
cities, and applied that formula to the Small Cities allocation of dollars
to the state pools. Opponents of that change in the program for small com-
munities were successful in making a small revision to the "dual" formula,
and also in amending the Act to require a study of small city needs, and
the best measures of those needs.
21
HISTORY OF ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
Certain features of the Small Cities allocation system have been pre-
sent from its beginnings. The system is an offshoot of the "entitlement"
approach of the CDBG program. This approach allocates funds on the basis
of two primary elements: (1) the use of verifiable need measures in a for-
mula to determine the maximum grant amounts eligible communities may re-
ceive; (2) an application by eligible communities meeting certain purpose,
planning and capacity requirements.
The entitlement approach, as an alternative to the problems of the
previous categorical aid programs, sought to: (1) promote local flexi-
bility in identifying needs and designing programs to meet those needs;
(2) reduce the inequities of "grantsmanship", that is, the perceived pre-
ponderant influence of expertise in winning grants, rather than the level
of real need, in determining who obtained federal community development aid;
(3) specify a broad range of local uses of aid consistent with national ob-
jectives; and (4) provide a predictable source of community development aid
to cities, in order to encourage comprehensive and integrated local plan-
ning and project implementation.
In an entitlement approach, large metropolitan cities and urban
counties are eligible to receive community physical development block grants.
The amount of aid per year that communities are "entitled" to is determined
by formula. This formula, is a mathematical equation whose terms are ob-
jective measures of community need--population, poverty, area growth lag,
overcrowded dwellings, area age of housing. In contrast, in a discretion-
22
ary grant approach, the amount of aid a community may receive and receipt
of aid is based on the discretionary action of the Department of Housing
and Urband Development.
The entitlement approach could only be partially pursued in the dis-
cretionary grant program (as the Small Cities Program was initially titled).
Not enough money was allocated to the discretionary program for eligible
small communities. The alternative strategy for the Small Cities Program
was the formula allocation of funds to the state level and a competition
among communities for funds within each state. The discretionary judgment
of HUD staff has been an important element in the competitive selection of
grant winners since the program's inception.
23
STAGE I: A NEED-BASED SELECTION SYSTEM
STAGE I 1975 HUD Area Offices apply need measures to
competitive selection of grant winners.
Small, high poverty communities with no
HUD grant experience win most of the
discretionary grant funds.
24
PROGRAM YEAR ONE (1975)
In the first year, the Small Cities Program was called the discretion-
ary grants program, with general purpose funds for metropolitan and for non-
metropolitan areas. This division reflects the language of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 (Section 103). Both sources of funds
were allocated to areas using the entitlement allocation formula: non-met-
ropolitan funds to the state level, metropolitan funds to the SMSA level,
with competitions, respectively, among eligible communities in each state
and among those in each SMSA. Eligible applicants were states and units
of local general governments not having CDBG entitlement status, i.e.,
those communities whose potential and grant amounts were not determined by
a need-based allocation formula.
Program Objectives
In the regulations set forth by HUD for Fiscal Year 1975, explicit
reference is made to the objectives to be accomplished in the discretionary
program selection process. HUD stated that:
"The...criteria accurately reflect the Congressional
intent that community development block grants be
used to assist in the development of viable urban
communities and expand economic opportunities prin-
cipally for persons of low- and moderate-income.
In addition, the Department has added another cri-
terion to encourage the submission of joint appli-
cations between states and units of general local
government or two or more units of general local
government for activities designed to implement area-
wide housing and community development plans.1
1Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 27. Friday, February 7, 1975. p. 5952.
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Thus, the purposes of the program as reflected in the regulations
draw from the general statement of objectives in the Act. The additional
criterion reflects special Congressional intent for the program; in a re-
port of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on the Senate
version of the Act, an additional purpose for the discretionary fund was
mentioned:
"to encourage submission of applications from urban
counties jointly with another unit of general local
government in order to achieve an area-wide approach
to community development." 2
Design and Administration of Selection Systems
For the first program year, each HUD area office 3 developed rating
and ranking systems, subject to central office review, to be used by area
office staff to select grant winners in the metropolitan and non-metropol-
itan grant contests in each SMSA and in each state.
As stated in HUD's First Annual Report on the CDBG program, "...the
general purpose fund (SMSA and non-metropolitan discretionary balances) ap-
plication process (was) not a major departure from the HUD categorical
grant application process." 4 In that categorical program process, HUD
Area Offices evaluated applicant communities to determine the winners of
2U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974: Report of the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
3HUD has three major levels of field offices: Regional, Area, and Service
Offices. Appendix A gives a brief description of these levels with accom-
panying organizational charts and maps.
4HUD Community Planning and Development Office of Evaluation. Community De-
velopment Block Grant Program: First Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, no date. p. 61.
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development funds. In the new CDBG discretionary grant process, as in the
categorical aid programs, "funding was based upon the rank order of each
application among all other applications from the particular SMSA for the
SMSA general purpose funds, and from the particular state for non-metropol-
itan general purpose funds." 5
Threshholds to Compete
A threshhold represents a stipulation by HUD limiting entry to parti-
cipate in Small Cities competitions to those eligible applicants meeting
additional requirements deemed appropriate by HUD. An example of a thresh-
hold might be a requirement that eligible applicants would be rated and
ranked in the competitive selection process only if the applicants had no
outstanding audit findings regarding previous HUD grants. Another example
of a possible threshhold might be a requirement that eligible applicants
would be permitted to compete only if their proposed projects provided at
least 75% of their benefits to low- and moderate-income persons.
In the first program year, HUD imposed no threshholds to entry into
the discretionary funds competitions. Eligibility and application stand-
ards closely followed the language of the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974.
Types of Grants
"Types of grants" refers to different categories of grants that may
be offered by a single program. Types of grants may be distinguished by
5HUD Community Planning and Development Office of Evaluation. Community
Development Block Grant Program: First Annual Report. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, no date . p. 61.
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the following eligibility requirements, the range of purposes of funds,
length of the period of time to be funded, application requirements, maxi-
mun grant size, or some combination of these or other well-defined char-
acteristics.
For Program Year One, no different grant types were defined in the
program regulations. Consistent with the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, grants were to be made on an annual basis, for the general
purposes authorized by the Act.
Selection Criteria
Area Offices were required to consider the following factors in de-
veloping their rating and ranking systems for the first program year'.
Priority was to be given to those applications whose proposed activities
addressed the following conditions:
(1) extent of substandard housing
o for metropolitan areas, the proportion and extent of
overcrowded housing, expressed as a percentage of the
total housing units of the applicant
o for non-metropolitan areas, the proposition and extent
of housing units lacking plumbing, based on 1970 U.S.
Census data, expressed as a percentage of the total
housing units of the applicant
(2) the proportion and extent of poverty, expressed as a per-
centage of the total population of the applicant
(3) an extraordinarily high rate of growth or a severe and
rapid rate of decline in population and economic activity,
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arising from the impact of national policy or direct
federal program decisions
(4) conditions which represent an imminent threat to health
or safety. 6
Area Offices were also given authority to extend additional priority
to:
(5) applications where there are joint and voluntary cooperation
agreements between states and applicants, or between two
or more applicants and the activities are designed to im-
plement Statewide or areawide housing and community develop-
ment plans.7
In particular reference to the branch offices discretionary power,
Area Offices were permitted to apply as "a judgmental factor" an estimate
of the applicant's capacity to complete the proposed activities within the
estimated cost. 8
Other Non-Formula Provisions
Several other non-formula provisions were put forth for the first
year competition: applications requirements; "hold-harmless" communities'
eligibility; and grant ceilings.
6Federal Register. op. cit. p. 5954. Section 570.402(b).
7 1bid.
81bid.
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Preapplications were encouraged by the first year program regulations.
A preapplication is a brief initial application by eligible communities
which is then rated by HUD staff; applicants with winning preapplications
then submit a final, full application. In the 1975 program regulations HUD
specified two basic purposes of preapplications:
o to determine how well the application compared with
other applications
o to discourage applications which had little or no
chance of funding before communities spent signif-
icant amounts of money preparing full applications.
However, due to the limited amount of time available to communities to ap-
ply for assistance in the first program year, full applications were to be
accepted from communities which had not submitted preapplications.9
A second non-formula provision of the first year regulations regarded
"hold-harmless" communities. "Hold-harmless" status refers to the granting
of temporary entitlement status to communities that had been receiving funds
from the HUD categorical programs by the CDBG program. This temporary en-
titlement status was provided by the Act to help ease the transition to the
new program--to a new level of funding for entitlement communities and to
the competitive selection process of the discretionary program for non-
entitlement communities. The discretionary program regulations allowed
non-entitlement communities eligible for hold-harmless funds to also com-
pete for discretionary aid. 0
9Ibid. Section 570.400(b)
10Ibid. p. 5952.
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The third provision to note regards grant ceilings, i.e., the maxi-
mum amount of funds that communities may apply for in one program year.
HUD Area Offices were "authorized at their discretion (but not required)
to set maximum grant limits for each year", in relation to the total amount
11
of discretionary funds available for SMSA or State competitions.
Effects of the First Year Discretionary Program
As shown by Figure 2.1, the new discretionary allocation system had
an immediate impact on the smallest communities, doubling the number of
recipients, while reducing the average grant size. Figure 2.1 combines
entitlement and non-metropolitan discretionary grant sizes. The actual
discretionary grants were much smaller on average--$87,5 0 0 for metropolitan
small communities, $168,500 for non-metro discretionary grant winners (see
Appendix C, Table 2.15).
1 1Ibid. p. 5254. Section 570.402(b).
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Figure 2.1
Comparison of HUD Categorical and CDBG Programs
By City Size
Number of Cities Funded
Population
S /
7
7
0-9999 10,000-24999 25,000-49999
Average Grant Size
($000)
Population 0-9999 10,000-24,999 25,000-49,999
Categorical
1975 CDBG
Source: Appendix C, Table 2.13.
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STAGE II: CENTRALIZATION OF SYSTEM DESIGN AND
LEGITIMIZATION OF DISCRETION
STAGE I 1975 HUD Area Offices apply need measures to
competitive selection of grant winners.
Small, high poverty communities with no
HUD grant experience win most of the
discretionary grant funds.
STAGE II 1976- HUD centralizes the design of the com-
1978 petitive selection systems.
Benefit and subjective program impact
measures receive progressively greater
weight than need measures.
HUD refines the selection process to re-
move "biases" and screen out low quality
projects.
Comprehensive multiyear grants are auth-
orized to respond to the needs of the
larger "hold-harmless" cities.
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PROGRAM YEAR TWO (1976)
In its Second Annual Report on the CDBG program, HUD indicated that
there were no major changes in its method of determining discretionary
grant winners for the second program year.12 However, several changes in
the regulations on selection systems and on other administrative procedures
are worth noting.
Program Objectives
The program regulations for 1976 did not further clarify or mention
the objectives set forth in 1975.
Design and Administration of Selection Systems
For the second program year, HUD transferred the responsibility for
design of project selection systems. In 1975, Area Offices had been given
this task; in 1976, Regional Offices gained this responsibility.
Each HUD Regional Office was directed to "establish a review and
rating system for evaluating preapplications from communities within its
jurisdiction."1 3 Separate selections systems could be designed for each
Area Office; copies of the systems were to be made available to communities
12HUD Community Planning and Development Office of Evaluation. Community
Development Block Grant Program: Second Annual Report. Washington, D.C.;
U.S. Government Printing Office, no date.
13Federal Register. Vol. 40, No. 21. October 30, 1975. p. 50667. Section
570.402(c).
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before they submitted their preapplications. According to HUD officials,
the latter was an effort "to inform applicants of the specific weights to
be used to rank order applicants."1 4
Threshholds to Compete
No definite threshholds were required in Fiscal Year 1976. However,
the review systems were to "give consideration to the capacity of the ap-
plicant to complete the proposed activity within a reasonable period of
time and within the estimated cost.1 5  In contrast, in Fiscal Year 1975,
Area Offices were given the option to assess applicant capacity as "a judg-
mental factor". According to HUD central staff, Area Office officials were
also to consider the sources of first year grantees' delays in expending
their discretionary awards, such as the need for lengthy environmental re-
views or other uncontrollable start-up problems.16
Types of Grants
The regulations for Program Year Two made no changes in the grant
types offered. Communities in both the metropolitan and non-metropolitan
discretionary grant competitions were eligible for annual general purpose
awards.
Selection Criteria
14Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 3, No. 11. October 20, 1975.
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs. p. 488.
15Federal Register. op. cit. p. 50667. Section 570.402(c)(2).
16Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 41, No. 3. July 12, 1976. p. 112.
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Based upon experience with the program in 1975, HUD determined that
"modifications from the criteria for selection used in fiscal year 1975
would substantially improve the administration of the program. ,17
The selection criteria to be used in the rating and ranking systems
were modified. The point systems could only consider the following fac-
tors:
o degree to which an applicant's proposed activities directly
addressed the "criteria for selection", that is, the initial
four selection factors designated in 1975.
- extent of substandard housing
- proportion and extent of poverty
- high growth or severe decline in population or economic
activity
- imminent threats to health or safety
o degree to which the proposed activities benefit persons of
low- and moderate-income
o consistency of the proposed activites with local and area-
wide plans.18
The provision was deleted that allowed additional priority for cer-
tain cases involving joint cooperation agreements among states and commun-
ities or among different communities.
17Federal Register. op. cit. p. 50664.
18Federal Register. op. cit. p. 50664. Section 570.402(c)(1).
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Two of the selection criteria carried over from 1975 were modified.
The new language was intended "to make clear that both absolute amounts
and percentages of poverty and substandard housing" were to be considered
in the selection systems, in order to allow HUD "to give equal considera-
tion to applicants of all sizes in making funding decisions."' 9 In assess-
ing the Fiscal Year 1975 competitions, HUD central staff members reported
that the funding reviews had tended to favor smaller communities with
higher percentages of poverty as against larger.communities with greater
numbers of poor persons.20
Other Non-Formula Provisions
Two of the non-formula provisions mentioned for Program Year One were
changed for Fiscal Year 1976, those pertaining to application requirements
and to grant ceilings.
The new regulations required all discretionary grant applicants to
prepare preapplications which would be rated and ranked through the review
systems.21 The regulations for Fiscal Year 1975 had not required preappli-
cations. Those communities that submitted preapplications were rated and
ranked, but those who had missed that scoring of preapplications were per-
mitted to submit late full applications. These full applications were then
rated and ranked against the preapplications, resulting in a new ordering
1 9Ibid. p. 50664. (emphasis added).
2 0Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 3, No. 11. October 20, 1975.
p. 488.
2 1Federal Register. op. cit. p. 50665. Section 570.400(b).
37
of applicants. The outcome of the double round of scoring, according to
HUD officials, was a disappointment for applicants who had come out winners
in the first ranking, only to be later displaced by late applicants. An-
other outcome of the process had been "overworked HUD employees."
2 2
The second change concerned grant ceilings. In 1975, HUD Area
Offices had been given the authority to set maximum grant limits, at their
option, for the discretionary competitions. This authority was withdrawn
for the second program year. No explanation was offered in the regulations
for that change.2 3
2 2Housing and Development Reporter. op. cit. p. 488.
2 3Federal Register. op. cit. p. 50664. Part 570-8.
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PROGRAM YEAR THREE (1977)
HUD continued to make adjustments in the discretionary grants allo-
cation system for the third program year. In reviewing the history of
the program in its Third Annual Report, HUD commented at length on the
problematic nature of discretionary grant competitions. HUD's analysis
pointed out features of the program that had a dramatic impact on the na-
ture of the competitions for funds:
(1) the legislatively prescribed percentage reduction of funds
for small "hold-harmless" communities created a shifting
focus of these communities to the discretionary program, and
a concommitant increase in the intensity of competition;
(2) communities under 5,000 population were under-represented
in terms of their proportion of eligible communities, in
the receipt of discretionary funds;
(3) the program had an "inherent conflict between the large
number of very small governmental units technically eligible
under the CDBG legislation to compete for funding and the
administrative problems of selecting and administering a
large number of small grants." 2 4
The Fiscal Year 1977 regulatory revisions made a number of substan-
tive changes in the program's allocation process.
24 HUD. Community Planning and Development. Community Development Block
Grant Program: Third Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, no date.
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Program Objectives
HUD made no explicit changes in the objectives of the discretionary
program for the third program year. The last formal regulatory statement
of objectives had been in 1975, when attention was drawn to Congressional
intent to assist in the development of viable urban communities and expand
economic opportunities primarily for low- and moderate-income persons.
Design and Administration of Selection Systems
Regional Offices retained formal responsibility to establish preap-
plication review systems for the Area Offices in their jurisdictions; var-
iations in those systems were allowed among, but not within, States. 25
The new regulations regarding the specifics of the review design pro-
cess were intended "to provide firm guidance to field offices on how to
establish ranking systems" for picking discretionary grant competition
winners. 26
Prior to the Fiscal Year 1977 selection regulations (described in de-
tail in the section Selection Criteria below), all field offices had estab-
lished their own ranking systems, which were forwarded to Washington for
review. Generally, the HUD central office did not revise the ranking sys-
tems or specify what HUD reviewers should look for. According to HUD cen-
tral office staff, the new regulations were an attempt to "downplay.. .the
pure numbers game of discretionary grants." 2 7
25Federal Register. Vol. 41, No. 158. August 13, 1976. p. 34303. Section
507.402(c).
2 6Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 41, No. 3. July 12, 1976. p. 112.
2 7Ibid.
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In the view of central office staff, some field offices had strictly
interpreted HUD instructions and the statutory requirements that funds be
distributed according to verifiable need, i.e., according to objective mea-
sures such as U.S. Census data on extent of poverty and substandard housing.
As a result, certain types of communities were gathering in all the money
in a given area because their numerical needs were greatest. Community
capacity and the quality of proposed activities had not been considered in
those cases.2 8
Threshholds to Compete
For Fiscal Year 1977, HUD developed well-defined threshhold factors
for entry into discretionary grant competition.
Area Office reviewers were to determine affirmatively that preappli-
cants met each of three threshhold factors in order to be considered for
rating:
o Performance--satisfactorily meeting HUD's performance standards
for previously approved CDBG aid, taking into account progress
toward completion of approved activities, as measured by
- expenditure of funds
- obligation of funds
- award of third party contracts
- committed matching funds
- compliance with program requirements
o Assisted Housing Effort--appropriate local actions to provide
assisted housing in accord with any HUD-approved Housing Assis-
tance Plan29 applying to an applicant's jurisdiction
2 8Ibid.
2 9The Ho 3ing and Community Development Act of 1974 required CDBG grantees
to dev Lop a Housing Assistance Plans describing community housing needs
and local plans to meet those needs.
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o Eligibility of Activities--apparent eligibility of the proposed
activities.30
In contrast to the previous year, reference to consideration of com-
munity capacity by HUD reviewers was deleted.
Types of Grants
Program Year Three regulations made no revisions in the single grant
type offered, annual general purpose grants for both metropolitan and non-
metropolitan communities.
Selection Criteria
Several important changes were made in the selection criteria to be
used by Regional Offices to design rating and ranking systems; changes were
made in the factors used, in their definition, and in the weights that each
factor could be given.
HUD continued to change the list of factors to be considered in rating
systems as they had done in Program Year Two.
3 1 The factors for 1977 were:
Factor Weight
Extent of substandard housing 10-15% percentage, absolute
amount
Extent of poverty 5-10% percentage, absolute
amount
Benefit to Low- and Moderate- 25-35%
Income Persons
3 0Federal Register. op. cit. p. 34303. Section 570.402(c)(1).
3 1Federal Register. Ibid. p. 34303. Section 570.402(c)( 2), (3).
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Housing Efforts 25-35%
Imminent Threat to Health 10-20%
or Safety
Total Weight 100%
A maximum of 10 additional percentage points could be awarded to com-
munities that proposed activities which involved or matched other sources
of community development funds.32
Several changes were made, compared to the previous year. Each of
the factors in the above table will be considered in turn.
The manner in which extent of substandard housing was to be measured
was revised. The separate use of the extent of overcrowding as a measure
of substandard housing for metropolitan applicants and the extent of housing
units lacking plumbing for non-metropolitan applicants was discontinued.
For both types of applicants, rating systems were to measure substandard
housing as the sum of crowded units and units lacking plumbing both as an
absolute amount and as a percentage of total units.
The extent of poverty factor was refined. The new regulations stip-
ulated that absolute and percentage measures be given equal weight in the
selection systems devised by the Regional Offices.
The way in which the benefit to low- and moderate-income persons fac-
tor was to be scored was clarified. Raters were to designate preapplication
activities as exclusively, principally or incidentally providing benefits.
32Ibid. p. 34304. Section 507.402(c)(3).
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A new factor, housing efforts, was introduced. This factor was to
assess the extent to which the proposed program was designed to support
the expansion of the low- and moderate-income housing stock of the appli-
cant community.
Two selection criteria from the previous year were deleted:
(1) a condition of high growth or serious decline resulting from
national policy or federal decisions;
(2) the consistency of the proposed activities with local and area
wide plans.
The most notable change was the new requirement that the review sys-
tems developed by Regional Offices assign numerical ratings within a spec-
ified range of maximum percentage points for each factor. As indicated in
the previous table, the substandard housing factor was permitted 10-15%,
the poverty factor 5-10%, the benefit and housing efforts factors each 25-
35%, and the health or safety factor 10-20%, for a point total of 100%.
For all the specificity of the new guidelines, it is important to
note the large amount of discretion left to Area Office raters. Of the
100% points total, no more than 25% was allowed for the objective community
wide poverty and housing needs measures. HUD emphasized in its comments
to the new rule that "the activities or programs proposed in the preappli-
cation (are to) receive a greater weight than the base demographic charact-
eristics of the applicant."3 3
3 2Ibid. p. 34304. Section 507.402(c)(3).
33Ibid. p. 34302.
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Other Non-Formula Provisions
In the third program year, there were numerous minor changes in
the non-formula provisions of the project selection process. Three
of those changes will be noted here: purpose of preapplications, de-
termination of grant ceilings, and determination of grant amounts.
In the first program year, two purposes had been set forth for
the discretionary grant preapplication process: (1) to determine how
well an application compared to other similar applications; and (2)
to discourage applications which had little chance of funding.
The new program regulations refocussed the purpose of preappli-
cations. The purpose of the preapplication process for Fiscal Year
1977, was to enable HUD to make funding decisions by comparing the
conditions of substandard housing and poverty of an applicant and the
activities proposed by the applicant, on the basis of the new selec-
tion criteria, with similar conditions and activities from other appli-
.0 34
cant communities.
Grant ceilings for the third program year were to be determined
by the Secretary of HUD at his discretion, on a State-by-State basis,
with a single maximum grant amount for each State.3 5 The authority
to set grant ceilings had been withdrawn from the Area Offices in the
previous year's regulations.
3 4 Ibid. p. 34303. Section 507.402(b).
35Ibid.
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The criteria to be used by the Secretary of HUD to determine
the grant amount for which an applicant was invited to submit a full
application were set forth for the first time in Program Year Three.
The Secretary could ask the applicant to submit a full application
for an amount -less than requested in the preapplication; that deter-
mination could "take into account the level and complexity of the pro-
posed activities and the capacity of the applicant to complete such
activities within a reasonable period of time and within estimated
costs."36
Two contrasts may be drawn. First, the procedure outlined
above differs sharply from the manner in which grant amounts are de-
termined for "entitlement" cities. There, the maximum possible grant
amount available to an eligible community (subject to submission of
an acceptable application) is determined by formula, based on commun-
ity wide measures of need. Second, in the first two years of the dis-
cretionary program, community capacity had been included in the pro-
ject selection criteria regulations. With the third year revisions,
capacity was to be considered in the determination of grant amounts
for communities with winning discretionary grant preapplications.
In assessing the third year project selection system, HUD offic-
ials made two additional points about the problematic nature of dis-
cretionary grant competitions.
The phaseout of "hold harmless" status as the CDBG program pro-
36Ibid. p. 34304. Section 540.402(d).
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gressed would affect both the entitlement and discretionary programs.
As the temporary entitlement awards of "hold-harmless" communities
were reduced to zero (over a six year period as provided in the Act),
the discretionary fund would grow rapidly, and have the effect of
shifting money from larger to smaller cities. Given the discretion-
ary nature of selection of grantees based on the merits of the pro-
posed activities, this shift would tend to reconvert the CDBG Program
into a categorical form of assistance. 3 7 (See Tigure 2.2)
HUD made an additional point about the selection criteria for
discretionary grant recipients:
"The necessity of developing quantifiable mea-
sures of applicant need and potential program
benefit as a basis for awarding discretionary
balances grants has posed a problem in devel-
oping a HUD small communities strategy: should
indices of need more heavily weight the char-
acteristics of target area beneficiaries or
the city or county-wide characteristics of
the local government applying for the grant?" 3 8
For the first three program years, measures of applicant city-
or county-wide need had been applied in the selection criteria. As
mentioned earlier, the decision to include "absolute amount" measures
of poverty and housing need reflected HUD's concern that percentage
measures of applicant need biased the selection process toward smaller
communities.
3 7Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 41, No. 22. February 21,
1977. p. 889.
3 8HUD. Third Annual Report. op. cit. p. 282.
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Figure 2.2
Changes in Small Cities Program Appropriations,
Number of Grants, Average Grant Amounts and
Hold Harmless Authorizations, 1975-1980 -
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However, concerning the outcomes of the selection process by
Area Office reviewers, HUD suggested that recipient-wide need measures
did not consistently affect selection decisions, whether percentage
measures or measures combining percentage and absolute amounts of
needs were used. 3 9  In its development of the project selection sys-
tem for the subsequent program year, HUD chose to weight the impact
of a community's program on a target area, and on the low- and moder-
ate-income residents of that area, much more heavily.
3 9Ibid. p. 280.
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PROGRAM YEAR FOUR (1978)
The discretionary program, newly designated the Small Cities
Program, was substantially revised for the fourth program year, in
order to incorporate the statutory changes and new administrative in-
itiatives consistent with the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1977.
The 1977 Act refined the CDBG Program significantly. New regu-
lations were put forth for application requirements, eligible activ-
ities, allocation and distribution of funds, and loan guarantees.
HUD was required to undertake a study of small city needs. Another
section of the Act made available to grantees technical assistance
from the Secretary's Discretionary Fund. 4 0 Another created discre-
tionary Urban Development Action Grants for severely distressed cities
and urban counties. 4'
Additionally, the 1977 Act authorized HUD to make multi-year
discretionary grant commitments of up to three years to small non-en-
titlement communities. These communities were required to have "com-
prehensive community development program(s) with provisions for lower
income housing."42
4 0The discretionary balances fund for non-entitlement cities and
counties is separate from the Secretary's Discretionary Fund for
diverse purposes.
4 1 HUD. Third Annual Report. op. cit. p. 20.
4 2Ibid. p. 22.
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Progran Objectives
HUD set forth new and explicit program objectives for the Small
Cities Program for Fiscal Year 1978. In its explanation of these objec-
tives, HUD cited a rationale: while the program was to provide funds for
the same community development activitites as in the entitlement CDBG pro-
gram, the program was competitive in nature and the demand for funds was
far greater than was available; therefore, further objectives must be
set forth. The communities to be selected for funding would be those
which (1) had the greatest need as evidenced by poverty and substandard
housing and (2) whose applications adequately addressed locally-determined
needs of low- and moderate-income persons. Local Small Cities projects
were required to be consistent with one or more of the following purposes:
o Support realistic and attainable strategies for expanding low
and moderate income housing opportunities;
o Promote deconcentration of lower income housing;
o Promote more rational land use;
o Provide increased economic opportunities for low- and moderate-
income persons;
5]1
o Correct deficiencies in public facilities which affect the pub-
lic health or safety, especially of low- and moderate-income
43
persons.
Of these objectives, only that relating to economic opportunities
had been mentioned in the discretionary program regulations of previous
years.
Design and Administration of Selection Systems
For the new Small Cities Program, HUD established a national proiect
selection system that identified the criteria and rating procedures to be
used by HUD Area Office staff in selecting applicants for Small Cities aid.
The new national system identified both subjective and objective factors
for selection. Decisions made by HUD in selecting grantees were to be doc-
umented and made available to the general public upon request.
In the first program year, the design of project selection systems
had been the responsibility of HUD's Area Offices. Regional Offices gained
that responsibility in the second program year. In the third year of the
discretionary grants program, HUD had revised and expanded the list of sel-
ection criteria and had specified the range of permissible points to be
considered by Regional Offices in their design of ratings systems for each
state. For Program Year Four, the central office of HUD assumed responsi-
bility for design of a uniform national selection system, and provided de-
tailed instructions to its Area Office staff in how to use the selection
Federal Register. Vol. 43, No. 41. March 1, 1978. p. 8482. Section 570.
420(a), emphasis added.
44
Ibid. Section 570.420(h).
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system to select grant winners in the separate State competitions.
The new rules also specified the type of data to be submitted by com-
munities in support of their preapplications, in order that Area Office
raters might adequately assess the proposed projects.45 Several commentors
to the proposed rules for 1978 felt that Area Offices were given too much
discretion in rejecting data submitted. The entire reference to rejection
of data was omitted in the final rules. 4 6
Threshholds to Compete
The new Small Cities Program regulations imposed new performance
threshholds for applicants who wished to compete for discretionary aid.
One new threshhold set standards for prior financial management.
Preapplications were not to be accepted from any community that had an out-
standing audit finding for any HUD program undertaken by the community or
that owed money to HUD as a result of an audit finding.
Capacity and performance threshholds were refined. No grant was to
be made to communities which did not have the capacity to undertake their
proposed programs. Those communities which had previously participated in
the Block Grant Program must have performed adequately, in accordance with
several criteria:
(1) community development activities
- rate of execution of activities
- rate of expenditure or obligation of funds
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. p. 8476.
4 Ibid. p. 8482. Section 570.420(j).
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(2) housing assistance
- actual progress in meeting Housing Assistance Plan goals
- absent such progress, actions taken to facilitate the
provision of housing assistance to low- and moderate-
income persons
(3) compliance with the laws and regulations applicable to the
CDBG program
- compliance with laws and regulations
- resolution of HUD monitoring findings
- resolution of audit findings.48
These regulations clarified and made more specific the threshholds
of the previous program year. Commentors to the proposed threshhold on
audit findings had charged that HUD was discriminating against small commun-
ities since no such provision was made in the entitlement program. HUD
disagreed, stating that the restriction, with a provision for waivers by
the Regional Administrator, was an "appropriate and useful check on past
(HUD program) participants." 49
HUD had set forth an additional set of capacity threshholds in its
proposed regulations for Fiscal Year 1978. These threshholds were designed
to condition entry into the competitions for comprehensive multi-year grants,
(described in the following section), on the basis of community size and
prior performance in the CDBG program.
Those tentative rules had provided for four requirements for a com-
munity wishing to apply for a comprehensive grant or a multi-year grant
commitment:
48 Ibid. p. 8483. Section 570.423(c).
49 Ibid. p. 8476.
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o 2,500 population (waivable)
o previous receipt of a CDBG grant
o adequate past performance
o capacity to undertake the proposed program.50
The first two of these, in particular the 2,500 figure, was strongly
opposed by smaller cities. The proposed "three stage approach"--first
eligibility for single purpose, then for comprehensive, and finally for
multi-year grants--was seen as discriminating against the smaller commun-
ities. The National Association of Smaller Communities made plans to file
suit against HUD, stating that "the regulations arbitrarily prohibit many
of the approximately 4,000 discretionary grantees under the first three
years of the community development block grant program from applying for a
multi-year commitment for three years' activities."51 HUD deleted the
"three stage approach" and the first two of the above threshholds in the
final Small Cities Program regulations for Fiscal Year 1978.
Types of Grants
The new Small Cities regulations created two types of programs avail-
able to small cities--single purpose grants and comprehensive mult-year
grants. This provision was made possible by the legislative revisions of
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977. In the first three
years of the discretionary program, communities had been eligible to obtain
annual general-purpose grants.
50 Ibid. p. 8477. Section 470.423.
51 Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 5, No. 28. December 12, 1977.
p. 662-663.
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The development of the new types of grants required adjustments to
the allocation system. First, the metropolitan SMSA funds, for which
eligible communities in each SMSA had competed, were to be aggregated into
separate state pools for state-wide competitions. This revision was made
in the allocation provisions of the 1977 Act.
Second, since metropolitan and non-metropolitan funds could now be
used for either single-purpose or comprehensive grants, new regulations
describing the division of these funds were required. In each state, 25
to 35 percent of funds in the metropolitan and in the non-metropolitan
balances were to be reserved for the Single Purpose grants, with the re-
mainder reserved for Comprehensive grants, except where the demand for Com-
52
prehensive grants was greater than 75 percent or less than 65 percent.
The proposed rules also had provided for a 30 percent - 30 percent -
40 percent split of funds among single-purpose, one-year comprehensive, and
multi-year comprehensive grants. This provision was deleted in the final
rules.53
Selection Criteria
As mentioned earlier, the new regulations imposed a new national
selection system for the separate single purpose and comprehensive, metro-
politan and non-metropolitan competitions for discretionary funds in each
54
state. The table below summarizes the factors and points prescribed for
the selection systems followed by a discussion of the factors.
52 Federal Register. op. cit. p. 8482. Section 570.420(e).
5 3 Ibid. p. 8476.
54 Ibid. pp. 8484-8485.
5Small Cities Point
nfrer ct pc.erty per
....... T ... .. ...
.r. 
.. ...
Selection System
iNced-;-tn
) Per!.
The new project selection system differed from the 1977 system in
the following ways:
o Separate point systems for the comprehensive multi-year and
single-purpose annual grant competitions.
o A new subjective factor--impact of the proposed program--with
40% nominal weight in the comprehensive grant competitions.
o A new performance factor, equal opportunity efforts.
o New incentive factors for coordination with area housing and
development plans.
o A small preference factor for "hold-harmless" communities.
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Other Non-Formula Provisions
Several other changes in the program regulations for the Small Cities
allocation system are noteworthy.
Preapplications
The requirements for preapplications were expanded considerably in
Program Year Four, both to fulfill legislative requirements and to ensure
sufficient data for Area Office reviewers to be able to rate and rank com-
munities using the new national project selection system. The number of
items required increased, from six in the previous year, to thirteen for
the Fiscal Year 1978 for Comprehensive program preapplications. Most of
the additional items were for data to use in the rating and ranking pro-
cess.
Size of Grants
The new regulations provided that HUD could establish grant ceilings
per applicant for the separate competition categories. Additionally, sep-
arate ceilings could be provided for comprehensive multi-year grants, for
joint applications among communities, and for applications in behalf of
other units of government. 55
In its preface to the 1978 regulations, HUD made clear it intended
56
that its field offices establish the ceilings. In the first program
year, Area Offices had the option to set grant ceilings. This responsi-
bility was withdrawn in the second year. In the third program year, this
responsibility had been identified with the Secretary.
5 5 Ibid. p. 8482. Section 570.420(f).
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'Ibid. p. 8476.
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The proposed rules for Fiscal Year 1978 had made provisions for
grant minimums. In response to comments on the rules, these provisions
were deleted in the final Small Cities regulations.
Again, as in Program Year Three, HUD provided guidelines to Area
Offices on determining grant amounts for Small Cities aid. In determining
an appropriate grant amount for a community, Area Offices could consider:
"an applicant's population, need, proposed activities,
ability to carry out the proposed program, previous 57funding levels, and avilability of hold harmless funds."
Funding Commitments
In a related matter, funding commitments, HUD provided regulations
for determining the number of years for which a comprehensive program com-
mitment would be made. These were essentially the same as the criteria
for determining the grant amount. However, consistent with the 1977 Act,
special consideration was to be given to hold-harmless communities.5 8
Reimbursement for Preapplication
Several commentors to the proposed regulations had requested that
reimbursements for application costs be extended to cover expenses for
preapplications as well as for full applications.
HUD had considered this option for several years, but again declined
to adopt it:
"Potential reimbursement would encourage the employment
of outside experts and could lead to a substantial in-
57 Ibid. p. 8482. Section 570.420(f)(2).
58 Ibid. p. 8483. Section 570.423(b).
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crease in the costs of comparing competitive pre-
applications. Such a result woul be unfair to
those communities not selected."
State Participation
HUD reserved a section of the regulations for 1978 for future rules
on state participation in the Small Cities selection process. A provision
of Section 104(e) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977
permitted the Secretary of HUD to provide States the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the discretionary grant selection process.
HUD had solicited comments on "workable State roles and on criteria
to be used in establishing levels of State participation" when it pub-
lished proposed rules for the Small Cities Program. Final rules were to
be established pending development of an urban regional strategy by the
60
Department. .
In the proposed rule, HUD outlined the goals of State involvement:
to assist small cities in meeting housing and community development needs
in the context of State and regional planning strategies and to coordinate
State programs with Federal programs. The degree of State participation
could range from actually assisting HUD in the selection process, to pro-
viding information and advice, to providing A-95 (Areawide planning agency)
61
comments.
5 9 Ibid. p. 8481.
6 0 Federal Register. Vol. 42, No. 223. November 18, 1977. p. 59656.
61 Ibid.
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In its final rules, HUD stated that it was still considering the com-
ments received on State Participation to the request made in the proposed
regulations.
Summary of Program Year Four
This section has analyzed the changes made in the discretionary pro-
gram for the fourth program year. New program objectives were defined em-
phasizing the selection of the best programs that most met the needs df low-
and moderate-income persons. A national selection system was designed,
with administration responsibility assigned to HUD Area Offices. Two new
grant types were created--single purpose grants and comprehensive multi-
year grants. New selection criteria were introduced for Fiscal Year 1978,
and old criteria refined. The-most important of these factors were the
subjective program impact factor and the benefit to low- and moderate-
income persons factor. Reflecting the 1977 legislative revisions, HUD
reserved a section of the rules for future provisions for state pz .tici-
pation in the Small Cities grantee selection process.
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Effects of Stage II: Centralization of System Design
HUD efforts to deal with biases in the selection process toward cer-
tain activities had some effect by Program Year Three (1977): more funds
were going to housing rehabilitation and less to public works in both metro-
politan and non-metropolitan discretionary grant competitions, compared to
1975 (see Figure 2.3)
With creation of the new multi-year grants in 1978, applications for
those Comprehensive grants had greater chances of winning Small Cities funds
than applicants for Single-Purpose grants. (See Appendix D).
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Figure 2.3
Discretionary Grant Activity Shifts
Fran 1975 to 1977
(% of dollars budgeted)
metropolitan Small Cities
1975 1977
Public Works 5
Housing
ix.
tehabilitation
Non-metropolitan Small Cities
1975 1977
Public Works 4i*/* 
.6
47I V v
Housing
Pehabilitation
SOURCE: Appendix C, Table 2.20.
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STAGE III: REFINEMENT
STAGE I 1975 HUD Area Offices apply need measures to
competitive selection of grant winners.
Small, high poverty communities with no
HUD grant experience win most of the
discretionary grant funds.
STAGE II 1976- HUD centralizes the design of the com-
1978 petitive selection systems.
Benefit and subjective program impact
measures receive progressively greater
weight than need measures.
HUD refines the selection process to re-
move "biases" and screen out low quality
projects.
Comprehensive multiyear grants are authorized to
respond to the needs of "hold-harmless"
cities.
STAGE III 1979- HUD continues to refine the PSS to remove
1980 "biases", to add new program objectives,
and to use threshholds to screen out "low
quality" projects.
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PROGRAM YEAR FIVE (1979)
The Small Cities CDBG program remAined essentially unchanged in
the fifth year of discretionary program operations, following the exten-
sive revisions of the previous year. No new program regulations were is-
sued for Fiscal Year 1979.
In its Fourth Annual Report, HUD analyzed the effect and effect-
iveness of recent Congressional and HUD changes to the CDBG program as a
whole.62 This analysis is also relevant to the Small Cities Program. In
particular, HUD cited four crucial methodological problems in monitoring
and evaluating CDBG progress:
1. The statutory objectives associated with the
CDBG program and the related statutorily-
defined permissible activities are broad
based. As a result they cannot easily be
converted into bona fide, generally agreed-
upon progress or impact measures.
Attempts to define other than very simple
progress and impact indices have generated
and continue to generate deep disagreements
among independent analysts over specific
Congressional intent. These disagreements
have often led to the substitution of varied
value judgments for strategic analysis.
2. The relatively limited size and scale of the
CDBG program in most grantee jurisdictions
makes it difficult to trace complex "cause
and effect" relationships with respect to
expenditures and Congressionally-defined
CDBG objectives.
3. HUD's desire to respond to Congressional
intent and to grant recipients flexibility
62U.S. Department of HUD. Community Development Block Grant Program:
Fourth Annual Reprrt. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, no date.
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relative to the precise use of CDBG
funds has led the Department to limit
data collection efforts and to narrow-
ly define data collection and related
program monitoring instruments.
4. The early state of the program and
frequent statutory and administrative
changes in it have heightened diffi-
culties associated with designing
and carr ng out progress and impact
studies.
In the Fourth Annual Report, HUD made no extended analysis of the
Small Cities Program, as it had in the previous year.
63 Ibid. pp. 4-5 (emphasis deleted).
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In the Single Purpose selection system, the way in which the
benefit to low- and moderate-income persons factor was scored was altered.
Benefits points were now to be awarded comparatively by the prob-
lem area chosen for the program impact factor. That is, communities
choosing the same problem area would be ranked together to award benefit
points. HUD made this change so that:
"public facility or economic development pro-
jects, for which it is almost impossible to
have 100 percent of funds benefitting low-
and moderate-income persons, will still be
able to achieve the maximum points."64
Other Non-Formula Provisions
Language was added to correct procedural errors, such as pro-
cessing or mathematical errors, in the final ranking of communities for
comprehensive and single-purpose grants. Applicants who would have been
invited for funding in the previous year's competition, but for a proced-
ural error, could now be invited to submit a full application for funding
from the current year's funds.6 5
64 Ibid. p. 37479.
65 Ibid.
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PROGRAM YEAR SIX (1980)
For Fiscal Year 1980, HUD retained all the essential features of
the Small Cities allocation process as established by the program regula-
tions for Fiscal Year 1978. Several relatively minor changes were made
in selection criteria and other non-formula provisions.
Selection Criteria
A minor revision was made in the program impact factor. This
factor assessed the relative impact of the proposed program, as subject-
ively determined by HUD Area Office raters, in comparing applicants along
several program design or problem area criteria.
In the lowest of the four standards for which impact points were
awarded, the word "insignificant" replaced the word "low". HUD clarified
that "its intent (was) to achieve as much differentiation as possible on
impact points and that it (expected) to award 0 to applicants on some of the
criteria where appropriate." 6 6
HUD added two more ways in which communities could earn points
for performance in equal opportunity.
Communities who participated in HUD's New Horizons Fair Housing
Assistance Project or who deposited local funds in minority owned banks
were eligible for equal opportunity performance points. 6 7
66 Federal Register. Vol. 44, No. 124. June 26, 1979. p. 37478.
67 Ibid.
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STAGE IV: REFINEMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION
STAGE I 1975 HUD Area Offices apply need measures to
competitive selection of grant winners.
Small, high poverty communities with no
HUD grant experience win most of the
discretionary grant funds.
STAGE II 1976- HUD centralizes the design of the com-
1978 petitive selection systems.
Benefit and subjective program impact
measures receive progressively greater
weight than need measures.
HUD refines the selection process to re-
move "biases" and screen out low quality
projects.
Comprehensive multiyear grants are authorized to
respond to the needs of "hold-harmless"
cities.
STAGE 1II 1979- HUD continues to refine the PSS to remove
1980 "biases", to add new program objectives,
and to use threshholds to screen out "low
quality" projects.
STAGE IV 1981 Refinement of the system continues. HUD
involves the States in selection process.
The Reagan administration proposes trans-
fer of the program to the States.
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PROGRAM YEAR SEVEN (1981)
For Fiscal Year 1981, the regulatory revisions in the allocation
system for the Small Cities Program are consistent with the changes estab-
lished in prior revisions. Most of the changes related to the selection
criteria. In addition, a demonstration project on State participation in
the Small Cities project selection process was initiated.
Design and Administration of Selection Systems
State participation had been an issue since the beginnings of
the discretionary CDBG program. The Ford Administration had suggested that
states administer the program; In the first program year, additional pri-
ority could be given to proposals involving joint and voluntary agreements
between states and local governments. In the 1978 program revisions cre-
ating the Small Cities Project Selection System, points could be earned by
grant applicants who participated in a State growth or resource coordina-
tion plan. And a section of the 1978 regulations was reserved for State
participation rules.
For Fiscal Year 1981, State participation has been increased in
two ways: (1) a State rating factor; and (2) a demonstration project in
which two states, Kentucky and Wisconsin, design and administer the selec-
tion systems in their state competitions.
Kentucky's system submitted to HUD in Fall, 1980 for their appro-
val is substantially the same as HUD's. 9 5
9 5Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 27. November 10, 1980.
pp. 499-500.
Wisconsin's selection system differs substantially from the nation-
al selection system. The Wisconsin criteria reduce the weight of the bene-
fit to low- and moderate-income persons factor by 75%, provide bonus points
to economic development projects, and introduce "distress criteria" to
select the most troubled cities. In addition, the Wisconsin system permits
communities to use updated locally available information and divides ap-
plicants into two groups, those with less than 5,000 population and those
over 5,000, for purposes of evaluation.96
Threshholds to Compete
The previous section described the results of the demonstration pro-
ject in state participation on the design and administration of selection
systems. This section continues the description of changes in HUD's na-
tional Project Selection System for Program Year Seven.
For Fiscal Year 1981, HUD provided for new threshholds for the
award of grants. These new requirements were laid out in the small cities
community development block grant field manual, which guides field offices
in administration of the Small Cities Program.
With a new stress on benefits to low- and moderate-income persons
in the program regulations for the seventh program year, the handbook
warns that "preapplications which propose less than 50 percent principal
96
Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 40. March 2, 1981. p. 828.
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benefit to low- and moderate-income persons may be funded only on an ex-
ceptional basis." 97
A new set of minimum standards for several criteria was also out-
lined. In addition to receiving total points based on the program criteria,
preapplications will be ranked in one of four categories depending on their
projects' demonstrated need, low- and moderate-income benefits, likely com-
munity impact, and support from the local A-95 areawide planning agency
clearing house. Preapplications falling in the lowest category won't be
98
awarded funds, regardless of their total program score.
Performance threshholds were also emphasizedin the new regulations.
According to one HUD official, the rule changes were designed to target
99
funds to the communities with the best projects and most efficient records.
For Fiscal Year 1981, a community's capacity and performance will
be "based in part on the applicant's adherence to its own schedule."10
Specifically, HUD will look at drawdown rates (the rate at which a grantee
draws funds from HUD), program implementation, program compliance and
housing production performance.
In addition, regarding the award of funds, no invitations for full
applications will be made to communities that score zero impact points.
97 Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 34. January 19, 1981. p. 689.
98Ibid.
99 Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 12. August 18, 1980 p. 209.
emphasis added.
100'Housing and Development Reporter, Reference File. RF-172. September 8,
1980. p. 09:3503.
101 Housing and Development Reporter. op. cit.
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HUD explained:
"In previous competitions, a few applicants with zero
points for program impact have been selected for
funding, not because their program impacted their
identified needs, but because of high scores for
other selection factors."10
Selection Criteria
The regulations for 1981 revised the project selection system fac-
tors in a number of major ways. The table below presents the criteria as
revised followed by a discussion of the revisions.
103
SMALL Cirs SELECTION POINT SYSTEM
Facter-
ta\ Need-- abolute number of poverty persons
(b) Need - percent of poverty person
(c) Program impact.
(d) Benefit to low and moderate income person
(e) Performance:
Housing
Local equal opportunity efforts
(f) Areawide Housing Opportunity Plan (AHOP)
(g) State's rating
(h) Energy conservation or production
(i) Other Federal programs
Com prejensve
metrd nanmetro
75' 75
75 75
400 400
200 200
100
50
50
25
20
995TOTAL Possible
100
50
25
20
945
stiftI
mete
75
75
400
200
100
50
50
25
20
25
1020
Purpose
non meiro
75
75
400
200
100
50
25
20
25
970
*Applicants cannot score zero points and still be funded.
The changes:
Reducing the weight of the needs factors and giving equal weight to the
two poverty needs factors
102 Housing and Development Reporter, Reference File. op. cit. 09:3502.
103 Housing and Development Reporter. op. cit. p. 210.
V
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HUD's rationale for the reduction in weight of the needs factors,
which in the original system equaled 200 points, was the following:
"These factors measure the needs in the entire com-
munity, not the needs to be addressed in the pro-
posed project. The weight of these factors, which
do not directly relate to a proposed project, oc-
casionally allowed poor qualj6, projects to rank
highly enough to be funded."
HUD's reduction in the weight of the two need factors retained was
intended to give greater weight to factors over which the applicant has
more control, by means of a 25% reduction in the weight of need (from 200
points down to 150 points).
In regard to the equal weighting of the two poverty need factors,
most commentors to the rule recommended such a change. HUD stated its
position:
"The Department believes that the rating system is
fair for all program participants because the rating
system has been designed to emphasize overall grant
quality. Giving equal weight to absolute and per-
cent of people in poverty will more accurat 18 mea-
sure the needs or distress of a community."
It will be recalled that in Program Years Two and Three, the regu-
lations were revised to specify that absolute and percentage need measures
be given equal consideration in order that the selection system not be
biased toward smaller communities.
However, in its Third Annual Report, HUD concluded that "recipient-
104 Housing and Development Reporter, Reference File. op. cit. p. 09:3503.
105 Ibid. p. 09: 3504, emphasis added.
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wide measures of need do not consistently affect the selection decisions
(for the first three program years) when measures are expressed as per-
centages, or as a combination of percentages and actual amounts."106
Yet, in Fiscal Year 1978 (Program Year Four), HUD justified the in-
creased weight of absolute need measures (to twice the value of percentage
measures) as a way to correct an advantage toward smaller communities in
Uscal Year 1977 arising from the equal weighting of needs factors. - Evid-
ence for this advantage was the award of funds to smaller communities far
in excess of their percentage of persons residing in cities under 50,000.
Eliminating Housing Needs Factor
The selection criteria for the Fiscal Year 1981 system delete the
objective housing need criteria completely. This factor was eliminated be-
cause "it was difficult for applicants to get adequate information on
housing quality."107
HUD gave a more detailed explanation in the preface to the final
rules:
"In addition there are indications that the mea-
sures of housing need (the incidence of over-
crowded housing and housing lacking plumbing),
are declining rapidly in some areas, but not
others. Therefore, the factors are becoming
less useful in measuring an individual small
community's relative needs, and give unfair
advantage in the selection system to commun-
ities with improving housing stock. (The
same is not true of larger cities and small
cities in Statewide aggregates because the
106
HUD. Third Annual Report. op. cit. p. 281.
107 Housing and Development Reporter. op. cit. p. 209.
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data base is larger and therefore more reliable.)
Poverty is a stronger reflection of needs and
less likely to unfairly disadvantage poorer com-
munities.
Since the needs factors will carry a reduced
weight and since the housing needs data are weak
and dated with respect to individual small cities,
-HUD is eliminating the housing needs factors'
fifty points in the selection system. The public 8
supported this action by an almost 3 to 1 margin."
Adding Comprehensive Grant program impact criteria dealing with economic
development and energy conservation
The first of these criteria was supported by commentors to the pro-
posed rules; this factor- permits programs to attract or retain businesses
that provide essential services. 109 The second criterion "recognizes the
crucial need for energy conservation considerations in every facet of com-
munity development activities" and permits the design of programs which
110
support energy conservation or production.
In addition, area offices were advised "to be more broadminded about
the different neighborhood conservation projects to be funded." One Small
Program official said Area Offices had been limiting cities to rehabilita-
tion projects, and the field handbook now suggests other options, such as
economic development. Area Offices were also advised to be "flexible and
open to innovation" in evaluating energy and economic development pro-
posals. Il
1 0 8 Housing and Development Reporter, Reference File. op. cit. p. 09:3503.
10 9 Ibid. p. 09:3504.
110 Ibid.p. 09:3505.
IllHousing and Development Reporter. Vol. 3 , No- 34 , January 19, 1981.
p. 689.
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Increasing the weight of the Single Purpose program impact factor
Due to the relative weight of the program impact factor in the orig-
inal Single Purpose selection system (less than 25% of the 875 total points),
"..projects with little significance in meeting
identified needs were occasionally funded while
projects with substantial impact were not." 1 1 2
To correct this, the weight of this factor was increased to about
40% of the total possible points.
Replacing the two criteria about State growth and resource coordination
with one factor, and upon HUD approval of a State's 701 planning strategy
statement, allowing a State to award up to 25 points for the factor
This new State's rating factor was mentioned in the previous section
on state participation in the project selection process.
Seven commentors to the rule, including four States, supported it,
22 opposed it, and two others expressed reservations. Opponents questioned
whether the State's evaluation criteria would be publicly available, whether
States have a capacity to review many preapplications, and whether State
decisions would reflect political considerations. HUD felt the final rule
113
adopted dealt with these objections.
Other Non-Formula Provisions
Another administrative program was planned for 1980, though not a
formal part of the Small Cities Program. Small city capacity to apply for
11 2 Housing and Development Reporter, Reference File. op. cit. p. 09:3508.
113
Ibid. p. 09:3507.
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and administer community development and physical improvement programs had
been an issue since the first years of the discretionary grant program. In
1977, the legislative revisions to the Housing and Community Development
Act authorized the use of the Secretary's Discretionary Funds to provide
technical assistance to CDBG grant communities.
.As part of its new rural development policy, the Carter Administra-
tion announced in June 1980 its plans to ultimately have about 300 private
consultants "assisting circuits of small communities with state and federal
development programs." This "circuit rider" program was intended to give
communities with less than 20,000 population full access to federal pro-
grams for hospitals, housing and sewer construction.114
In the 1978 Small Cities Program regulations, HUD had declined sug-
gestions that. communities who won grants be reimbursed for the costs of
preparing preapplications. This was to avoid driving up the costs of com-
peting resulting from increased use of outside consultants to prepare Small
Cities project plans.
This completes the description of changes in the Project Selection
System for Fiscal Year 1981. This chapter so far has described the develop-
ment of the Small Cities CDBG Program Project Selection System.
1 14Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 8 No. 53 . June 9, 1980.
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HISTORY OF ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROJECT
SELECTION SYSTEM: THE PROBLEMS, THE RESPONSES
In discussing the major problem areas and major agency responses
I will try, where possible, to identify whose problem it was, whether HUD
central or Area Offices, or the major groupings of communities eligible
for Small Cities aid--larger or smaller cities, metropolitan or rural com-
munities, "hold-harmless" or non-"hold-harmless" grantees. First, I will
discuss the problems identified, and then, the responses of the HUD cen-
tral office.
Problems Identified
There are nine problem areas that I will describe:
o "Bias": the selection of grant winners
o "Bias": the selection of activities
o Local flexibility
o Area Office capacity
o Area Office discretionary power
o Community capacity
o Needs of "hold-harmless" communities
o Sensitivity of the selection system
o Data
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"Bias": The Selection of Grant Winners
Both the agency and eligible communities identified inconsistencies
between the outcomes of the selection process and their expectations of
what its outcomes should be.
In Program Years Two to Four, HUD officials felt that the Small
Cities selection system had favored small, high poverty applicants. By
the seventh year, HUD perceived a bias toward other types of communities.
Smaller communities felt that some features of the 1978 Project
Selection System, such as performance and capacity threshholds, worked
against all smaller communities.
"Bias": The Selection of Activities
Some communities believed that the national project selection sys-
tem favored certain types of local development activities. In 1978, com-
munities charged that the selection criteria revealed HUD's preference for
particular community development activities.
In later years, both HUD and eligible communities saw a bias in
the earlier system in favor of housing activities and against economic
development projects.
Local Flexibility
Communities'felt that HUD's selection process constrained local
choice in setting priorities for community development activities. They
felt that high priority local projects could not be pursued, because of
the strictures of the selection system.
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Area Office Capacity
HUD officials felt that the selection process, in the first three
program years, created high overhead and a work overload for the Area
Offices who administered the system.
Area Office Discretionary Power
Both HUD officials and participating communities were concerned
about the use and misuse of administrative discretion by Area Offices.
HUD officials felt that initial overly strict interpretations of
the regulations by the Area Offices had biased the selection system toward
smaller, higher poverty communities.
When the national selection system was proposed for 1978, some com-
munities thought that Area Offices would be given too much discretion in
considering program impact, in rejecting local data, and in assessing other
subjective selection factors.
Community Capacity
Eligible communities wanted HUD to provide more and better techni-
cal assistance to improve community capacity to compete for and administer
Small Cities projects.
HUD felt that deficiencies in community capacity required capacity
threshholds and performance measures to ensure that those who won grants
could carry out their programs.
Needs of "Hold-Harmless" Communities
Both HUD officials and representatives of small hold-harmless cities
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felt that the discretionary program of the first three years had failed
to serve the community development needs of hold-harmless communities.
HUD justified the reshaping of the program in 1978 as a way to
meet the needs of "hold-harmless" grantees--comprehensive programs, multi-
year funding, larger grant amounts.
Hold-harmless communities believed that the program did not serve
their needs, and that the uncertainty of the competitive selection system
disrupted local development efforts.
Sensitivity of the Selection System
HUD felt that the selection system failed to measure need well and
allowed poor quality, low need projects to win funds. They believed that
community need measures did not discriminate well between needy and non-
needy communities, between high quality and low quality projects. The
wrong weighting of factors and the lack of threshholds reduced the ability
of the system to select good projects and avoid bad ones.
Data
For both HUD and applicant communities, the quality and type of data
required by the selection process raised difficulties. Were census data
used for the need factors too outdated, too unreliable for small communities?
Did the poor quality of some data flaw or bias the selection process? Was
uniformly available but outdated census data better than more timely but
less comparable locally- or state-produced data? Was too much or too
little information required for the assessment of subjective rating factors
such as program impact?
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Agency Responses to Problems in the Selection System
For each generic type of agency response, I will briefly describe
the nature of the response and the problem areas it addresses.
Five generic types of response by the HUD central office will be
discussed:
o Redefine objectives
o Redistribute administrative discretion
o Reformulate the formal allocation process
o Provide other resources
o Create new programs.
Redefine Objectives
HUD has redefined the formal objectives of the discretionary grant
programs several times.
Specific objectives were stipulated in 1978, the fourth program
year. Prior to that, HUD had restated the broad Congressional goals in
the first year. In Program Year Four, HUD specified the objectives of
benefit to the poor, housing opportunities, rational land use, and better
public facilities. In later years, grantee program quality was stated as
a specific program objective.
Primary goals were defined for the program in regulatory statements.
Benefit to the poor, housing activities, program quality and economic de-
velopment have been cited at various times as primary goals in the regula-
tions and in st ements by program officials.
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This generic response has been a reaction to "bias" in the selection
of activities.
Redistribute Administrative Discretion
HUD has altered the distribution of administrative discretion and
program authority for the Small Cities program--who is responsible for
specific aspects of administration, who reviews the decisions of each or-
ganizational level.
The central office has shifted the responsibility for design and
administration of the competitive selection systems. In Program Year One,
Area Offices designed the rating system; in the next two years, Regional
Offices were assigned that task, and were given increasingly specific in-
structions; the national office designed the systems in the fourth year;
for Fiscal Year 1981, in a demonstration project, States design and admin-
ister their own selection systems. Most recently, HUD under the new Reagan
administration has proposed shifting primary program responsibility t-o the
States by Fiscal Year 1983. Over several years, Area Office discretion to
make grant awards and funding commitments, to waive certain requirements,
has been decreased, then increased, with some responsibilities going to the
Regional Offices, others to the central office in Washington.1
This redistribution has been a response to the problems of "bias"
in the selection of grant winners of activities, Area Office discretionary
power, and sensitivity of the system.
1Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 16, No. 12. August 21, 1978. p. 323.
2Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 42. March 16, 1981. pp. 868-
869. and Vol. 8, No. 48. April 27, 1981. pp. 992-993.
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Reformulate the Formal Allocation Process
HUD has reformulated the selection scheme in order to improve its
performance in selecting grant winners.
The agency has changed the conditions for entry into the program by
refining eligibility guidelines and by allowing new types of applications,
such as "in-behalf-of" and joint applications, and by requiring preapplica-
tions and additional application elements. Also, the development of entry
threshholds (e.g., greater than zero program impact factor scores) has
changed the conditions for entry.
HUD has altered the selection criteria of the rating and ranking
systems. New factors have been added, old ones deleted; the relative
weights of some factors increased, others diminished. HUD has revised the
procedures for assessing some factors. For example, the method of mea-
suring benefits to the poor has been revised, and the procedures and cri-
teria by which applicants are compared have been altered as well. The
types and sources of data have been changed as the scoring criteria were
altered.
Reformulation of the formal allocation process has addressed the
problem areas of bias in selection of grant winners and activities, local
flexibility, Area Office discretionary power, community capacity, sensi-
tivity of the system, and difficulties with data.
Provide Other Resources
HUD has developed and delivered other resources to eligible commun-
ities, in particular, technical assistance to aid communities in preparing
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proposals and operating their programs. Also HUD has developed data for
use by applicant communities.
This agency response has addressed the problem areas of Area Office
capacity and community capacity.
Create New Programs
HUD, with legislative assent, has created new programs, within the
discretionary program and outside of it as well. The Comprehensive Grant
element of the fourth program year is a new program created side-by-side
with the existing program, which was retained as the Single Purpose Grant
element. That the Comprehensive Program is a new program is clear, with
its different funding period, eligible activities, application requirements,
and separate selection system.
HUD has also created a new program outside the CDBG process. The
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) Program provides community develop-
ment aid to large and small cities in exceptional distress.
The creation of new programs has addressed the problem areas of
local flexibility, needs of "hold-harmless" communities, and bias in the
selection of activities.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE
SMALL CITIES PROGRAM
FORMAL ALLOCATION PROCESS
The adjustments, evaluations and outcomes of one formula alloca-
tion system, the Small Cities CDBG Program Project Selection System,,have
been reviewed in Chapters One and Two. This chapter will consider the
question of what is a good formula allocation system, in the context of a
decentralized grant program.
The first section of this chapter will discuss the general charact-
eristics of allocation processes that use need-based formulas, and compare
the Small Cities PSS to those general features. Then, I will delineate the
circumstances needed for a formula to work well in allocating aid, first
for a program with a single objective,then for a program with multiple ob-
jectives. The fourth section will treat the organization's problem, i.e.,
the implementation problems that a formula allocation process poses for
the agency that administers it. In the final section, I consider the role
of competition in a need-based allocation system.
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Characteristics of Grant Allocation Formulas
Allocation formulas--in general, elementary linear weighted mathe-
matical equations--are used to distribute billions of dollars of federal
funds to state and local governments, as legislatively specified. Using
these formulas, the executive departments, such as the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, compute entitlement grant amounts, based on
quantitative measures of need, such as percentage of target population,
number of eligible families and age of housing, and of performance, such as
tax effort.
While the Small Cities Project Selection System (PSS) shares the
linear additive form and community need factors of the CDBG "entitlement"
grant allocation formula (Appendix A), it differs in key ways. Its primary
purpose is to rank grant applicants to determine winners in a competitive
process. Its factors include subjective merit criteria with greater weight
than the objective need measures. Its purpose of ranking applicants requires
a separate discretionary determination by HUD of suitable grant amounts.
Its use is restricted to allocation of state pools of funds that are deter-
mined by an allocation formula almost identidal to the CDBG entitlement
formula.
Therefore, my analysis of what is a good formula allocation system
will first consider linear weighted allocation formulas in general, and
then extend the framework to include the use of organizational discretion
and the role of competition in the allocation system.
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Table 3.1
Characteristics of CDBG Entitlement and
Discretionary Formula Allocation Systems
Entitlement
Determine grant
amounts for
entitlement
PSS
Rank grant
applicants for
competition
Form
Factors
Burden of Proof
Dual Formulas
Grant Maxima
Threshholds
Eligibility Cutoffs
Applicant Classes
Grant Amount
Additive
Need(3)
HUD
Yes
No
No
No
1
Formula
Determination
Additive
Need (2)
Merit(7)
Grantee
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
4
Discretionary
Determination
Purpose
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A Good Formula Allocation:
A Single Program Objective
A good formula allocation system will predictably and understandably
determine grant amounts or rank applicants in accordance with some gener-
ally accepted notion of deservedness (need and merit). To work well, com-
munity need, the measurement of need, and the responses of participants in
the system must combine in a way that reflects the elementary nature of
the allocation formulas. To the extent that the program setting diverges
from the assumptions of the mathematical equation chosen to make the allo-
cation decisions, the working of the system will be less predictable, less
understandable, and, as a result, less satisfactory to policymakers, agency
administrators and program users.
It will be useful to consider an elementary case: the use of a
linear weighted sum formula to allocate a single resource (dollars) to
help meet a single need (housing).
Three categories describe the program setting: who has the dollars--
the funding agency; who gets the dollars--eligible states, towns, and
cities; who benefits from the dollars--program beneficiaries.
Need
The illustrative allocation process will divide up resources
to reduce the single need, housing. A first requirement for the formula
to work well is that the funding agency, grantees, and beneficiaries share
a common understanding of the nature of need. If program participants do
not agree on what need is, that is, have different opinions of what aspect
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of need should be addressed, then the formula allocation will always be
seen as unsatisfactory by at least some, if not the majority of program
participants.
Such a shared understanding is difficult to achieve. The formula
will operate as a proxy for consensual decision making on the detailed as-
pects of need. Those aspects of need include:
o who is needy (persons, regions, governmental units)
o how need is created (market forces, national policy, personal
efforts, natural disaster)
o how to tell the needy from the non-needy
o who knows best about the ways to meet need
o how need changes over time
For example, consider a single need, housing. Is the problem bad
housing or too little housing? Are some "truly needy" while others are
not? Is it important to deal with absolute need (a thousand families
living in substandard housing) or relative need (giving priority to the
very neediest first or to areas with high concentrations of need). Is
housing need a function of income, poorly built units, or regional differ-
ences in climate? When has "enough" need been met?
Lacking some unambiguous agreement as to the nature of the need to
be met through the allocation process, any allocation formula will suffer
an inherent lack of specificity and focus--policymakers will never find the
right formula. Those whose diagnosis of the nature of the housing problem
and need veers away from the diagnosis assumed in the design of the allo-
cation formula will always perceive as faulty the allocation based on that
diagnosis.
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For example, small towns in the West and South may feel that their
"housing problem" is due to insufficient construction. They may always
consider erroneous an allocation formula that uses age of housing as a
measure of need.
Or, some program participants may feel that housing need is more
than a simple summation of individual needs. Perhaps housing need becomes
greater when other types of need are present (for example, the effects of
overcrowding may be more or less severe depending upon housing density,
family composition, or age of residents). Then, an additive formula will
not be seen as the right form for those who hold this view of need.
And, perceptions of need change over time. As income, personal
tastes and the relative levels of need change, so too will the perception
of what housing need is. Again, a formula based upon prior agreements as
to the nature of housing need will be seen as providing an incorrect allo-
cation, because the new housing need will not be distributed among eli-gible
communities in the same way as the old housing need.
Thus, need, when considered for a single objective program is dynamic,
complex and value dependent. Any single need can be thought of in several
ways, and, to the degree that eligible communities are dissimilar in the
aspects of need they experience, agreement among program participants will
be difficult to obtain, unstable, and based upon compromises of differences
in values (priorities) among the participants in the formula allocation
system.
Measurement
Agreement may be achieved regarding the nature of need; still, an-
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other requirement is necessary for a formula allocation to work well:
acceptable proxy measures of need must be available.
An allocation formula requires some numerical assessment of the ex-
tent of need. The housing needs of eligible communities has to be measured
--age of housing, number of substandard units, number of residential
building code violations--using data that meets minimum standards of accur-
acy and comparability among eligible communities.
That measurement of need will always be indirect and imperfect.
Need may be too dispersed or too large to measure precisely at a cost and
within a period of time that we can afford: some acceptable proxy indica-
tor or relative measure of need is necessary. If some measure of absolute
need is not attainable, then measures of relative need among communities
can be used in its place.
How good a need measure will be depends on how clear the definition
of need is, how costly the measure, how accurately need can be assessed,
how often the necessary data is collected. For the measure of need as
well as for the definition of need, program participants will have to
agree on how much imperfection is tolerable.
The different participants are likely to weight differently the
errors introduced into the allocation process by a particular proxy mea-
sure of need. A five percent possible error from the point of view of the
funding agency may represent much greater error from the program benefici-
aries' point of view (for the marginal beneficiary, it may represent the
different between getting and not getting aid) or from the grantee's point
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of view in the Small Cities Program (the error may switch the rankings of
applications).
Therefore, the proxy measures of need must be accurate enough so
that their errors fall within a range acceptable for each of the different
program participants. In judging whether this is the case,-several types
of error need to be considered.
An error of specificity occurs if the proxy measure includes. those
who fall outside the accepted understanding of need. If housing need is
felt to be a condition of those who live in substandard housing because
they cannot and will not be able to afford decent housing, then a measure
which includes the poorly housed middle class student will have an error
of specificity. The measure will be seen as well functioning if its error
falls within an acceptable range.
An error of sensitivity occurs if the proxy measure misses some of
those who fall within the accepted understanding of need. If housing need
is a condition of people, rather than structures, then a proxy measure
which assesses housing need by counting substandard structures may miss
those without permanent address, migrant workers, etc. Again, if the de-
gree, or distribution, of this type of error is acceptable, then the mea-
sure will be seen as well functioning.
An error of reliability arises from imperfections in the process
of measurement. A good example of this is the U.S. census undercounting
of certain groups, such as young Black males in central cities. Again, if
the degree of error is acceptable, or if random errors balance out, the
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measure will be judged adequate.
Any proxy measure of need chosen will suffer from these types of
error. The need measures may be unacceptable for other reasons as well.
Decennial census measures of housing need will become increasingly out-
dated. Since the degree of need among communities will change at different
rates, untimely data introduces new errors in the formula allocation pro-
cess. Sample census data may not be reliable for small places. Local
data on housing condition may be insufficiently comparable due to differ-
ent definitions of need, or the quality and timing of measurement. Again,
to the extent that program participants are willing to accept (even un-
knowingly) the error introduced by these data problems and the allocation
of funds based upon such measures, the formula will be seen as working
well.
While any allocation process is subject to error (and some disagree-
ment or confusion over the nature of need and the specific program objec-
tive), formal allocation processes that depend on need-based formulas al-
low such errors to be easily noticed. A political or administrative dis-
cretionary allocation decision may be more subject to errors, but the
criteria used to evaluate them are less stringent and explicit. Formula
allocation may well be better than alternative means of dividing aid re-
sources.
Participant Response
In addition to requirements for need and measurement, the nature of
participant response to the formula allocation process affects how well
the formula will be seen to work.
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First, at the most basic level, the problem addressed must be amen-
able to the application of money or other resources. Program participants
--the grantees--must be able to engage in activities that reduce need (in
our example, that better house families as a result of the allocation pro-
cess). This requirement links back to the nature of need (and potential
disagreements about need). However, the response of participants may be
to see flaws in the formula allocation ("the formula doesn't allot us
enough resources to deal well with our needs") rather than in the diagnosis
of the housing problem on which the program is based.
Second, the use of a linear weighted formula suggests that commun-
ities receiving aid have the same marginal productivity in meeting needs,
and face the same processes by which need arises. A dollar spent by one
community to reduce housing need will reduce the same amount of need when
spent in another community. And, a dollar spent by a community with lit-
tle need will have the same marginal impact as when spent by a community
with great need. This requirement (arising from the linear form of the
allocation equation and its restriction to need measures), when not con-
sistent with the program context, again, may result in perceptions of
error in the formula allocation--"the wrong factors were chosen", "the
need measures were too imprecise," "differences in need (or deservedness)
should have been taken into account." For either an entitlement or com-
petitive allocation process, divergences in this requirement will result
in perceptions of unfairness in the system.
Third, participant response also means that eligible communities
will utilize the program, and that the funding agency administers the pro-
gram in a way that eligible communities have access to the program (in
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accordance with an accepted standard of equity). For many different rea-
sons, that may not occur--eligible communities may choose not to partici-
pate, may fail to prepare an adequate application, or may lose eligibility
for infringement of the funding agency's regulations; the funding agency
may be unprepared to deal with all eligible communities, or may have re-
gional variations in its administrative practices that affect utilization
of the aid.
Fourth, a formula allocation presumes that the offer of aid or its
receipt will have no unintended incentive effects, either for grantees or
for program beneficiaries. Communities will not substitute the grant for
housing aid for other locally financed housing activities; families will
not make themselves "needy" (in accord with the definition of need and its
measures) in order to take advantage of the program's benefits. To the
extent these occur, the formal allocation process will be viewed as biased
or faulty. When detected, these effects will create demands for adjust-
ments in the allocation system, either through redesign of the formula, or
through revision of eligibility requirements or of administrative practice.
Fifth, the minimum aid provided to a community must be sufficient
to make a difference for the extent of need. That is, the minimum aid
must be greater than production threshholds or trigger points. Again,
exceptions to the formula allocation may be demanded to deal with any di-
vergences. For the formula to work well, either threshholds must affect
sufficiently few communities as to be considered an acceptable error, or
adjustments to deal with those errors must be made.
Related to this is a requirement that the formula allocate enough
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aid, but not too much, in the sense that a community may not be able to
handle the scale of program consistent with the amount of aid (through
wastage, "free spending", or failure to spend all the money on the program
objective). While this can be diagnosed as a community capacity problem,
its immediate interpretation may well be as a formula problem. (And, its
easier to alter the formula than to alter capacity).
Need measurement and participant response will affect how well a
linear weighted allocation formula will work. Even a single need is com-
plex, dynamic and a subject of disagreement; proxy measures are subject
to error and are costly--to the extent program participants do. not agree
on the nature of need, the errors will be weighed differently; participant
response is complicated by the varieties of local need, effort and capacity
and by unintended effects of the process of giving aid.
In the case of a simple program to provide local grants to deal
with housing need, a formula approach will have effects other than those
originally considered by its designer, effects necessitating a continual
process of adjustments in the allocation system.
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A GOOD FORMULA ALLOCATION:
MULTIPLE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
Despite the difficulties in the use of a need-based linear weighted
allocation formula in the simple case of a development program with one
objective, these formulas are, applied most often in the more complicated
case of a multiple objective program.
Instead of attempting to meet a single need, the formula allocation
system apportions funds among communities that will decide how to use the
funds to meet several local development needs.
In the case of the Small Cities Program, a local project may in-
clude economic development, service facilities, housing rehabilitation,
public works, or some combination of these and other activities. Theoret-
ically, communities have sole responsibility to determine priorities among
local needs and to design activities to meet those needs, in accordance
with limited national objectives for the program.
A typical formula designed to allocate funds for multiple purposes
(or to rank applicants for multi-purpose grants) looks no different than
a formula for a single objective program.
For such a multiple need formula, all the conditions for a single
need allocation formula to work well apply. However, the combination of
different program objectives in the formula creates new complications and
sources of error (inconsistency of outcomes with expectations).
For example, compare HUD's Fair Share low-income housing allocation for-
mula with the CDBG entitlement grant formula.
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Need
If an allocation formula for a multiple objective program is to
work well (to predictably and understandably allocate resources in accor-
dance with program goals), participants must share a common understanding
of the various aspects of need. Again, this understanding must extend
to the definition of who is needy, how the needs are created, how to tell
who is needy, who knows best how to deal with the problems, and how needs
change over time.
In my earlier example, this understanding was required for the
need "housing". For the multiple objective case, this requirement might
include the needs "housing, "economic development," and "social services."
However, in the multiple objective case, the complexity of reaching
a common understanding is enormously increased. For now, the relations
among the various needs must be well enough understood to separate out
the diverse aspects of each need.
For example, consider the three needs mentioned above:
o Are people with housing need the same as people with economic
development need and those with social services need?
o Is economic development a need of individuals or of commun-
ities?
o What economic or social links exist between the different
needs?
o How will changing one affect the others?
Program participants must also agree on the relative importance of
each need. Suppose participants could agree that economic development
need is twit as important as housing need, and then designed a formula
that gave twice as much weight to a measure of economic development need
as to a measure of housing need.
If economic development programs have no impact on housing (and
vice versa), and each local area spends twice as much on economic develop-
ment as on housing, then the 2 to 1 formula weights can, in some sense,
be regarded as priority weights. One still might ask whether each dollar
spent on economic development has as much effect as each dollar spent on
housing. When the effects are not so separable, the meaning of formula
weights is equally complicated.
Those who disagree with the theory of the problem (the relations
between the various needs) and with the nominal relative importance of
each need (the weighting of factors) will always have grounds to criti-
cize the allocation of a particular formula system. To the extent that
needs (however measured) are differently distributed among communities,
the formula will not be seen as working well, unless participants agree
on the national share of resources to go to each need, whatever the dis-
tribution of each need among eligible communities.
Even if program participants agree on the nature and importance of
each need, such an understanding, unfortunately, will contribute little
to perceptions of formula success. More likely, each community will tend
to evaluate the formula allocation on the basis of the distribution of
their priority needs. As a result, all communities will have some dissat-
isfaction with the formula allocation.
Thus, allocation formulas used for multiple objective programs are
difficult to rationalize for block grant programs that emphasize local
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discretion. The result is an additional layer of formal allocation rules
to correct the limited scope of the formula in the allocation system.
Measurement
As in the single need example, acceptable proxy measures must be
available for a linear weighted allocation formula to work well in the
case of multiple program objectives.
For example, need measures would have to be obtained for housing,
economic development, and social services need, again within a range of
errors of specificity, sensitivity and reliability tolerable to program
participants.
However, the different kinds of need will overlap to some extent
The needs may not be defined clearly enough to find measures sensitive
to just one kind of need. Since the needs are interrelated (in a way that
depends upon one's view of the problem), the measures will tend to be cor-
related, and each measure will contribute less toward differentiating
among eligible communities (with some unknown degree of error).
Participant Response
For the case of a multiple objective program, participant response
to the allocation process also affects how the formula will be seen to
work.
Again, the problems that the program addresses must be amenable
to the application of money or other resources. The range of problems
addressed is much broader, and the mix of activities will differ from one
community to another. This broader scope makes comparisons among commun-
ities more difficult.
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The desire to find out how communities compare to one another, both
in their productivity and in the nature of their needs, is not a bad idea.
However, most practical means of comparison will result in charges of un-
fairness
When some efficiency measure (such as drawdown rates), or impact
measure (such as benefit to the poor), or equity measures (such as per
capita allocation) is used to compare communities, and then added to the
factors in the allocation formula, some communities will always charge
that the allocation system results in restricted local flexibility, and
that the "incentives" of the system work against local priorities.
Ambiguity
When Congress states a program's goals in ambiguous, vague and
inconsistent ways, they serve the process of political bartering. To
agree to a program only partially understood or desired may be better
than to stalemate.
Block grant formulas then serve an additional function: shifting
political decisions to another level of government in order to avoid
stalemate, as well as dividing resources based on need, and decentralizing
decisionmaking in order to get better decisions about priorities among
needs.
Since reaching an agreement on need, measurement and participant
response is so troublesome, ambiguity plays another important role: re-
ducing tensions or disagreements over program objectives by reaching agree-
ment on vague or ambiguous grounds.
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The first cost of this use of ambiguity is increased perceptions of
error in the system because no substantive agreement exists among pro-
gram participants. The second cost of ambiguous communication is that
it increases a propensity to search for the "real" meaning of the agency's
directives and adjustments to the allocation process. For example, com-
munities will question whether the deletion of a housing needs factor
means that housing is no longer a priority, or that the data were so bad
that the factor didn't work as intended. Deletion of the factor could be
construed as refinement of the system or as unacceptable changes in prior-
ities with little credible evidence available to choose between the two
interpretations.
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THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM
In this section, I extend the framework of analysis to consider
organizational issues in a block grant formula allocation scheme.
Although numerous groups have a stake in the Small Cities Program,
I will consider four groups in this section: the HUD central office, HUD
branch offices, eligible communities, and the Congress (which fits in
primarily through eligible communities).
These four groups are likely to disagree on the nature of need, its
measurement, and appropriate participant responses. The main additional
feature added by these groups is differing non-program purposes in imple-
mentation of the formula allocation system. All will be pursuing other
organizational objectives, such as implementation of other programs, main-
taining influence and power in a certain area, or maintaining internal
stability and levels of funding.
As a consequence, predicting the evolution of a formula allocation
system (and reducing errors) will require that these other program objec-
tives be considered. In addition, the ability of participants to diagnose
and resolve problems in the allocation system will be affected by other
demands on the agency. Such demands can be deduced and predicted building
on the experience of the adjustments in the formal allocation process of
the Small Cities CDBG program.
For example, block grant schemes place new responsibilities on
grantees and take away responsibilities previously assumed by agency
branch offices. This redistribution may set off chan as within the organ-
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ization that affects the allocation process, as discretion is rearranged
inside the agency to create a new balance. Area Offices may no longer
design the selection systems, but instead are given new discretion in
awarding grants without higher level authority.
In this same vein, some agency responses to problems may work
better than others for reasons that are far removed from the primary pro-
gram goals. Weaknesses in the formula selection system can then lead to
changes that address a symptom that may or may not deal with the root prob-
lem:
o Apparently objective procedures may be substituted for sus-
pect staff judgment as a response to "bias" in the selection
of winners when a more fundamental problem is the lack of
agreement about who is neediest.
o Responsibility to design the system may be shifted from one
group to another in response to errors in the system attri-
buted to "too strict" interpretation of the legislation when
the real problem is insufficient sensitivity and specificity
of the proxy need measures used.
o New factors may be added to the formula to reflect new ob-
jectives when.the real problem has been a failure to resolve
the priorities among all the objectives.
o Performance threshholds and benefit measures may be added to
screen out "low quality" projects (and reduce agency workload)
when a more fundamental weakness exists, the inability of the
formula to link national funding priorities to how communit-
ies actually choose to spend the funds.
Understanding how participants misdiagnose problems in the system,
or choose a certain solution without knowledge of its effect on other ob-
jectives, both program and organizational, will be a major part of the in-
terpretation of the history of the Small Cities Project Selection System
in Chapter IV.
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THE ROLE OF COMPETITION
The primary use of block grant allocation formulas is to determine
appropriate grant amounts for an eligible community, as a share of the total
program appropriation based upon statistical measures of need. Such formula
allocations shift the burden on HUD to provide reasons for denying funds,
rather than on the applicant communities to prove the worthiness of their
project proposals. In a competitive process, in contrast, the need is to
choose a few winners among many applicants, where decisions on how much
money to award affects the possible number of winners, and sufficiently
fine criteria (even if completely subjective) are necessary to differentiate
among the proposed projects.
HUD relied on its past allocation approach, the design and adminis-
tration of rating and ranking system by its Area Office professional staff.
These systems would need to possess a semblance of fairness and objectivity
comparable to the CDBG entitlement program, even though the purpose of
such systems was quite different than the entitlement allocation formula.
This desire for fairness and objectivity on the part of participating com-
munities pervades the legislative history of the CDBG program, and the
later history of the discretionary grant program. Differing interpreta-
tions of what is fair or objective provide a set of values on which the
performance of the allocation scheme can be judged.
Of course, a competition should be fair: the rules of the competi-
tion should be known to all potential participants; the grounds for com-
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petition should be clear--if there is a generally accepted measure of
need, then competitors of similar need should differ in their chances of
winning only to the degree they differ in regard to some mutually agreed
upon criteria of merit or performance; competitors of similar need, merit,
and capacity should have similar chances of winning the same amount of
funds, no matter their location or competition category; and winners
should have less chance of winning in future competitions, since their
program efforts will reduce their need relative to losers.
The value of equity or fairness in a competition (and the potential
for disagreement about what a fair outcome is) provides insight into fu-
ture errors in the system. The value is based upon agreement on the
terms of the competition, in other words, on need and merit. Agency ac-
tions that treat communities differently, or that treat communities alike
who perceive themselves as different, will open the door to contention
about fairness in the system, and about "bias", quality of discretionary
judgment, and sensitivity of the selection system.
Failure of the allocation system to meet the above conditions for
fair, equitable access to discretionary aid funds (or at a more basic
level, failure to operate as promised, due to unintended effects) can
serve as the basis for perceptions of problems in the system, based on
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selection process; redefinition of eligibility to allow redistribution
of capacity (allowing some communities to take advantage of the greater
capacity to compete of other communities); refinement of measures for the
scoring process; increased administrative discretion to increase the sen-
sitivity of the competitive selection process to differences not well re-
flected in the formal, objective rating scheme; provision of extra resources
to train less able jurisdictions; decentralization to allow selection
systems to be tailored to regional differences.
This initial project selection system, with its elements of need,
competition and formula allotment, would then have pressures on it from
eligible communities, from representatives of beneficiaries, and from HUD
staff to be adjusted for greater equity by reducing discretion in the
system and by equalizing treatment of applicants.
On the other hand, some participants would want a system flexible
enough to promote equity in outcomes by responding to diverse needs in
different areas of the country; this could be most quickly achieved by
allowing Area Offices enough flexibility to adjust to those differences.
Due to limited funds, these pressures would be more urgent because losers
faced zero funding, rather than a smaller entitlement grant than they
believed they deserved. Thus, a powerful tension in the allocation sys-
tem based on equity values, the definition of eligibility, the distribu-
tion of need, and the necessity of a competitive process was already in
place in the first program year.
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comparisons among competitors, among contests, among different classes
of communities, and among Area Offices.
The administrative actions that will be called for to correct these
perceived problems can be predicted. Evaluators and eligible communities
may call for uniformity of rules and administrative practices across the
country. Rigid 'timetables and strict interpretations of rules can be
seen as ways to achieve equal treatment. Increasing elaboration of scor-
ing criteria and codification of scoring practices will seem to serve the
goal of fairer competitions, by assuring equal treatment.
However, the formula allotment to State areas and to SMSA's was
based upon aggregate measures of individual need, while the unit of com-
petition was local government. Therefore, the disagreements about the
outcomes of a competition would not be restricted to disagreements about
need measures or about merit in the abstract. Communities can identify
many factors for which there should be fair treatment or compensation in
practice to make the terms of competition fairer:
o Community size
o Number of communities competing in each contest
o Capacity to compete
o Distribution and concentration of needs.
Participants who see these differences as important may call for a
different set of administrative corrective actions: formula expansion
to equalize allotments to States and SMSA's by incorporating capacity and
community characteristics (size and number); class refinement to create
separate competitions for.disparate communities in order to equalize the
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CHAPTER IV
INTERPRETATION OF THE EVOLUTION
OF THE SMALL CITIES PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
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INTERPRETATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SMALL CITIES PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
The following chapter will interpret the evolution of the Small
Cities allocation process, diagnosing the major problems in each program
year in light of the limitations of linear weighted allocation formula,
the objectives of the program and the non-program goals of the various
participants.
I will look for tensions in values, conflicting but desired goals,
that are revealed in the history of adjustments to the system, and parti-
ally explain the outcomes of those adjustments as a product of these ten-
sions.
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INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
STAGE I 1975 A NEED-BASED SELECTION SYSTEM
Competitive selection required more of
need-based allocation formulas than did
block grants, for equity and precision.
HUD Area Offices faced different incen-
tives in designing selection systems
than did the central office.
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PROGRAM YEAR ONE (1975)
The first program year provided the starting point for further devel-
opment of the allocation system. As noted in Chapter I, the Community De-
velopment Block Grant program had broad and ambitious goals. The CDBG
program replaced prior categorical aid programs, whose allocation process
had been competitive and discretionary.
During the first year of the discretionary CDBG program, the allo-
cation system more closely resembled that of the previous categorical
grant programs than the allocation process of the entitlement block grant
program.
Grant recipients had to submit applications, and winners were chosen
competitively. HUD Area Office staff designed point systems which they
used to rate and rank project proposals from eligible communities in each
SMSA and in the non-metropolitan areas in each state. Communities could
apply for single or multiple activity grants for one year project periods.
As provided in the 1974 Act, a linear weighted allocation formula was used
to determine the pool of funds available in each state, after a share of
the total appropriation was reserved for non-metropolitan communities and
funds were set aside for "hold-harmless" communities.
Several features of the initial program differentiated it from the
prior categorical programs: 1) an eligibility definition that included
a vastly larger number of communities; 2) allotment of funds for discre-
tionary grants to state and to SMSA pools; 3) a clear mandate to base
selection (at least in part) on community need as objectively measured,
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rather than through the political process, or solely on the basis of pro-
fessional staff judgment; and 4) the concurrent implementation of the en-
titlement CDBG program, in which receipt of funds was determined by a
formula allotment and preparation of an adequate program proposal by elig-
ible communities.
I will first consider three aspects of the initial year's formal
process: the need-based formula allotment to States and SMSA's; competi-
tion among eligible communities for funds; and broad Area Office discre-
tion in alloting discretionary grant dollars.
Formula Allotment to States
The formula allotment to State areas and to SMSA's was not contro-
versial in the first program year. This feature of the allocation pro-
cess was required by the CDBG legislation adopted the year before. While
the need for CDBG aid to non-metropolitan areas had been disputed in the
legislative consideration of the 1974 Act, the choice of the particular
formula to apply to discretionary funds had not been an issue.
The formula was not seen as a problem, probably for the following
reasons: First, communities that had received aid from the categorical
programs were unaffected by the regional division of discretionary aid,
due to the buffering effect of the hold harmless provisions. Second,
the formula allotment was only one part of the allocation process; it did
not apportion funds to specific, easily identifiable projects or commun-
ities. Its effects could only be judged in combination with the competi-
tive selection process. Third, the primary constituency for aid was com-
munities with little prior experience with HUD aid programs, and no direct
experience with block grant aid.
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While there was no easily available evidence that the formula allot-
ment would be seen as good by program users and evaluators, due to its
untried nature, there was no evidence it would be disliked either. Most
likely, smaller communities, and groups representing them, had not en-
gaged the issue of the adequacy of the need-based formula. In fact, given
the indeterminacy of the second half of the allocation system, the grant
competitions, an a priori assessment of the adequacy of the formula would
have to be abstract: no one knew who the final recipients would be.
Still, the clarity of the legislative instructions on allocation of
discretionary funds to State and SMSA balances may have relieved HUD of
one potential administrative problem--justifying an agency-designed for-
mula that differed from the entitlement formula. However, the second
principle feature of the discretionary allocation system, a competitive
grantee selection process, introduced a new source of dilemmas and poten-
tial criticism.
A Competitive Process
This second feature of the program is simply explained: Congress
authorized too few dollars to distribute aid to all eligible communities
on an entitlement basis. Too few dollars were available to provide
enough funds to all communities to undertake legitimate, effective local
community development programs. Given the range of eligible activities,
from housing rehabilitation to public works, and given the costs associated
An estimated 38,000 jurisdictions were eligible for discretionary CDBG
aid.
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with federal grant administration and program coordination, an entitle-
ment formula approach was unworkable. Congress placed on HUD the respon-
sibility of finding a practicable alternative allocation process.
However, as noted in the previous chapter, the desire for equity,
the distribution of need, and the characteristics of eligible communities
combine with the necessity for a competitive process to create tensions
in the allocation system. While Congress provided too little money for
everyone, the success of a particular competitive formula approach would
depend upon communities' expectations, the nature of need, and the cap-
acity of communities to act to meet that need.
If many communities with need lacked capacity to administer a
grant program, then a selection system that ranked according to capacity
criteria would be a direct, simple way for HUD to increase administrative
success. Whether or not the winners would meet need well would in part
depend on how HUD determined grant amounts. Three alternatives seem poss-
ible: (1) HUD uses a pro rata entitlement formula to divide dollars up
among capable communities; (2) HUD gives the most capable communities what
they ask for; (3) HUD tries to consider both need and capacity in setting
grant amounts (and choosing winners).
The first alternative would ignore needs of less capable communities,
violating communities' expectations for equity. The second alternative
would concentrate funds among few, perhaps non-needy, communities. The
third alternative comes closer to the form of the selection process in
later program years.
118
But in the first stage of the program, HUD Area Offices tended to
award relatively small one-year grants to the neediest communities, as
measured by a particular allocation formula. Again, the decision about
the most appropriate grant amount was separate from the decision to award
funds. Here the degree of competition is quite small.
Criticism of this approach could come from another direction. The
nature of need for some communities might require a higher threshhold level
of aid and a longer project period than allowed. Insufficient capacity to
administer an effective program might add another incremental threshhold
of aid (to increase capacity).
Threshhold- levels of aid then will provide a different rationale for
a competitive process--"not enough funds" would mean only a few effective
programs to meet some need can be awarded with the available appropriation,
rather than all need cannot be met with the available appropriation.
On the other hand, if capacity and threshhold levels of aid were
less important than the intensity and duration of need, the first year al-
location process would be seen as a "problem" for different reasons. Sup-
pose that community development need for small communities is intermittent
in nature (for example, a periodic need to upgrade the water system or
install new waste disposal facilities).
Then, a competitive allocation system based on infrequently measured
need factors would award too much money to some communities: communities
would continue to win funds after the need was not. Since this type of
need is narrow, though intense, broad proxy measures of need would be less
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acceptable because they would not measure brief, special needs well. Al-
ternatively, those camnunities with more generalized long-tern need of a
type not measured well by the particular selection formula HUD used would
see the ccmpetitive selection process as particularly unfair. In such a
situation, the greater of HUD discretion (rather than formula detennin-
ation) to choose winners and select grant amounts would seem particularly
attractive.
This discussion presumes that there is meaning to the amount of mon-
ey that ccmnunities ask for, that is, that HUD will control costs through
monitoring or through approved rates of expenditure for different activi-
ties to ensure a reasonable relation between ccanunity need and approved
grant amounts for project activities. To the extent that cost control
and monitoring are missing, the campetitive allocation process will have
another source of unexpected (unwanted) results.
Area Office Discretion
It will be useful to consider the discretion given to HUD Area Of-
fices in the first program year. Area Offices designed the point systems for
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grant competitions, set grant limits if they chose, assessed applicant
capacity at their own discretion. The program regulations had stipulated
four factors to be incorporated into the rating schemes--percentage of
substandard housing, percentage of poverty, federal impacts on community
growth, and imminent threats to health and safety. The first two of
these factors are also found in the entitlement program allocation formu-
la.
With these limited instructions to Area Offices, the outcomes of
the allocation process depended heavily on Area Office expertise to devise
competition processes that would work well in each area, and across the
country as well, although Area Offices were unlikely to be able to iden-
tify system-wide allocation objectives.
Sound organizational and programmatic reasons can be conjectured
for extending broad discretionary power to HUD field offices in the in-
itial stages of the new program.
First, the approach moved discretion away from Washington and to-
ward the users of the program, consistent with the CDBG decentralization
goal. Area Office staff were more likely to have a better understanding
of local needs and capacities than the central office planners, and as a
result, better equipped to produce a system satisfying program users.
Second, the approach allowed variation in the allocation systems across
the country, reflecting variability of need and, perhaps, blunting re-
gional disputes that a uniform national competition might foster. Third,
given the size of the Area Offices in the HUD bureaucracy, it may have
been wise to allow field staff to continue with what they were used to
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doing, in order to reduce the confusion in learning how to operate a new
program, and dealing with the accompanying delays and errors. A marginal
change in operations can seem a better way to maintain staff morale and
efficiency than a change that drastically changes responsibilities and
the nature of work. (But note, marginal changes in operations will work
only to the extent that the program environment changs only marginally
at the same time--work load won't double etc.)
Another reason for giving discretion to Area Offices in the first
program year derives from the central office's lack of experience with
the use of point systems in block grant programs. By giving Area Offices
the responsibility to design their own selection systems, the central
office would (in effect) be encouraging a range of attempts, experimenta-
tion, and useful knowledge for future improvements.
Additionally, failures and unsatisfactory outcomes would be local,
rather than national, in scope. An attempt by HUD in the first program
years to impose nationally rigid application criteria, to set up strict
threshholds for entry into the competitions, to assess applicant capacity
finely, would have risked inconsistency with the spirit of the CDBG. leg-
islation and unacceptable delays in starting up the program. Design of
not one but many point systems might reduce such risks.
Therefore, decentralization of discretion can be justified in terms
of internal agency requirements when faced with a new program learning
task. Why then would "Area Office discretionary power" be so quickly
perceived as a problem in the allocation system?
A brief answer would be that Area Offices face a different set of
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incentives for action, interpret the implementation task differently, and
place value on meeting the requirements of different system participants
than does the central office.
Placing such discretionary power with the field offices required
some major assumptions about their capacity and their priorities. First,
Area Offices would recognize as error or misallocation the same outcomes
that the national office would. That is, Area Offices would rank program
needs and administrative priorities in the same way as the national plan-
ners. But this is unlikely, as field offices are more likely to consider
workload, clear and non-contradictory instructions, and shelter by a
higher organizational level for making locally unpopular decisions as
more important than the interpretation of legislative goals to produce
a workable program.
Second, Area Offices would comprehend the need for open and fair
competitions, given the context of objectivity and entitlement of the
larger CDBG allocation process. This comprehension, however, might re-
quire more distance from operations and more knowledge of the rationale
for the program than Area Offices would have.
Third, Area Offices would understand the subtleties in the use of
need-based formulas to determine grant winners: the need to use discre-
tion and judgment to temper formula "errors" caused by the use of proxy
factors and imperfect data; or, alternatively, the need to gain a degree
of concensus among program users on what constitutes acceptable "error."
Here again, the assumption could be faulty, for why use an explicit, ob-
jective formula if its results required fudging, and certainly, why ex-
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pect professional staff to promote political concensus. Most likely,
neither of these actions required by the nature of allocation formulas
were anticipated by any of the participants in the first program year.
Finally, Area Offices would be risk-takers and innovators, rather
than conservatively adhering to the sketchy national guidelines. Whether
this assumption is correct depends on the incentives for taking risks
that the Area Offices faced. If Area Office staff felt safe to be inno-
vative, then they might be more likely to think about the policy implica-
tions of their actions. On the other hand, if initial errors (from the
central office point of view) were punished (by taking away discretion or
by reversing Area Office actions), then the merits of decentralization
would be neutralized. The rational Area Office strategy in such an en-
vironment would be to check every action with headquarters.
To the extent those assumptions about the field offices were incor-
rect, the national officials would feel the need to act to correct errors
in the allocation system: by redirecting Area Office discretion; by re-
fining the formula scheme to automatically correct Area Office "missteps";
by giving responsibility to someone else with greater knowledge or legiti-
macy.
What might have been bad allocation outcomes in the first year? I
have already discussed the need for a fair system of competitions, and for
an equitable system; other types of agency failure, less related to the
formula and point systems, were also possible: 1) excessive delay in
selecting winners and obligating funds, 2) overrepresentation of some
types of communities (such as large towns or towns with prior grant exper-
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ience or towns who hired consultants to write their proposal); 3) funding
of obviously ineligible communities or projects; 4) inappropriate grant
sizes for the needs of an area, resulting in many small, ineffective pro-
grams, or in a few big winners. Of these outcomes; only the second could
be the result of point system properties, while all four could be the re-
sult of misjudgment, inattention, or special priorities of an Area Office.
All four could be influenced from the central office by more detailed in-
structions and controls, by the specification of performance standards,
but only at the expense of the legitimate exercise of the specialized
knowledge of the Area Offices.
Community Response to the System
HUD needed to put in place an acceptable allocation system--accept-
able to Congress, to the Executive Office, to communities and their repre-
sentatives, to advocates of the poor, to their own staff. The formal al-
location system would receive pressure for change to the extent one of
these groups was dissatisfied and was able to influence agency actions.
Explicit in the block grant concept was the preservation of local
choice among the progam's diverse goals and activities. To preserve a
degree of local choice while discovering which of the goals were import-
ant to which groups was one of the major tasks HUD faced in the first
years. By a combination of incentives, information, and exclusion, the
system could be made workable. However, in the first year of a voluntary
program, it would be difficult to know how communities would respond, and
which features of the system would act as incentives.
From the communities' point of view, there were many uncertainties
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as well. The legislation allowed a wide range of activities, but was
vague on which goals were most important. Only with a system in place
would communities learn the hierarchy of subobjectives.
For local planning purposes, communities would want to know what
they could or could't do. An Area Office interpretation, even if national
guidelines were later clarified or reversed, should, from the communities'
point of view, be adhered to in order to avoid reversal of previous plan-
ning, with accompanying economic and political consequences.
In the first program years, communities would want to test the
limits of the administrative interpretation of the program as well. The
nascent administrative procedures might allow many false signals and er-
rors. From the communities' point of view, the administration of the
program should: 1) provide consistency of interpretation of policy; 2)
allow enough flexibility to include their highest priority projects; 3)
provide for some bargaining room to package high priority community activ-
ities with high priority HUD activities; 4) ensure fair treatment--that
is, a system not biased against their own views of legislative intent
and proper intergovernmental relations; and 5) permit the integration of
local community development activities by means of substitution of re-
sources.
From that point of view, a decentralized system responsive to com-
munity priorities would be preferred. But, even this breaks down if com-
munities differ in their needs and priorities to the extent that either
a decentralized, subjective or a centralized objective allocation process
splits eligible communities into separate groups who make differing de-
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mands on the allocation process in regard to flexibility, importance of
national objectives, basis of assessment of fair treatment, and views
about who knows best.
Thus there is a tension between community requirements for flexi-
bility and administrative need for control that cannot be resolved by
moving discretion among organizational levels, or by refinement of the
formal allocation process but can only be managed as community responses
to allocation outcomes reveal themselves.
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INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
STAGE I 1975 A NEED-BASED SELECTION SYSTEM
Competitive selection required more of
need-based allocation formulas than do
block grants, for equity and precision.
HUD Area Offices faced different incen-
tives in designing selection systems
than did the central office.
STAGE II 1976- CENTRALIZATION OF SYSTEM DESIGN AND
1978 LEGITIMIZATION OF DISCRETION-
A competition based solely on need was
not a competition at all; HUD moved
away from need-based selection.
HUD centrally designed the selection
systems to avoid unexpected results in
the competitions.
HUD legitimized Area Office discretion-
ary power by increasingly narrow defin-
ition of the selection systems.
HUD created a new program when formula
refinement could not resolve rigidities
in the allocation process.
Tensions among program goals resulted
in shifts in priorities by HUD.
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PROGRAM YEAR TWO (1976)
In the second year, discretion in the design of selection systems
was redistributed and the selection system was refined in response to
several problems.
The major problem cited by HUD was the Area Office rating systems'
tendency to favor smaller communities with higher percentages of poverty,
as against larger communities with greater numbers of poor persons: a
perceived bias in the selection process.
This outcome suggests that Area Offices, either through strict ad-
herence to the first year point system design criteria, or through the
discretionary exercise of their own priorities, had tended to produce an
allocation of funds consistent with a formula approach that used percent-
age measures of poverty need. The evidence on the outcomes of the sys-
tem in the first year indicates that winners were very small communities
with no previous experience with HUD aid.
Also, the outcomes suggest that the "red tape", elaborate applica-
tion processes, and grantsmanship of previous HUD aid programs had not
been barriers to these communities.
Two potential sources of difficulty may explain this perception of
a "problem" by HUD: first, an inconsistency of the allocation outcomes
with program objectives as viewed at the national level; and second, the
future demands on field offices by many small grants to communities with
no previous grant experience.
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Need Factors as A Source of Bias
In the first program year, no record of community performance or
capacity was available for the untried grantees. So the test for con-
sistency of allocation outcomes with program objectives would be to apply
some need criteria. Since HUD saw the outcome as a problem, the selection
criteria set forth for the first program year must not have reflected the
relative priorities of poverty concentration versus poverty magnitude.
Put another way, larger cities had more power to influence the system and
seemed worse off as well. That would be the problem as long as there
was no concensus on where the allocation system should be.
To justify a change in the system, a criterion such as grant dollars
per poor person or per capita could be applied to the outcomes of the
system. However, the legislation provides no specific guidance on the
appropriate measure of community development need, other than the specifi-
cation of the entitlement allocation formula.
To deal with the problem directly, HUD could have refined the for-
mal allocation process, by creating separate competitions for cities of
different sizes, or by introducing new selection criteria, or by leaving
resolution of the issue to Area Office discretion. These solutions would
require that the formal allocation mechanism, that is, the point systems,
be sensitive to such explicit adjustments.
Lack of Community Capacity as a Source of HUD Capacity Overload
A second potential interpretation of the problem, more accurately,
of the need to shift dollars to larger communities with greater absolute
need could have been the excessive demands on capacity placed upon HUD
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field offices by the resulting need to monitor many grants to small com-
munities with little expertise in program administration. Field office
capacity to administer many small grants, and community capacity to pro-
duce "quality programs" were an issue, as noted in HUD Annual Reports in
the third and fourth program years. In the second program year, however,
only the issues of size "bias" and community capacity were publicly raised
by HUD officials.
But, if Area Office capacity was also part of the problem, the re-
sponse of refining the formal allocation process would be indirect, how-
ever justifiable to eligible communities in terms of equity and a better
interpretation of the program's priorities. More direct, but less accep-
table to agency clientele, would have been responses such as establishing
minimum grant sizes and imposing capacity threshholds effectively screen-
ing out smaller communities. Even more direct responses, such as increas-
ing Area Office staff, or providing training and administrative help to
small grantees, would have required external moves by HUD to increase
agency resources rather than internal discretionary actions.
HUD's Responses: Refinement of the Formal Allocation Process
To reduce the size and poverty concentration biases of the first
year's allocation process, HUD required Area Office rating systems to
consider an applicant's absolute, as well as percentage, indicators of
poverty and substandard housing. By continuing to include percentage
amounts of need, HUD signaled that concentration of poverty was still a
concern, though not the overriding one that the first year program regu-
lations seemed to indicate.
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It is important to note the double function of the rulemaking pro-
cess as shown here. The official regulations inform eligible communities
about the formal rules of the allocation system, as well as establishing
priorities for the field offices. However, the constructions placed upon
these regulations by communities and by the field offices can vary greatly
from the intent of the rulemakers.
In any case, the respecification of need criteria for the selection
systems was designed to favor certain types of communities over others;
presumably, if the inclusion of absolute measures of need had its intended
effect, smaller communities would have less chance of winning funds rela-
tive to larger communities in the second program year.
Unfortunately, a competition based solely on need criteria is not
a competition at all, but instead a formula allocation with all its atten-
dant sources of error.
First, community capacity and effort would not affect the Area
Office competitions based on need measures: not directly because the
point systems would not consider them; not indirectly because the links
between local program activities and the proxy measures of need were too
tenuous, and because measurement of even the tenuous links between need
measures and project activities occurred only decennially for the data
source, U.S. Census Bureau tabulations and sample estimates.
Second, the effects of altering the need factors and their weights
are more unpredictable in the use of a formula to select grant winners,
than in its use to allocate entitlement funds. The interaction of the
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correlations among need factors and voluntary participation by eligible
communities creates this unpredictability. Since factors are correlated,
the potential weight of absolute and percentage measures of each need will
differ from the nominal point system weights. And, the actual weights of
the need measures will vary from competition to competition depending on
the correlation among factors of those communities who actually participate
in each competition.
In an entitlement formula allocation, the actual weight of factors
in alternative formulas can be determined using needs data for all entitled
communities. But, with a competitive grant process, only with program
experience regarding who applies can a probability distribution of actual
factor weights be estimated, for a particular set of nominal weights.
Note also that errors (unanticipated effects) of a refinement of
the formal allocation system for a competitive grant process are more
costly for those who suffer the effects of the errors, than the errors in
an entitlement process: losers get nothing.
HUD's response to bias in selection of winners, though not predic-
table in its results, did deal with the questions of need and equity, but
not with respect to the nature of a competition.
Responding to the latter issue, HUD expanded the list of criteria
that rating systems had to consider: 1) the degree of benefit to low-
and moderate-income persons of a proposed program; and 2) the consistency
of that program with local and area community development plans. However,
the response may not have intentionally dealt with the need for competitive
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selection criteria; the two factors can be argued on their own merits as
consistent with national program objectives.
Even so, these factors, unlike the initial four, can be influenced
by applicant communities, and are drawn from the multiple objectives of
the legislation. However, by expanding the list of factors, the weight
of community wide need measures, whether absolute or percentage, could
be reduced significantly.
The addition of these factors was a major change because the new
criteria were essentially judgmental. Area Offices were given no regula-
tory guidance for determining "benefit" or "consistency". Furthermore,
the introduction of the benefit measure, while consistent with the "pri-
mary benefit to low- and moderate-income persons" objective of the CDBG
legislation, moved the selection system away from a formula allocation
based on proxy measures of community wide need, and toward a system that
estimated the effects of particular programs on defined target areas with-
in a community. This further specification of factors defined new areas
in which Area Office subjective judgment was to be exercised, while con-
straining to those areas Area Office discretion in the selection process.
So, we see that HUD responded to additional concerns by expanding
the list of rating factors. In so doing, HUD reduced the weight of com-
munity-wide need measures, introduced grounds for competition, and in-
itiated a strategy of constraining Area Office strategy by clearly spec-
ifying the areas in which discretion could be exercised.
134
HUD's Responses: Redistribution of Discretion
HUD responded in another way to the first year's experience with
the discretionary grant allocation process: shifting the responsibility
for design of the project rating systems to its seven Regional Offices.
This response may have occurred for any of several reasons. First,
the central office may have felt that the Regional Offices were more com-
petent than Area Offices to design acceptable rating systems. Second,
the central office may have felt it could more easily predict and control
the direction of Regional Office activities. Third, this centralization
may have been seen as a way to relieve the Area Office workload by mov-
ing an essentially policy oriented task to a higher level. Fourth, by
having fewer entities designing rating systems, the move could be viewed
as way to reduce excess variations in the selection systems in various
parts of the country. Alternatively, as a fifth reason, Regional Offices
might be less susceptible to local political influences or to excessive
identification with local priorities in conflict with national program
objectives. And a sixth, contrary justification could be that Regional
Offices would be more politically reliable to the Executive Office in an
election year.
Most notable about these possible justifications is that they stem,
not from the requirements of a formula allocation process or the competi-
tive nature of the program, or decentralizing logic of the block grant
approach,- but instead from a process of internal agency adjustments for
the purposes of control and predictability of branch office operations.
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From the point of view of the Area Offices, the move may have been
seen as an inappropriate diminution of responsibility (a signal of cen-
tral office displeasure), or alternatively, if Area Offices had been
criticized by their area communities for the rating approach, as a relief
of unwanted authority--moving the responsibility, as well as the criti-
cism to another organizational level. These speculations must remain un-
tested as there was no available evidence on the reasons for or reactions
to the shift of rating system design responsibility.
In any case, from the point of view of those communities who had
been critical of the outcomes of the first year's competitions (the vari-
ous types of losers), the shift to the Regional Office would have served
to confirm, through an organizational signal, the changes in the criteria
for the ranking systems (to confirm.that the criteria changes were not
feints, but seriously intended).
HUD's Responses: Tightened Procedures
HUD also required several changes in the procedures to be used in
designing and administering the second year's project selection systems:
Regional Offices were to design the systems prior to the submission of
applications, and communities were to be informed of the weights and fac-
tors used; preapplications were to be required of all applicants and no
late full applications were to be accepted.
These procedural responses can be linked back to the earlier analy-
sis of what constitutes a "fair" competition. The first procedural change
deals with the issue of fairness directly: how can a competition be fair
if participants don't find out the basis for the competition? The second
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change related to fairness, and also to Area Office capacity. In 1975,
late full preapplications were accepted from communities who had not sub-
mitted preapplications, due to delays in program startup. The acceptance
of late applications required a second round of scoring, after the scor-
ing of preapplicants, disappointing some who thought they had won, and
burdening Area Office staff with duplicate work.
These procedural changes do not relate directly to the program ob-
jectives, arising less from the multiplicity of objectives, imperfect
measurement, legislative ambiguity, or the nature of community need, than
from administrative requirements brought on by program users' desire for
a fair and open selection process. These tightened procedures would be
a problem to no one as long as the rating criteria and the weighting scheme
actually worked as intended.
To summarize the changes in the first and second program years,
three tendencies are discernable in HUD's modifications:
o A shift away from a need-based formula;
o Accretion of subsidiary program and organizational goals via
addition of new point factors;
o Increasingly narrow definition of how rating factors are to
be implemented.
All three tendencies reflect a changing interpretation of program
goals by the central office and an attempt to increase central control of
the discretionary program allocation process.
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PROGRAM YEAR THREE (1977)
In the third program year, HUD responded to problems of Area Office
discretionary power, community capacity, sensitivity of the selection
system and bias in the selection of grant winners. The modifications of
the discretionary allocation process took the following forms: 1) con-
tinuing to dilute the impact of community-wide need measures; 2) intro-
ducing threshholds to control for community capacity and quality of pro-
posed activities; 3) adding new point system factors to reflect more re-
lated CDBG goals; 4) refining the earlier selection criteria and 5) for
the first time, specifying the range of weights to be applied to the
rating systems.
HUD's Responses: Refinement of the Formal Allocation Process
As additional program and operational goals became apparent, HUD
needed to move away from a system that seemed to award dollars based on
need toward an allocation system that rewarded conformance with these
subsidiary or substitute goals. The means apparently available for this
purpose included compliance regulations--"an acceptable program will pro-
vide X% benefit to low- and moderate-income persons" and point system in-
centives--"an applicant may score additional points and increase the
chance of winning a grant by...".
Of the two means, the second would seem preferable to HUD,
since the communities would willingly comply with the national (and or-
ganizational objectives), preserving local choice by making compliance
"voluntary".
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However, the first means is more sure, since compliance regulations
can take the form of threshholds to enter a competition. In a point sys-
tem approach using need factors, an applicant with marginal capacity or
performance might yet win due to the weight of those need factors. And,
the "errors" of the compliance approach bear less on the agency than
those of the point system approach. For example, a poorly performing yet
demonstrably needy grantee can get training, or consulting help, or leni-
ency in monitoring, but a misdirected project (one with ineligible activ-
ities or with primary benefit to the non-poor) is less likely to be "saved",
and the agency will face the blame for approving the project in the first
place.
There is another aspect to the move away from the need-based, ob-
jective system. The starting place was not the professional judgment of
agency personnel, but instead quantitative measure of community need.
This standard of measurement would subsequently be used to judge the
merits of a selection process involving Area Office discretion--quantified
explicit criteria would be expected by program users.
The most natural way to assure an "objective" approach would be
through an increasingly narrow set of criteria to which subjective staff
judgments would be exclusively applied. The dictates of fairness would
suggest a uniform system of criteria and procedures across the country.
Thus, the form of verifiable need-based allocation formulas would be pre-
served in an increasingly subjective selection process.
Whether HUD's field offices actually developed and used point sys-
tems in this manner in the first three program years could only be resolved
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(for the central office) by requiring documentation at each step in Area
Offices' administration of the competitive selection processes. Still,
the discretionary program had built into it a tendency toward elaboration
of the formal allocation process, much in the same way that compliance
regulations were elaborated and qualified in the CDBG entitlement program.
In refining the selection systems and expanding the list of selec-
tion criteria, HUD saw the need to give "firm guidance to field offices
on how to establish ranking systems and "to downplay... the pure numbers
game of discretionary grants." Some Area Offices had "strictly interpreted"
HUD instructions and the statutory requirements that the funds be distri-
buted on the basis of verifiable need.
So, the regulatory instructions and shifting of system design re-
sponsibility to Regional Offices in the second program year had not re-
solved the issues of: 1) bias in the system toward smaller communities;
and 2) insufficient screening of ineligible, incapable, or low "quality"
projects. Some types of communities continued to gather in all the money
in some areas because their numerical need was greatest.
The diagnosis of the source of these problems as the insufficient
or inappropriate exercise of field office discretionary power, while a
common theme in the relations between central and branch offices of a
bureaucracy, seems remarkable, even disingenuous, in the context of the
use of a formal, formula-based allocation approach.
Formal allocation schemes depend on a literal interpretation to
work as predicted; in fact, the explicit, mechanical nature of their de-
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cisions can be seen as their main strength--Congress shifted to HUD the
burden of justifying any allocation decision not based upon the entitle-
ment formula. However, if discretionary adjustments around the formal
selection system are expected, then regulations defining the selection
system must provide two types of information: 1) the features of the
formal method of selection and 2) instructions on how literally to apply
that formal method.
Thus, there is a subtle tension introduced that can have profound
operational effects. If the response of the central office to errors in
the outcomes is that "branch offices used poor judgment" rather than "we
gave instructions that had effects other than we anticipated--that is,
the wrong instructions," then the most forceful programmatic reason for
using a formula scheme, its apparent predictability, is negated. Addi-
tionally, the most appropriate Area Office response to central office dis-
pleasure with the exercise of discretionary power, namely, literal inter-
pretation of central office policy, becomes confused as well. Even more
confusing is the substitution of a numbers game based on subjective criter-
ia for a numbers game based on need measures.
To further deal with the "bias" towards certain types of communities,
HUD introduced a range of permissible weights to be used in the point sys-
tems, with verifiable need representing no more than 25 percent of the
possible nominal weight in the systems. The needs factors continued to
be split, half absolute measures, half percentage measures. The housing
need factor was given a new proxy measure, the sum of overcrowded units
and units lacking plumbing.
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The strategy of changing selection criteria and their weights had
its limits though. HUD for the first time introduced strict threshholds
requirements: 1) quantitative measures of past performance (expenditure
and obligation of funds); 2) local effort to further HUD approved housing
assistance plans; and 3) apparent eligibility of proposed activities. These
entry requirements were applied before communities' preapplications were
rated.
The second of these threshhold represents an additional goal
brought into the administration of the discretionary grant program. This
goal can be linked back to the early Congressional intent of the discre-
tionary program to promote area-wide planning, particularly for central
cities, with particular reference to the failure of metropolitan suburbs
to comply with central city housing assistance plans required by the en-
titlement program, and calling for spatial deconcentration of low-income
housing.
In addition to housing threshhold, HUD specified a new factor
"housing effort", which had greater weight than verifiable need, 25-35
percent of total nominal weight. Thus HUD injected a new objective into
the program, closely related to HUD's subsidized housing programs.
This addition of objectives reveals another tendency in the imple-
mentation of selection systems for multiple objective programs. Expansion
of the point system is used in an attempt to improve performance of grantee
communities in related agency programs under the umbrella program legis-
lation. Expanding the list of selection criteria moves the system away
from verifiable need factors, but also provides new means to subjectively
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discriminate among applicants according to some defensible criteria. (And
also allows redefinition of program objectives through a technical adjust-
ment).
The addition of new goals relating to a particular eligible activ-
ity immediately provides new incentives for applicant communities, and a
new source of problems: "bias" in the selection of activities. The
change in the system did have some effect: in the second program year,
communities with high percentages of poverty who proposed projects with
high benefit to poor people had a competitive edge; in the third program
year, communities who proposed housing rehabilitation projects with ex-
clusive benefits to the poor were favored.
The addition of new goals into the selection system created another
problem as well. With less (nominal) weight given to community-wide ;need
measures, and more to factors which communities could affect by skillful
packaging of activities, the problem of unfairness resulting from grants-
manship was increased. Communities with comparatively less need (whether
relative or absolute) were now in a much stronger position to win discre-
tionary funds.
HUD made other refinements of the formal allocation process. The
third year program regulations instituted a threshhold for apparent elig-
ibility of project activities,required Area Offices to rate proposed activ-
ities according to three categories of benefit to low and moderate-income
persons, and clarified that different activities in a preapplication be
rated s parately, unless designed to meet a single objective.
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These more specific rules of classification and rating procedures
can be interpreted in three ways: as the result of the discovery by the
central office of what field offices were actually doing, and the itera-
tive correction of practices that led to "bad" outcomes; as a means of
creating more uniformity among the Area Office competitions; and third,
as one more aspect of the deemphasis of need and the overriding concern
of the central office with problems of implementation, rather than commun-
ity-wide need.
The first change, the threshhold to assure eligibility of approved
projects is striking when compared with the first year system. Rather
than relying on Area Offices to design workable ranking systems, HUD in
the third year felt the need to make sure Area Offices understood that
approved projects at least seemed to be consistent with the most definite
criteria in the legislation, the list of eligible development activities.
This response no doubt arose from egregious error in the first two pro-
gram years' selection processes (in the entitlement program, as well as
the discretionary program).
The requirement that proposed activities be rated separately could
have had two functions: first, to require a more careful review of pre-
applications, rather than an overall assessment of project quality--sub-
jective judgment was to be applied finely, rather than grossly; second,
and more critically, to preserve the local choice objective of the program
by countering some of its incidental incentive effects.
If Area Office raters evaluated projects as a whole, they would be
assessing the relative merits of widely varying activities (for example,
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housing rehabilitation versus a water line project). However, that type
of assessment works against the decentralization objective of a block
grant program: the relative worth of different activities is a matter of
local choice. So, the overall ranking of different types of projects
would need to be a resultant of the mechanics of the point system selec-
tion process, an "objective" result of a primarily discretionary ranking
system.
However, this means of preserving local choice while subjectively
assessing project worth increases the unpredictability of the selection
process, for Area Office raters as well as for the central office. The
effective weights of the selection factors by which individual activities
were judged could vary widely from competition to competition, depending
on which communities chose to apply the type of activities they proposed,
and the nominal weights of a particular Area Office point system.
The unpredictability of the selection process could be greater for
another reason as well. For those field offices that had in previous
years developed selection system strictly based on HUD instructions and
the statutory requirements that allocation of funds be based on verifiable
need, the increasing complexity and subjectivity of the evolving point
systems allowed for juggling of the process to obtain results closer to
Area Office values for the "best" outcomes.
On the other hand, by restricting Regional Offices in their design
of the selection systems, and further constraining Area Office authority
to interpret the regulations, the HUD central office took on greater re-
sponsibility for the outcomes of the selection process, whether good or
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bad. In the process, it made itself more vulnerable to an "enforce a bad
law" approach by Area Offices. For field offices that believed a more
need-based system was more appropriate, or that wanted discretion to be
redistributed back to the field office level, strict interpretation of
the regulations might seem a good tactic.
Yet, HUD would need the Area Offices to identify and correct at
the local level any deficiencies in the formal allocation system, to ig-
nore a "bad law". For legitimate exceptions to threshhold requirements,
circumstances unanticipated by the program designers, and conditions be-
yond applicants' control are almost always present. For example, in the
previous program year, HUD had instructed Area Offices not to be too rigid
in their assessments of applicant performance because of legitimate rea-
sons for program delays.
Thus, centralization of point system design arising from'apparent
field office error can initiate internal organizational tensions that
get played out in the creation of and reactions to the rules for the for-
mal allocation process around the issues of community need and program
merit.
HUD's Responses: Reacting to Legislative Review
The third program year was also the time for legislative reassess-
ment of the entire CDBG program, and an opportunity for the new Democratic
administration to recast the discretionary CDBG program.
HUD was under intense criticism from interest groups and academic
analysts for its failure to monitor the targeting of benefits to poor
people in the entitlement program.
146
Also in that year, large and small cities were beginning to become
aware of the impact of the formula reduction of "hold-harmless" entitle-
ment grants, and the formula shifting of dollars to the Southwest and
Western States. One reaction was lobbying by "hold-harmless" communities
to maintain the status quo. As these cities faced reduced funding, they
would increase the pressure and competition for discretionary aid dollars.
In analyzing the first three program years, HUD noted the effect
of the phaseout of "hold-harmless" status, and two other characteristics
of the discretionary program: 1) communities under 5,000 population had
been underrepresented in receipt of grants in terms of their proportion
of eligible communities; and 2) the program posed an inherent conflict
between the number of eligible communities and the agency's ability to
select and administer a large number of grants.
These two issues were in conflict as well; the number of grants
had grown slightly each year. The revisions to the formal allocation
process in the first three program years had not resolved this dilemma,
but HUD, in its plans for the fourth program year, suggested changes in
the program that would make it more responsive to the needs of small
hold-harmless communities.
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PROGRAM YEAR FOUR (1978)
In the fourth program year, HUD took the next step in the central-
ization of the discretionary program selection process.
The program was renamed the Small Cities Program, and a division
of the central office in Washington created to oversee it.
There were five significant revisions of the program arising from
the 1977 legislative review: 1) reformulating the program objectives to
give primary benefit to low- and moderate-income persons; 2) providing
two different grant types, single purpose annual grants and comprehensive
purpose multi-year grants; 3) developing a unitary national selection
system to be used by Area Office staff for both objective and subjective
assessments of applications; 4) imposing additional performance and cap-
acity threshholds for eligibility to enter grant competitions; and 5)
using a new need formula, similar to the entitlement program's dual allo-
cation formula, to distribute aid to State pools for the Small Cities
grant competitions. These revisions will be treated in turn in this sec-
tion.
While the 1978 program underwent substantial changes for the most
part these changes continued the trends of earlier administrative responses.
These trends included reduction of the weight of community-wide objective
need indices in the selection process, expansion of program objectives
through an increase in the number of factors in the rating system, and
increased definition and standardization of Area Offices procedures for
selecting grant winners.
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HUD's Responses: Redefining Program Objectives
In the 1978 Small Cities Program regulations, HUD specified five
program objectives (see p. 50 ), with primary emphasis on the objective of
benefit to persons of low- and moderate-income, and practical implementa-
tion of this objective by means of new weights and selection criteria in
the national competitive selection system.
A first interpretation of this change is the political mandate of
the 1977 legislative revisions to the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974. In the discretionary program, as in the entitlement program,
benefit to the poor had been one among a number of procedural and substan-
tive program objectives.
By 1977, the failure of communities to target funds to low- and
moderate-income persons was increasingly seen by Congress as an adminis-
trative failure of HUD. Congress then, made its intent clear by declaring
the primacy of the benefit goal.
HUD responded initially by proposing a minimum 75 percent benefit
threshhold. However, communities opposed this as inappropriately re-
stricting local flexibility in meeting critical needs and as not taking
into account the character of those cities where the poverty population
is not concentrated.
HUD responded by deleting the threshhold, and instead, altered the
ranking scheme to give preponderant nominal weight to projects with high
benefit to poor people, as measured by the percentage of project dollars
estimated by the applicant as benefiting those persons.
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Thus, the increased emphasis of the benefit objective can be seen
as a response to legislative intent, while the form of the emphasis was
influenced by acceptability to program users.
A second interpretation is possible as well. A program such as the
CDBG program has many ,diverse, competing, and possibly conflicting goals.
The original legislation did not specify which of these goals were of pri-
mary importance, and to that extent the legislation was vague.
Apart from the particular mechanism used to administer the funds,
the tendency in such a program may well be to use administrative experience
to test out which objectives should be primary. If the program had no
national objectives other than the transfer of revenues, then a competitive
system would hardly be necessary.
However, any administrative process, such as the one HUD used in
the first three years of the program, provides valuable information to
the administering agency regarding which objectives will be most acceptable
to its various constituences. Or, to put it another way, which mix of
administrative procedures will invoke critical values for the agency.
A program as broad in its scope as the CDBG program will undergo
a process of adjustment by the gradual learning of what types of "errors"
in administration are tolerable to system participants. "Errors" here
refers to administrative actions (intentional or otherwise) whose appar-
ent results conflict with some values of program participants. Thus, an
emphasis on benefit to poor persons that takes the form of minimum benefit
entry requirements is unacceptable because program users believe it will
restrict local choice and close the door to certain types of communities.
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The same emphasis, when implemented through the subjective selection
criteria, is acceptable, although the ultimate effects of the second al-
ternative are much less predictable.
However, the particular tension in the block grant approach be-
tween national objectives and local priorities would hav.e been played out
no matter HUD's starting place.
If HUD had emphasized benefit to low- and moderate-income persons
at the start of the discretionary program, by means of threshholds, point
system incentives, and close monitoring, an adjustment (enacted through
the political process) toward those objectives which agreed with other
local priorities would probably have occurred. The strength of those
priorities is indicated by the reaction to the proposed benefit thresh-
hold.
In administrative terms, the articulation of a primary objective
for the program in the 1977 review was probably more important than the
particular objective emphasized. However, this is only true as a general
statement, because the particular objective chosen would have great im-
pact on the administrative direction taken--an emphasis on community-wide
need might have indicated a return to emphasis of need factors in the
selection system, with new errors resulting from a reduction in bases for
competition, and the necessity to deal with community capacity problems
by means other than skimming the applicant pool;--an emphasis on a partic-
ular program area, such as economic development, would probably lead to
new subjective selection factors, with concommitant reduction in the weight
of other factors, and "biases" away from other activities such as housing;
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-- an emphasis on local flexibility might lead to refinement of criteria
and searches for ways to rid the selection process of "biases" toward cer-
tain activities or communities, which in prior years might have been in-
itiated as incentives to applicants.
Additionally, legislative changes of primary objectives would re-
quire HUD to deal with the rigidities in the formal allocation process
introduced by prior efforts to adjust the system to the latest politically
salient program goals. This would occur in an environment of uncertainty
about the effects of each change in the formal selection system; for ex-
ample, the Isserman evaluation of the 1978 competitions found that pro-
posed programs with high benefit to low- and moderate-income persons were
not funded (see Appendix D).
HUD's Responses: Create New Programs
The second major change for the fourth program year was the creation
of two different grant types: single purpose annual grants and compre-
hensive purpose multi-year grants.
City groups had raised the issue of lack of assured funding for
comprehensive, long-range development plans under the original discre-
tionary grants program, during the Congressional hearings on the 1977 CDBG
legislative revision.
In particular, small cities with "hold-harmless" status wanted the
continuation of that status as their "hold-harmless" entitlement grants
were phased out, in accordance with the provisions of the 1974 Act.
The Carter Administration proposed a new comprehensive, multi-year
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grant type for the Small Cities CDBG program. Larger small cities would
presumably have a greater chance of winning these grants, given their
greater planning and administrative capacity (compared to smaller cities),
and the likelihood that they would have a greater range of identifiable
needs to address through a comprehensive program, than would those smaller
communities that the discretionary program initially served. Moss's
evaluation found that community size and prior experience increased a
community's chances of applying for and winning a grant in the Small
Cities competitions.
In the final program regulations for Fiscal Year 1978, HUD directed
Area Offices to reserve sixty five to seventy five percent of funds in
both the metropolitan and non-metropolitan pools in each State for com-
prehensive grant competitions, subject to modification based on the rela-
tive demand for the two grant types in each State.
Two circumstances made this change politically salient: 1) in-
creased pressure and competition for discretionary funds by small "hold-
harmless" cities as they lost temporary entitlement status; and 2) a re-
duction in the potential pool of available discretionary funds, because
a portion of these funds were being used to finance the shift to the dual
formula system in the entitlement program.
The initial HUD regulations to enact this revision proposed com-
bining the new program provisions with performance threshholds. Commun-
ities with no prior CDBG experience would eligible to compete for annual
single-purpose grants; having that type of experience, communities could
compete for annual comprehensive grants; and those communities with
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successful experience with those grants could compete for multi-year com-
prehensive funds.
The use of these threshholds would seem a logical direct way for
HUD to deal with the problem of inadequate community capacity (that re-
finements of the point system could not deal with), although the thresh-
holds would screen out some communities who, lacking experience, would
still be able to successfully operate a larger program, if they were given
the opportunity to compete.
However, smaller communities strongly opposed this proposal as an
arbitrary restriction on their access to a program (i.e., grant type) that
might be most appropriate for their needs. Analyses of the proposal at
the time predicted that it would produce a split between smaller and
larger non-entitlement cities over the issue of access to comprehensive
grant funds. The three-step performance threshhold was deleted in the
final rules, as was a minimum population requirement for comprehensive
grant applicants.
From the point of view of eligible communities, the main positive
features of the comprehensive grant program were greater predictability
and continuity of funding, and greater flexibility in designing larger,
more complex programs.
The timing and predictability requirements are in part conditions
by the list of eligible activities included in the objectives of the HCD
Acts of 1974 and 1977. An allocation system may be criticized if it
"biases" the selection process toward certain activities or types of com-
munities because of the weights built into its rating schemes. It also
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may be criticized as "biasing" the selection process if some eligible
activities are not feasible because they require a longer project period
than allowed, or a long-term commitment of funds for completion. For ex-
ample, a housing rehabilitation program in a smaller city can be designed
and implemented in eighteen months, while significant redevelopment of a
target area may require several years.
This issue can be traced back to the previous chapter's analysis
of the requirements for a formula allocation system to work well. Formu-
las and point systems never address the question of distress (i.e., need
as measured by formula factors) versus the capacity to act.to alleviate
stress. The latter issue is different from the community capacity problem
identified in Chapter One. The list of eligible activities may require
project planning and implementation levels that outstrip both community
capacity and the delivery cycle of the allocation system. Attempting to
alleviate this by increasing the allowable period for commitment of funds
creates another tension: longer term commitment of funds for some com-
munities reduces the pool of open funds available for future competitions
for other communities.
Apart from the overt political aspects of the creation of the new
grant type, it can also be interpreted as a necessary response to an in-
cipient change in the pool of eligible communities. The phasing-out
"hold-harmless" communities as a group differed from non-hold-harmless
small communities in types of need, planning capacity, and experience
with federal programs. Both on these grounds, and because it suited their
purpose of maintaining funding levels, "hold-harmless" communities could
argue for creation of th, comprehensive, multi-year grant program.
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Hold-harmless provisions, and other transition devices that separ-
ate a class of eligible communities from the effects of a developing com-
petitive allocation system may have the primary function of postponing
political battles until the provisions run out. The administering agency
should anticipate pressures for major adjustments to the allocation system
as that class enters the applicant pool.
HUD's Responses: Reformulation of the Formal Allocation Process
HUD developed a national rating and ranking system for the Small
Cities Program for Fiscal Year 1978.
In prior years, HUD had given increasingly detailed instructions
to its field offices on how to design rating and ranking point systems
for the discretionary grant competitions. HUD was responding to a per-
ceived bias in the selection process toward certain types of communities,
without enough sensitivity in the selection systems to quality of the
proposed projects, to community capacity to complete activities, and to
the greater absolute need of some larger communities with high quality
preapplications.
To deal with these problems, in the new national Project Selection
System for Comprehensive and Single Purpose grant competitions, HUD cre-
ated new threshholds, gave greater weight to absolute need measures, and
expanded the list of point system factors to include measures of program
quality.
The addition of new factors continued the trend toward decreased
weight for measures of community-wide need. The factor for benefit to
low- and moderate-income persons, as quantitatively measured, had as much
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nominal weight as the poverty and housing need factors. Performance in
the areas of housing and equal employment opportunity (as assessed by
Area Office raters) had three fourths the nominal weight of the need
factors. "Hold-harmless" status had one eighth the need factors' weight.
A new factor, program impact, was a subjective measure of program
quality. This factor was given twice the nominal weight of the need fac-
tors, and represented 40 percent nominal weight out of total possible
points of 1025 in the Comprehensive grant selection system. The new fac-
tor required a subjective comparison, along specified design criteria, of
applicants in a competition who addressed similar problem areas.
The comparison of similar projects was an attempt to avoid "biases"
in the system toward particular activities such as housing rehabilitation.
Such "biases" might occur in Area Office raters.directly compared dis-
similar activities with incommensurable impacts. Thus, it extended the
strategy of the previous year's instructions to Regional Offices on how
to design rating systems.
The new national selection system injected an additional element
of discretion into the selection process, although the level of detail
in the regulations concerning how discretionary Area Office judgment was
to be exercised was much greater than in the past. At the same time, the
system provided more bases for competition among applicants, by adding
more factors which communities could influence through design of their
proposed activities.
The overall sensitivity of the system to the community-wide need
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criteria was reduced, and sub-area measures of actual benefit to needy per-
sons (through the benefit measure) and assessments of program merit were
given preponderant weight. But, the complication of the rating process
also reduced its predictability.
William Moss analyzed the 1978 Small Cities competitions and noted
four unanticipated results:
o Community size and previous experience are important deter-
minants of program participation, project selection, and the
chances of being funded.
o The percent of communities applying for Single-Purpose grants
is larger than that applying for Comprehensive grants, in
marked contrast to estimates of the allocation of funds.
o The nominal or official weights used in the PSS scoring sys-
tem are different from the actual or effective weights. The
four need factors are significantly less important in prac-
tice, and the factors for program benefit dnd the benefits to
low- and moderate-income individuals are more important.
o The award of points for previous experience in the amount of
25 points for "hold-harmless" status in Comprehensive competi-
tions has very little effect on the ranking of applicants,
and therefore little direct effect on the likelihood of being
funded.
Therefore, two non-formula characteristics of applicant communities
had more effect than the need measures, and the two program quality fac-
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tors had more effects than anticipated. The efforts to weight the need
factors toward larger communities had little effect, as the effects of jur-
isdiction size were more indirect. Additionally, the effort to bias the
system toward "hold-harmless" applicants was unsuccessful--a 25 point
rating factor had more symbolic than actual impact on the rankings of
applicants.
Andrew Isserman evaluated the 1978 competitions and found that:
o Proposed programs with high benefit to low- and mocerate-
income persons went unfunded.
o Community flexibility in program design and funding opportun-
ities for non-housing programs were discouraged by the point
system.
o The point system by itself did not curtail Area Office dis-
cretionary power, as measured by the differences in rankings
using only the need measures as compared to the actual rank-
ings with the full point system.
Unpredictability in the new allocation system can also arise from
the actual implementation of the point systems by the Area Offices. Given
the high nominal and effective weights of the two subjective selection
factors for program quality, the system will be sensitive to Area Offices'
use of the system.
The evidence confirms that Area Office practice was less than
ideal. A U.S. General Accounting Office review of rating procedures in
*This finding is consistent with Moss' conclusions about the actual
weights of the need factors on the results of the 1978 competitions.
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Fiscal Year 1977 found that "deficiencies in HUD's review and approval of
applications (had) resulted in funds being given to some communities
which did not have the most promising projects." In addition, "HUD re-
viewers drew conclusions about estimated project benefits which were not
consistent with information con'tained in the application," the report said,
"and in other cases, they did not resolve conflicting statements about
estimated project benefits."
Later program experience indicated additional problems in Area
Office implementation of the detailed rules of the national allocation
system. Some Area Offices overcommitted Small Cities multi-year compre-
hensive grant funds, creating fund scarcities for future competitions.
HUD also found Area Offices approving grants in excess of the ceilings
that they had established for single purpose and comprehensive grants.
Many offices were also not recording the basis for the award of points
in rating preapplications, as required by program regulations "to ensure
that the decisions are based on regulations and policy requirements and
applied consistently to all preapplicants.
With no good sense of what a good allocation of funds in the com-
petitive system should be, evaluation of the system, other than proced-
urally, is problematic. The above evidence of Area Office practice in-
dicates that procedural uniformity in use of the selection systems is not
guaranteed.
Housing and Development Reporter. Vol. 6. No. 16. September 18, 1978.
p. 437.
2Housing and Development Reporter. October 27, 1980. pp. 442-443.
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However, evaluations such as the Isserman study based on some
community-wide indices of need, no matter which measure of need is chosen,
do not judge the allocation system on its own terms, given the intent to
select grant winners based on program quality as well as need.
Therefore, two types of unpredictability are introduced when the
allocation system is elaborated. The first, uncertainty arising from the
degree of field office compliance with operational rules, would be pre-
3
sent in any allocation system, but would tend to increase as the system
became more complicated. The second, uncertainty of results due to the
effects of correlations among selection factors and the voluntary nature
of entry into the system, would also increase as point systems were ex-
panded; however, this type of unpredictability is peculiar to formula-
based competitive allocation systems.
Given this situation, the appropriate agency strategy for improving
the performance of the system might seem to be the following:
o design a point system which includes all salient objectives
and add factors for new objectives as they arise
o ensure procedural uniformity via increasingly detailed defin-
ition of selection criteria
o deal with problems iteratively as they become perceived by a
sufficient number of program users
3
However, this uncertainty would be least in a pure need-based formula
allocation approach.
o as errors creep in (for example, a low benefit project in a
high need community with a skillfully written proposal work-
ing the "merit" factors), establish threshholds for each
selection factor in response to error from that factor's con-
tribution to the ranking.
However, such a system will become increasingly rigid and more
difficult to adjust in response to shifts.in program priorities by Con-
gress or the Executive Office. Inevitable complaints about the alloca-
ion system will elicit responses increasing the rigidity of the system
in ways that, in the longer term, may be viewed as suboptimal.
It will be useful to consider the role of threshholds in the new
national selection system.
The 1978 program revisions also created more definite performance
and capacity threshholds. The political reactions to some of the proposed
threshholds were noted earlier.
In the competitive block grant program, HUD has more influence on
grantee performance than in the entitlement program: future chances of
winning a grant can be conditioned on current performance, either through
new rating factors or through performance threshholds. HUD faces a greater
burden in denying an "entitlement."
However, if many program users perform poorly, a rigid adherence
to performance threshholds will not be possible. Just as no criterion for
a good allocation of funds is unanimously accepted by program users, no
standard of efficiency is universally recognized as best. If communities
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perform poorly, then the agency will be blamed for not administering the
program in a way that increases local capacity. Threshholds that bar many
eligible communities can be critized as inconsistent with that program
goal.
Additionally, community inefficiency or inability in program ad-
ministration affects the equity of the allocation system for ultimate pro-
gram beneficiaries: why should residents of an inefficient, even incom-
petent unit of local government be denied access to Small Cities aid, if
their needs are a great as those of better performing grantees?
To deal with the problem of insufficient community capacity to com-
pete and to administer Small Cities grants, HUD permitted joint applica-
tions, applications by one community in behalf of another, and the con-
tracting out administration of local programs.
HUD contracted for technical assistance for communities to better
compete and perform in the Small Cities Program, in order to increase and
redistribute capacity among communities. HUD preferred this alternative
to allowing increased administrative expenses for communities to hire their
own experts. This suggests another HUD objective in this approach: to
increase control over the quality of applications and administration by
having influence over the type of technical assistance that communities
received. Providing other resources can be more effective than thresh-
holds in increasing the predictability of the allocation system.
Formula Allocation to States
In the 1978 Program Year, Congress altered how Small Cities funds
were distributed into State pools for the Comprehensive and Single Pur-
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pose grant competition. Congress applied the dual formula system of the
entitlement program to Small Cities funds, with the substitution of a
population factor for growth lag.
As a result of the debate over this change, HUD made a study of
small city'needs and alternative allocation formulas for the Small Cities
program.
This formula change altered the relative availability of discre-
tionary funds among states, and as a result, the intensity of competition
for funds. Andrew Isserman's evaluation noted that the opportunity for
funding varies tremendously across Area Offices, since the number of ap-
plicants per aid dollar varies.
The issue of differences in intensity of competition has not been
raised with respect to the Project Selection System. This may be due to
the difficulties in connecting the issues of competition and area alloca-
tion. In any case, the lack of agreement on needs and measurement apply
to the formula allocation to states as well as the Project Selection Sys-
tem. Since many measures of community distress, capacity and program
quality are inapplicable to State areas, the debate over the best alloca-
tion formula has been around the issues of need and the "right" proxy
measures.
To summarize the changes in Program Year 1978, the trends in pre-
vious years were continued: redefinition of objectives and selection of
a primary objective; continued centralization of the selection system de-
sign responsibility; expansion and refinement of the selection formula and
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reduced weight for need factors; increasing emphasis on performance to
counter the selection system's insensitivity to this issue. And, a new
program for comprehensive grants was created.
Evidence indicated that the selection system had unanticipated re-
sults: subjective selection factors had more impact than intended, and
need factors had less; two community characteristics not included in the
selection system, community size and prior experience,were major deter-
minants of success in the competitions; "incentive" and "preference" fac-
tors, such as the "hold-harmless" factors had very little effect on the
competitions. Area Office implementation increased the unpredictability
of the system.
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INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
STAGE I 1975 A NEED-BASED SELECTION SYSTEM
Competitive selection required more of
need-based allocation formulas than do
block grants, for equity and precision.
HUD Area Offices faced different incen-
tives in designing selection systems
than did the central office.
STAGE II 1976- CENTRALIZATION OF SYSTEM DESIGN AND
1978 LEGITIMIZATION OF DISCRETION
A competition based solely on need was
not a competition at all; HUD moved
away from need-based selection.
HUD centrally designed the selection
systems to avoid unexpected results in
the competitions.
HUD legitimized Area Office discretion-
ary power by increasing narrow defin-
ition of the selection systems.
HUD created a new program when formula
refinement could not resolve rigidities
in the allocation process.
Tensions among program goals resulted
in shifts in priorities by HUD.
STAGE III 1979- REFINEMENT
1980
The new selection process was stable;
HUD concentrates on enforcement and
monitoring.
In response to new program emphases, HUD
attempted to reduce "bias" and "error"
in the system.
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PROGRAM YEAR FIVE (1979)
The Small Cities Program allocation process remained essentially
unchanged in the fifth year of program operations.
Participants in the system--HUD central and Area Office staff and
program grantees had no major complaints about the Project Selection Sys-
tem in Fiscal Year .1979. This may reflect the complexi.ty of the new sys-
tem, and the time necessary to gain information about its outcomes. A
type of stability may be possible following a period of elaboration and
centralization of the selection process, indicating that the major issues,
"bias" in the selection of winners and activities, Area Office capacity, and
"hold-harmless" communities, were resolved. It can also indicate that
more fundamental issues, such as disagreement over needs, measurement,
organizational stability, and confusion over multiple objectives were
abated as a "merit"-based competition replaced a "need"-based one.
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PROGRAM YEAR SIX (1980)
For Fiscal Year 1980 HUD retained all the essential features of
the Small Cities allocation process. Three technical changes were made
in the Project Selection System.
First, HUD attempted to reduce the "bias" toward certain activities
in the Single Purpose Grant System. For the program impact factor in the
original system, all preapplications addressing the same "problem area"
were compared to determine their program impact points. This procedure
was extended to the benefit to low- and moderate-income persons factor.
Thus, some activities which, due to their nature, always benefit a lower
percentage of poor persons than other activities (for example, economic
development versus housing rehabilitation), would still be able to
achieve maximum points.
This feature of the scoring process ensures greater flexibility
for local communities in proposing activities, since they will not be
penalized for choosing lower benefit activities. However, the change
also works against the fourth year program objective of awarding funds
to projects that most benefited low- and moderate-income persons. If the
number of problem areas were to be increased and this procedure applied,
the selection system would drift further from this primary objective, un-
less threshholds for benefit were put in place as well.
The second technical change increased the ways in which communit-
ies could earn points for performance in equal opportunity. The effective
weight of this factor is very slight.
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Communities must participate in other HUD programs (such as the
New Horizons Fair Housing program or Areawide Housing Opportunity Plans)
to earn extra points. The addition of new ways to earn points may seem
an easy, cheap way to increase participation in other programs, while not
changing the importance of other factors in the Selection System. However,
this factor contributes so little to the distribution of winners that its
main purpose in the selection process is symbolic.
The third change allows Area Offices to award current year's fund-
ing to a community that failed to win funds the previous year due to pro-
cessing or mathematical errors. This housekeeping change preserves the
fairness of the competitions.
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INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE PROJECT SELECTION SYSTEM
(Continued)
STAGE IV 1981 REFINEMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION
Changes in formula measurement preserve
the competitive equilibrium at expense
of system sensitivity to changes in need.
Decentralization to States will increase
drift of program away from original pro-
gram goals, and reduce equity across
States.
170
PROGRAM YEAR SEVEN (1981)
The most recent changes in the allocation system for the Small
Cities Program are consistent with prior revisions.
I will consider three types of changes: refinement of the alloca-
tion system, redistribution of discretion, and transfer of program respon-
sibility to the States.
HUD's Responses: Reformulate the Formal Allocation Process
HUD made only minor changes to the Small Cities Project Selection
System for Fiscal Year 1981, altering the factors used to award points:
o Deleting the housing needs factors
o Giving equal weight to the two poverty needs factors
o Adding program design criteria for economic development and
energy conservation in the Comprehensive Grant program
o Increasing the weight of the program impact factor in the
Single Purpose Grant program
o Combining the two criteria about State growth resource coordin-
ation plans into a single state rating factor
o Changing the criteria for awarding bonus points for partici-
pation in an Areawide Housing Opportunity plan
o Adding an energy conservation selection factor.
Thus, these changes continue the trend of reducing the weight of
need factors in the system, increasing the ways in which subjective pro-
gram quality factors could be earned, and adding new selection factors
to reflect new or newly emphasized program goals. The relatively minor
changes in the national selection system since 1978 indicate a much greater
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stability in the allocation system than in the first three program years,
a stability associated with a "recategorization" of the program, with
less emphasis on community need, and more on performance, grantsmanship,
and the traditional determinants of success in a competitive system, com-
munity size and planning expertise.
The stability of the system arises in part from the reduced impact
of proxy measures of need in the allocation formula. The housing need
factor was eliminated, according to HUD officials, because it was diffi-
cult for applicants to get adequate information on housing, and because
"the measures of housing need.. .are declining in some areas, but not
others," giving an unfair advantage to communities with improving housing
stock.
In other words, housing need is changing, while poverty need is re-
maining relatively stable. Elimination of the housing need factor (which
would be updated by 1981 census information) then contributes to mainten-
ance of a status quo based upon discretionary competitions emphasizing
performance more than relative need among cities.
The measurement problem with housing need (statistical reliability
for small places, obsolescence, incomparability of more accurate local or
state data) might suggest finding new measures sensitive to rapid changes
in need. For a need-based formula such as in the entitlement program,
such a response would be a rational refinement to the system. However,
in a system'that uses a linear weighted allocation formula, not to ration
based on need, but to constrain and legitimize discretionary selection of
winners by branch offices, rapid change in the measures of need are con-
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sidered disruptive to the system by most program participants.
HUD also gave equal weight to the poverty need measures, returning
the system to the weights of Program Years Two and Three. This change
responded to complaints that the 1978 systems were biased toward larger
communities. HUD thus has moved back and forth on the issue of size bias
in the system; however, the actual effect of these changes has been minor,
as HUD noted in its Third Annual Report, and as suggested by the results
of William Moss's evaluation of the 1978 competitions.
A surer means to ensure "fairness" across city size would have
been to create separate city classes, based upon population. However,
this proposal would-have opened a new political debate on the proper for-
mula to use to divide up the state pools among the new classes, much a-
long the lines of the criticisms of the set-aside of funds for non-metro-
politan communities. (Using the entitlement formula as the basis for
allocating funds, the non-metropolitan towns would receive a much larger
share of all funds.)
Several changes in the allocation process were not directly ex-
pressed in the regulations: interpretation of regulations by field offices
and new grant award threshholds.
Interpretation of Regulations
HUD communicated additional policy changes to Area Office staff in
its operational field manual. Area Office raters were advised to be more
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broadminded, and flexible and open to innovation, in evaluating energy
and economic development proposals. These instructions are consistent
with the earlier observation that changes in factors would have to be
accompanied by information about how or how literally field staff should
interpret the changes in the discretionary selection factors.
Grant Award Threshholds
HUD also imposed threshholds based upon rating scores, as well as
the older threshholds to entry into competition. Area Offices were in-
structed to award funds only to those preapplications with greater than
50 percent benefit to the poor, except on a exceptional basis. (In 1978,
HUD deleted a 75 percent benefit threshhold due to community opposition.)
Additionally, Area Offices are to rank each applicant in one of four cate-
gories, depending upon demonstrated need, benefit to low- and moderate-
income persons, likely community impact, and support from A-95 clearing-
houses. Those preapplications falling into the lowest category would not
be invited to submit a full application regardless of their total points.
Again, these new threshholds indicate the insensitivity of the
selection system to certain errors, and consequent unexpected results.
Some low need, low benefit, low impact projects had been funded in pre-
vious years.
Threshholds are an easy, logical response to the insensitivity of
linear weighted formulas. By the eighth program year, HUD had developed
a set of threshholds that were acceptable to eligible communities and that
addressed the most striking errors in the selection system, errors due in
part to the lack of performance factors and the large number of different
factors in the point system.
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HUD's Responses: Redistribute Discretion
HUD changed the State role in the Small Cities allocation process
in two ways for Fiscal Year 1981: 1) a new State factor to be rated by
States; and 2) a demonstration project for States to design and administer
the selection system for their state competitions.
Since the passage of the 1974 Housing and Community Development
Act, state participation had been an issue in the discretionary CDBG pro-
gram. The Ford administration had proposed that States administer the
program. In Program Year One, the design criteria for the Area Office
selection systems had allowed extra priortiy to projects where States and
local governments cooperated. In the national selection system introduced
in 1978, bonus points could be earned by communities participating in
State development plans. That same year HUD reserved a section of the
program regulations for State participation guidelines.
The State Rating actor
For Fiscal Year 1981, HUD added a State rating factor of 25 points
to be scored by State officials for Comprehensive and Single Purpose grant
competitions. The majority of commentors to the change opposed increased
state participation, even though the nominal weight of the factor (less
than 3 percent of the total possible score) would contribute very little
to the final ranking.
State Selection of Grant Winners
In Fiscal Year 1981, Kentucky and Wisconsin participated in a dem-
onstration project to see whether state design and administration of the
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the Small Cities grantee selection process will increase links between
local Small Cities projects and State and Regional development plans.
Kentucky's selection system is substantially the same as HUD's
national system.
Wisconsin's criteria are substantially different, although their
changes follow the general direction of the evolution of HUD's system.
The major new features of the Wisconsin system include:
o Reducing the nominal weight of the benefit to low- and moder-
ate-income persons factor by 75 percent, and omitting the HUD
threshhold for that factor
o Providing bonus points for economic development projects
o Introducing "distress" criteria to select the "most troubled"
cities
o Evaluating communities with less than 5,000 population separ-
ately from communities with over 5,000 population
o Use of locally available, rather than national, data.
In terms of earlier analysis of the national selection system,
Wisconsin's system represents a further drift from the original block
grant goals of allocating aid for projects primarily benefiting the poor
on the basis of verifiable community need.
The reduction in weight of the benefit factor and elimination of
the HUD threshhold for that factor decreases the importance of that cri-
teria in distinguishing applicants. Substitution of city "distress" cri-
teria for aggregate measures of individual need represents a further di-
vergence from the program's conception (more akin to the UDAG program than
the block grant program). However, separate evaluation of applicants
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according to city size directly addresses the issue of fairness of com-
petition. And, use of local data reduces one aspect of the measurement
problem, its accuracy and timeliness, at the expense of another, its com-
parability across the States.
Embodied in the State selection systems are all the significant
strategies used by HUD to make its Project Selection System work better:
o addition of new scoring factors to reflect new program ob-
jectives
o revision of the need factors in the linear weighted formula
o use of factors and threshholds to deal with performance and
capacity problems of eligible communities
o changes in measurement of need and program impact
o division of eligible communities into separate classes.
Two sources of problems are relevant for the Wisconsin and Kentucky
selection systems.
First, the outcomes may be inconsistent with the stated goals of
the systems. HUD had continuing problems of this sort during the seven
year evolution of the Small Cities allocation system. For example, Wis-
consin's system may have "bias" toward economic development projects to
the exclusion of other types of eligible activites. Or, the lack of
threshholds on some factors can result in "low quality" projects receiving
funds.
Second, the outcomes may be inconsistent with HUD and other eval-
uators' expectation of how the Small Cities program should work. Without
benefit threshholds (formal or informal), funds may be awarded to projects
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with little benefit to the poor. And emphasizing city "distress" rather
than "need" may result in high need communities going unfunded.
Either of the sources of the problem can serve as grounds for future
criticism of the program based on 1) the unpredictability and imprecision
of linear weighted formulas and 2) disagreement about the relative priority
of the multiple objectives of the program.
On a more general level, the development of separate State rating
systems (or State programs) which differ substantially from one another
will increase the variation in outcomes along a number of evaluation cri-
teria. The move toward uniformity in the national selection system was
one response to a desire for equity of treatment of eligible -communities.
The State administration of the selection process moves in the
other direction--equity is traded for greater sensitivity to the needs
and objectives of the eligible communities in a subarea of the program's
coverage. This trade-off between efficiency in meeting local needs and
equity of treatment for all eligible communities is just one of a number
of polarities in the Small Cities allocation system.
Identifying these polarities can not only help the agency better
identify symptomatic and more fundamental problems in the program, but
can also help the agency anticipate future directions the allocation sys-
tem (and its participants) will take in response to the agency's "solu-
tions" to those problems. This analysis of the evolution of the Small
Cities program provides a useful catalogue of the "problems" and "errors"
of a competitive grant process that makes use of need-based linear weighted
allocation formulas. It also identifies the trade-offs and dil immas in
178
implementation, the tensions in the system. In the following section,
I describe the important tensions I see in the Small Cities allocation
process.
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TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION PROCESS
National and Local Objectives
An inevitable tension between national objectives and local ob-
jectives will occur in a block grant program. The national objectives
are often an assortment of goals that are purposely ambiguous because
various interests could not agree on priorities among the goals; a block
grant program is passed because certain interest agree with a part of it.
Letting localities determine the priorities for community projects detracts
from the intended national program. However, both the objectives of the
program and the points of view of participants in the allocation process
are varied and complex. Easy definition of national and local priorities
and compromises among those priorities are impossible in advance.
This tension has been played out in three ways in the Small Cities
CDBG program. First, both HUD officials and communities have tried to
interpret Congressional intent in a way consistent with their own prior-
ities. HUD wished to respond to clear legislative mandates and to new
Congressional interpretations of the national objectives (such as emphasis
on benefits to the poor). Communities wished to broaden the ways in which
the grant dollars may be used to enable pressing current problems to be
met regardless of their nature.
Second, the debate over how dollars are allocated by an objective
formula has mediated the tension between national and local objectives.
No "best" formula will be consistent with all the different objectives:
the formula chosen relates more to the prevailing view of what Congress
will support (or what they won't reject). The tandard against which the
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Small Cities Program's allocation process has been measured is first, the
past distribution of dollars and second, simple measures of need.
Third, the competitive nature of the Small Cities allocation pro-
cess has been a focus of this tension. The use of explicit, weighted
rating criteria to select grant winners necessarily embodies a particular
interpretation of the multiple objectives. Three sources of potential
disagreement arise: 1) how money should be distributed to the competitive
pool; 2) what activities are eligible; and 3) what activities are com-
petitive due to the effective weighting of the selection criteria.
No natural balancing point has been found for this tension in the
Small Cities program because local and national objectives have changed
over time and HUD's responses to those changes have created new disagree-
ments over priorities for the program.
Agency and Grantee Discretion
A second tension occurs between agency discretion and grantee dis-
cretion. Arguments about discretion are often arguments about who should
have the authority to interpret the enabling legislation's spirit and
mandates.
The block grant concept moves discretion to grantees: they know
best for choices confined to a specific set of national purposes. However,
the distribution of discretion serves other purposes than the program
goals.
The amount of discretion grantees are allowed will help shape the
local debate over community development. Discretion (or its absence) can
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be used by local elected officials to sanction an unpopular program direc-
tion (the regulations require it), to excuse poor program performance
("we didn't have the authority to act"), or permit substitution of feder-
al for local resources ("the law means we know our needs best").
For HUD, how discretionary power is distributed among central and
field offices and program grantees serves diverse purpose. Shifting re-
sponsibility for design of the selection systems to the national office:
1) increased the uniformity of program outcomes; 2) reduced egregious
error, such as improper political influence in project selection; and 3)
increased the reliability of the system in its implementation and its re-
sponsiveness to central decisions.
Such a transfer also shifts the relation between HUD and eligible
communities, since Area Offices have the primary contact with grantees.
Decisions on interpretation of guidelines take longer since Area Offices
must check with the central office.
In addition, shifting discretion toward the center decreases the
ability of the Area Offices to deal with defects or errors in the formal
allocation system. Informal Area Office action is required by the rapidity
with which formal guidelines become outdated and by the often inappropri-
ate or too narrow policies based on insufficient information about the
problems of implementation.
For example, one evaluator concluded that high benefit and high
need projects went unfunded in the 1978 competitions. Area Office discre-
tionary power could have avoided this "error" of the formal system, by
applying threshholds or judgmental factors outside the selection system.
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When HUD centrally designed the strict rating system, it reduced
the ability of Area Offices to shortcircuit "bad" features of the alloca-
tion process. Those who implement procedures often can recognize smaller
errors sooner than those who designed the system. "Bias" in the selection
of activities, such as housing or redevelopment, would be easily noticed
(and corrected) by staff raters.
A continuing theme of early adjustments in the rating system was
the too strict interpretation by field offices of the legislative mandate
and HUD guidelines. Once a national rating system was in place, HUD had
to formally alter the system to correct errors, rather than instructing
Area Offices to use their discretion. Likewise, communities had to wait
for policy decisions from Washington to correct problems. By redistri-
buting formal discretion among the participants in the allocation system,
HUD gained one type of predictability at the expense of another.
The tension arises because "who know best for what purposes" is
also related to who will use their discretionary power to further program
goals, rather than to pursue non-program goals or other interests. Who
has the right incentives to use what they know properly brings up a real
dilemma: HUD's efforts to correct "bad" use of Area Office discretion
by drawing in responsibility for design of the selection systems reduced
the incentives of Area Offices to use their discretion well; the Area
Offices decreased ability to respond quickly to policy questions reduced
communities' incentives to pursue innovative uses of the program. Thus,
redistributing discretionary power requires not only trade-off among goals,
but also creates new, unintended incentives among program participants.
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Program and Organizational Goals
The tenstion between program and organizational goals manifests
itself in ways other than the distribution of discretion. HUD, in its
Fifth Annual Report, drew attention to the inherent conflict between the
high number of eligible communities and the agency's ability to administer
a large number of small grants.
Here, the tension is explicit: the program objective of providing
aid to needy communities and the organizational objective of balancing
the field offices' workload and capacity in a way that satisfies internal
(central and field staff) and external (Congress and program users) stand-
ards of quality and efficiency.
HUD responded by reducing the workload (taking over design respon-
sibility, and emphasizing community capacity and program quality over
community need). By emphasizing quality over need, HUD has decreased the
chances that grantees will perform poorly, has enhanced the agency's per-
formance record, and as a result reduced the relative workload of its
staff. At the same time, less capable but more needy communities have
less chance to win funds.
Stability and Sensitivity of the System
The desire for stability and continuity of funding conflicts with
the desire to refine the allocation system so that it detects finer changes
in community need and performance. Communities want a constant flow of
aid, with relatively stable guidelines; program participants also want to
distribute aid on the basis of objective need--money should go to the
neediest first, and reduced need should result in reduced aid.
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HUD increased the stability of the system by creating multi-year
grants, by eliminating the housing need measure which was sensitive to
rapid changes in housing need, and by imposing a uniform, stable national
selection system. HUD attempted to increase the sensitivity of the system
by adding selection factors, by requiring extra data from applicants, and
by analyzing the differences in need among small cities. The two types
of HUD responses work in opposite directions: increasing sensitivity
makes the outcomes of the system more volatile; efforts to make outcomes
more stable increases the degree of mismatch between aid and need.
Multiple Objectives and Meeting Acute Need Well
Another tension arises between the desire to pursue many program
objectives and the desire to target aid to a single, acute problem. Ef-
forts to widen the scope of the selection system, to allow maximum flexi-
bility among the activities chosen reduce the sensitivity of the system
to rapid increases in a single need for few communities.
For example, increasing the number of selection factors reduces
the contribution of a single factor to the ranking of applicants. In-
creasing the weight of one factor or need measure targets aid more closely
to a single type of need (or communities with a particular need).
HUD has responded to the desire to pursue multiple objectives by
increasing the number of selection factors, reducing the weight of need
measures, and, most importantly, by only allowing the comparison of like
projects in determining benefit and program impact scores.
To retain the ability to respond rapidly to acute need, HUD has
relied on a separate "imminent threat to health or safety" grant type,
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with maximum discretion (and no point system) for Area Offices to award
grants for this purpose. Thus, the pursuit of multiple objectives in the
larger Small Cities Program was increased at the expense of the Project
Selection System's sensitivity to acute community need.
Community Need ,and Administrative Efficiency
The tension between meeting community need well and having an ef-
ficient, well run program has also been present in the Small Cities allo-
cation process. Having a system that awards funds based upon the commun-
ities' distress or objective indicators of absolute or relative need con-
flicts with a system that awards funds based on good performance, rapid
completion of projects goals, and minimal administrative problems. Com-
munities with high need may not have the capacity to run programs well,
communities with administrative expertise may have little need.
HUD has responded to the issues of need versus performance through-
out the evolution of the allocation system. Threshholds were introduced
for capacity and performance; major weight was given to "program quality"--
benefit to the poor (at the target area level) and program impact. Need
threshholds were introduced to make sure the lowest need communities were
not funded. Additionally, other resources such as technical assistance
were made available to increase community capacity, apart from the level
of community need.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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SU2RY
In this thesis I have examined the evolution of the Project Selec-
tion System of the Small Cities Program, and have developed a framework
for analyzing that system.
I noted several trends in its evolution:
1. A shift away from allocation formulas based on community-
wide need toward selection formulas based on subjective
measures of program impact and quality.
2. Accretion of new program and organizational goals by means
of additional formula factors, with consequent "formula
drift" away from the block grant concept.
3. Shifting of formula design responsibility to the center,
and constraint of Area Office discretion, to reduce errors
and to legitimize discretionary selection of grantees.
4. A.continuing process of HUD adjustment of the formal alloca-
tion process, in response to the limitations of linear
weighted allocation formulas.
5. Responses to those adjustments based on polarities or ten-
sions in goals, that is, program participants attempting
simultaneously to pursue conflicting goals.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Small Cities formal allocation process has evolved
predictably.
Over the seven year history of the Small Cities
CDBG Program, its allocation process has developed progress-
ively in a series of related, understandable changes. This
development has been constant, and relatively insensitive to
political shifts in the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment.
While the ou.tcomes of a competitive selection system
are unpredictable when using linear weighted allocation formulas
(due to divergence in the nature of need, measurement, and
participant response), my analysis suggests that the evolution
of a competitive grant process can be predicted. Program
participants can anticipate generic problems and the likely
effects of different agency responses to those problems.
HUD has responded effectively to unexpected results of the
program's allocation process.
The responses by HUD have generally diminished the un-
expected results (the generic problems) of the Small Cities
Program allocation process. Progressively greater stability
in the design and administration of the selection system and
greater attention to logistical and enforcement issues in the
later stages are evidence of successful HUD response. Fewer
communities are dissatisfied with the selection system, and,
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as a result of HUD's responses to their problems, more communities accept
direct and effective features of the allocation system (such as capacity
and performance threshholds) which they opposed in its early stages
of development.
Although the outccmes of the Small Cities allocation process are pro-
gressively more predictable and acceptable, this evolution does not imply
convergence toward an "optimal" allocation system.
While HUD's responses to unexpected results of the Project Selection
System have increased its stability and predictability, evolution along a
different path could be stable and predictable as well. Due to the
limitations of selection of grant winners by formula, HUD's adjust-
ments to the system have given the appearance of a better working system
for eligible camunities, while the actual effects on outcames are dis-
covered years later through lengthy and expensive evaluation research.
litionally, since its responses have not helped HIUD, the Congress,
or eligible cmmunities to identify and resolve the tensions among the
goals of the Small Cities Program, the allocation system continues to
produce unanticipated and unplanned trade-offs among those goals.
Finally, because the greater predictability of the allocation system
has depended on HUD's ability to respont to the expectations of Congress
and the communities, the adjustments in the system, in order to be
politically effective, have been directed more toward changing expect-
ations and- providing an appearance of responsiveness, rather than toward
more fundamental questions about program priorities and the underlying
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sources of conflicts among expectations. As a result, the stability of
the system is likely to be illusory and temporary.
The Small Cities campetitive selection approach is incampatible with the
block grant concept.
While camunity need and capacity, administrative efficiency and
equity, agency monitoring and enforcement, and the limitations of linear
weighted formulas will be concerns in all block grant programs, the use
of a competition to select grantees creates a unique conflict in the
allocation process. This fundamental conflict arises between choice based
on need and choice based on merit. Capetitive selection formulas that
ccmbine need and merit criteria are incampatible with basic assumptions
of the block grant approach:
* that camunity-wide need provides a sound basis for distri-
buting aid, separate frcm the issue of how well the aid
can be used
* that local capacity is a resource to be developed rather
than a criteria for distributing aid
* that relative need among carrunities should be the criterion
for allocating aid.
For that reason, the debate over fairness and equity of outccmes in
the Small Cities Program is not similar to the debate over those issues in
the CDBG and other block grant programs. A canpetition based solely on
need is not a competition, while a ccmpetition based on merit is not a
block grant allocation. Ieedy cities are often not meritorious, and cities
with meritorious programs are often not needy.
As a consequence, the Small Cities ccmpetitive selection process,
incorporating need measures, has a special source of conflict and tension,
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which surfaces as dissatisfaction with the selection formula, rather
than as dissatisfaction with IUD monitoring and enforcement of corrmnun-
ities' administration of local programs. This result is not surprising
since the ccmpetitive process is basically a yes/no decision, taking an
applicant's grant request as the starting point. The formal allocation
system includes no objective process for determining the "right" grant
amount for an eligible camnunity.
Further research should be directed to the role of competition
in need-based allocation systems.
Even though the need for a competition has dominated
the evolution of the Small Cities allocation process, my analysis
has been unable to determine the real role of competition in
that process. While the use of Linear weighted allocation
formulas to determine pro rata grants for entitled communities
is fairly well understood, the use of such formulas to make
all or nothing decisions about grant awards is less well known.
The incompatibility of merit selection and entitlement
selection based on community need increases the difficulty of
interpreting the competitive process. A formal'analysis of the
major features of the Small Cities Program allocation process.-
Allocation of resources based on need
Taking into account community capacity
Through a competitive selection process
Administered by a decentralized bureaucracy--
would contribute greatly to better understanding the role of
need-based allocation formulas in competitive grant processes.
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Appendix A
Characteristics of Allocation Formulas
THE CDBG ENTITLEMENT GRANT ALLOCATION FORIULA
80% funds for SMSA's
20% funds for non-SMSA's
Hold-harmless provision is phased
out in 5 years
The larger of two formulas is chosen to determine a grantee's
share of appropriation:
NEED A = .25
+ .50
Area population
Total population of all areas
Area poverty count
Total poverty count for all
areas
+ .25 Area overcrowded dwelling units
Total overcrowded dwelling units
for all areas
NEED B = .20 Area growth lag
Total growth lag for all areas
+ .30 Area poverty count
Total poverty count for all
areas
+ .50 Area age of housing
Total age of housing for all areas
Population: the most current estimates from the Bureau of the Census
Poverty: from the 1970 Census of Population
Overcrowded dwelling units: from the 1970 Census of Population (number
of dwelling with more than 1.01 persons per room)
Age of housing: the number of existing year-round housing units con-
structed in 1939 or earlier from the 1970 Census of Population.
To the initial entitlement, any appropriate hold-harmless credits
are added; if needed, a pro rata reduction is carried out to conform with
the total funds appropriated.
Extent of growth lag: the number of persons who would have been
residents in a metropolitan city or county, in excess of current population
if the population growth between 1960 and the date of the most recent pop-
ulation count had been equal to the population growth rate of all metropol-
itan cities or urban counties.
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Source: Maria Elena Gonzalez. "Characteristics of Formulas and Data Used
in the Allocation of Federal Funds." The American Statistician.
Vol. 34, No. 4. November 1980. pp. 203-204.
The general characteristics of the block grant entitlement "dual"
formula includes the following:
1. The formula is additive and uses several factors differentially
weighted.
2. The primary purpose of the formula is to determine appropriate
grant amounts for an eligible area, as a share of the total
appropriation.
3. Readily available, uniformly comparable official statistics are
used as proxies for community need as defined in legislation for
the aid program.
4. Hold-harmless provisions or minimum amounts of entitlement
based on previous program levels are established.
5. The initial estimates of entitlement are reduced so that the
total dollars distributed will equal the amount of funds appro-
priated by Congress to be distributed by the program to state
and local areas.
6. Two formulas are defined and entitlement areas are allowed to
choose the one with the higher value.'
7. Only a portion of the available funds are distributed by formu-
la, with the balance being distributed at the discretion of the
sponsoring federal agency.2
'Gonzalez. Ibid.
2John L. Goodman. "Federal Funding Formulas, Po alation Redistribution
During the 1970's and the 1980 Ceisus." Washing on, D.C.: The Urban Insti-
tute. April 1980. p. 15.
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8. The formula reserves funds for an eligible community, conting-
ent upon the community meeting certain requirements, having ap-
proved programs and applying for the funds.
9. The size of the annual appropriation affects the formula dis-
tribution.
Other features of allocation formulas not in the CDBG program are
nevertheless typical of many formula grants-in-aid:
10. A two-tiered procedure is used, with allocation by formula
to the state level, and then allocation within the state using
local data or administrative discretion.
11. Many programs have minimum and maximum allocations for eligible
areas.
12. Eligibility criteria are often used to establish cutoffs to
determine which areas may receive funds.
13. Matching grants may be required of participating areas, usu-
ally some percentage of the entitlement amount.
14. Many of the allocation systems dampen the fluctuations in an-
nual funding to shifts in the values of need factors by lagging
the adjustments in funds (basing current year funding, in part,
on previous year funding).
While the allocation to States in the Small Cities Program is es-
sentially the same as the CDBG entitlement process, the Project Selection
System differs in several key respects from past formula allocation systems:
1. The primary purpose is to rank grant applicants to determine
winners in a competitive process.
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2. Subjective merit criteria receive greater weight than objective
need measures.
3. The burden of proof is on the applicant to jtistify granting
funds, rather than on the agency to deny funding.
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APPENDIX B
Legislative Issues in the Small Cities CDBG Program
Prior to the establishment of the CDBG program by Title I of the
1974 Housing and Community Development Act, federal urban development
assistance had consisted of individual categorical programs with specific
purposes. The participation of small communities in the prior categori-
cal aid programs is summarized in Tables 2.10-2.12.
In those categorical programs, federal staff selected grant recip-
ients from competitive applicants, and closely monitored utilization of
funds. In the CDBG program, non-entitlement cities (both metropolitan
and rural) continued to face a competitive allocation. However, the 1974
Act preserved the ability to undertake activities included in the categor-
ical programs.
Funds for Non-Metropolitan Communities
While the original Block Nixon Grant proposal assured no funding
for non-metropoligan areas, The House version of the 1974 Act earmarked
20 percent of the funds for these areas, and the Senate version called
for a 25 percent share. The final version followed the House proposal,
and included the House's formula allocation of funds among the states.
The Senate version had linked funding to prior levels under the categori-
cal programs being replaced. For transition purposes, small governments
were given temporary funding entitlement based on prior grant experience
(the hold-harmless provision).'
Rural America, Inc. Limited Access: A Report on the Community Develop-
ment Block Grant Program in Non-metropolitan Areas. Washington: Rural
America, Inc.: December 1977.
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Table 2.10
Participation by Small Communities in HUD
Categorical Grant Programs
(as of December 31, 1971)
Program
Water and
Sewer Facilities
Grant Program
Total Program
Dollars
$ 986,741,000
Dollars Awarded to
Communities Less Than
50,000 Population
$ 666,332,000
Percent Of
Program
Dollars
68%
Urban Renewal 11,363,847,000 2,941,975,000 26
Neighborhood
Facilities 229,207,000 90,789,000 40
Model Cities 1,937,857,000 177,600,000 9
Open Space
Land Grant
Program 576,006,000 183,051,000 32
$15,093,658,000 $4,059,747,000
Source: HUD. Third Annual Report. p. 278.
TOTAL 27%
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Table 2.11
Percentage Distribution of the Dollars Awarded
to Small Communities by Grant Type and Population
Categories
Population Categorical Grants
Discretionary
Balances Grantsa
5,000
5,000 - 9,999
10,000 -49,000
Source: HUD. Third Annual Report. p. 279.
12%
14%
74%
40%
19%
41%
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Table 2.12
Water and Sewer Expenditures Under Categorical
Programs vs. Under the CDBG Nonmetropolitan General
Purpose Fund
Water and Sewer
Categorical
Program 1968-72
Nonmetropolitan
General Purpose
Fund FY 1975
Average HUD Water and
Sewer Grant Amoung
Average Project Size
$ 439,332
$1,424,508
$ 23,491
Not available,
no local share
required
Recipients Under
50,000 Population 76% 100% of munici-
palities; most
counties
Total Dollars Approved
for Recipients Outside
SMSAs $291,866,000 $85,208,803
Source: HUD. First Annual Report. p. 64.
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Future Funding for Hold-Harmless Cities
The future funding for small cities with "hold-harmless" status was that
principal concern of those cities' officials in the 1977 Congressional
review of the HCD Act. This issue was mainly a small city versus large
city problem, particularly since a large share of discretionary funds were
redirected to pay the additional costs of 1977 legislative changes in the
2
entitlement program's allocation process.
In its proposal to Congress the Carter administration dealt only
with the hold-harmless issue, proposing that the discretionary funds be
used "primarily for comprehensive community development grants" rather
than single purpose activities. Presumably this would be an advantage to
many of the small hold-harmless communities since their programs tended to
be set up on a long-term, multi-purpose basis. The only other significant
change proposed by the Administration concerned the discretionary balances
metropolitan areas. The Administration recommended that the metropolitan
discretionary balances be aggregated at the state area level rather than
by individual metropolitan areas within the states, since, in a number of
cases, the SMSA balance for a metropolitan area was considered too small
to have a significant impact.
In the House hearings, several organizations representing small
city interests appealed for retention of the hold-harmless grants.
The Ad Hoc Committee for Adequate and Assured Community Development
Funding testified that "There is no predictability in the discretionary
2
This part is based on pp. 8-15 of HUD. Report on the Allocation of Com-
munity Development Funds to Small Cities. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
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funding system for programs with long-term implication" and requested an
entitlement program for small cities with critical needs. The Northeast-
Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition, a group which represented almost
half of all small hold-harmless cities, also criticized the discretionary
grant program: "Forcing cities to compete each year for a "one shot"
grant cannot result in the orderly, planned and effective community devel-
opment effort which our distressed small cities clearly need." The coal-
ition presented the subcommittee its proposal for a Small Cities Entitle-
ment Program. A third group representing small cities, Rural America, Inc.
praised the CDBG program for the expansion in participation afforded non-
metropolitan cities, but criticized the low level of funding for non-metro-
politan areas. The National League of Cities also testified in behalf of
small cities. According to League officials, the discretionary grant sys-
tem had not been an improvement over the old categorical system: "One
year programming, no flexibility and 'point systems' which vary from re-
gion to region make the discretionary program into a continuation of the
old categorical grants.
Small City Needs and the Dual Allocation Formula
The Project Selection System is the second in the stages of the
formula allocation system for the Small Cities Program.
Metropolitan and nonmetropolitan discretionary funds are apportioned
into state pools using a need-based formula. The 1974 formula, identical
to that used for entitlement city allocations, was based on population size,
poverty and overcrowding.
3
Ibid.
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In the 1977 amendments to the Housing and Community Development
Act, Congress approved a two tier formula to distribute CDBG funds. It
was designed to provide more funding to older central cities which were
4
considered by many to have been slighted under the initial 1974 formula.
The application of the dual formula to the division of small city funds
touched off a Congressional debate along both small city versus large city
and Frostbelt versus Sunbelt lines.
The formula added in 1977 was based on population growth lag, age
of housing and poverty in the entitlement cities. Each city could choose
the higher of the allocations from the 1974 and 1977 formulas.
HUD, and Secretary Patricia Harris, had proposed this two-tier
or "dual formula". According to one analyst of alternative allocation
formulas,
"The 1974 Act's formula would have made a large
proportion of funds--nearly a billion dollars--
available for discretionary grants; potential
problems in administering such a large sum in
fact contributed to HUD's will4ngness to de-
velop an alternative formula."
The applicability of the dual formulas to the needs of small cities
was questioned in the Senate. In a regional split over the issue, the
dual formula system was adopted for the Small Cities discretionary funds
(substituting a population factor for growth lag, due to inadequacy of
.4
HUD. Fourth Annual Report. p. 2.
Robert Schafer. Alternative Formulas for Allocating Community Develop-
ment Block Grants. Cambridge: Department of City and Regional Planning,
Harvard University, October, 1977. p. 9.
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data for small places). This dual formula had the effect of shifting funds
from the West and South to the Northeast and Midwest; thus, it shifted
6discretionary funds among the state pools.
An opponent to the adaption of the dual formula for small cities,
Senator Sasser, succeeded in amending the Act to require a study of the
differences between large and small cities, and the implications of those
differences for alternative allocation formulas.
One study prior to that required by the Sasser amendment found sig-
nificant differences in need between metropolitan and non-metropolitan
small cities.
"By every test--population change, poverty, income,
unemployment, housing deficiencies--small non-
metropolitan cities are in ,uch greater need than
small metropolitan cities.'
Need on most counts was also found to be greater in small non-metro-
politan cities than in large cities. A regional effect was noted as well:
"faster growth but more poverty and deficient housing in the southern and
"9
western than in the northeast and north central regions. Additionally,
looking only at rural areas, the study indicated that poverty is a better
6
HUD. Report on the Allocation of Community Development Funds to Small
Cities. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. p. 8.
7
Ibid.
8 Ibid. p. 63.
Ibid. p. 63-64.
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measure than community age to allocate non-metropolitan Small Cities funds
to areas of greatest need.
The Congressionally mandated Small Cities Study revealed small
cities perceptions and priorities about their developmental needs.10
Regarding community problems related to development, lack of jobs, lack
of adequate housing for low- and moderate-income persons and conditions of
streets were most frequently mentioned by small cities. Top priorities for
improvements in facilities, however, were sewer and drainage facilities,
water facilities and streets. Size of city was more important than metro-
politan or non-metropolitan status in determining development priorities.
Cities under 2,500 population were twice as likely to cite water facilities
as cities from 25,000 to 50,000. Those larger cities mentioned housing
for low- and moderate-income families and central business district im-
11
provements twice as often as smaller cities.
The HUD study of small city needs also looked at a number of alter-
native allocation formulas to divide non-metropolitan discretionary funds
12
among states. The report recommended no particular alternative formula,
but instead recommended further research incorporating 1980 census data on
population, employment and poverty trends, prior to altering the current
13
dual formula.
10
HUD. Developmental Needs of Small Cities. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 197
11
Ibid. pp. 3-4.
12
Metropolitan small cities were not analyzed due to lack of data.
13
Ibid. p. 177.
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This concludes the discussion of additional legislative issues
affecting the Small Cities program allocation. process. The next section
is a compilation of available data on the outcomes of that process.
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APPENDIX C
Outcomes of the Allocation Process
In each of its annual reports for the first five years, HUD has
tabulated the outcomes of the discretionary grants selection process--
dollars available, categories of grant winners, types of activities funded.
This section presents that material.
Comparisons of CDBG and Categorical Grant Program
Table 2.13
Comparison of CDBG and HUD Categorical Programs:
Average Grant and Percent of
Universe Funded, by Population
Category*
Categorical Programs
Population
500,000
250,000-499,999
100,000-249,999
50,000-99,999
25,000-49,999
10,000-24,999
0-9,999
Total
Incorporated Average Number of
Recipients Cities Each Year
No. %
26
30
97
232
455
1,127
16,699
18,666
26
30
95
204
253
344
450
1,403
100.0
100.0
98.0
87.9
55.6
30.5
2.7
Average
Grant
$23,459,150
9,840,700
3,580,611
1,190,951
953,573
599,590
332,096
7.5
CDBG Program*
Total Funded
in First Year Grant
No. %
26
30
95
223
269
375
938
1,956
100.0
100.0
98.0
96.1
59.1
33.2
5.6
10.5
Data excludes all places not considered incorporated by the Bureau of the Census, e.g., townships, counties, Indian reserva-
tions, and States, as well as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
SMSA discretionary balance recipients' data is not included since review is in process.
,Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and Development.
First Annual Report. p. 142.
Table 2.13 compares the first year of CDBG program aid with the
prior HUD categorical programs. The most notable change was in the small-
est size category, with the number of grantees doubling, while the average
gra-. amount decreased by a third.
Average
Grant
$23,765,615
9,981,500
3,721,505
1,149,427
921,640
554,272
207,379
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In program participation by non-metropolitan communities in the
first program year, HUD statistics indicated that a high percentage of
non-metropolitan discretionary grant winners, 75%-93% by city size, had
not had previous experience with HUD categorical grants.
Table 2.14
CDBG Nonmetropolitan Discretionary Recipients: Comparison of HUD Categorical
Grant Program Participation, by Population Groupings Under 50,000
Total CDBG Nonmetropolitan
Incorporated CDBG Discretionary Recipients
Nonmetropolitan Discretionary That Did Not Receive
Recipients Categorical Grants
Population FY 1968-1972 % of Total
25,000-50,000 39 31 79.5
10,000-24,999 110 82 74.5
0-9,999 679 6 92.2
TOTAL 828 739 89.2
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and Development.
First Annual Report. p. 142.
In Table 2.11 in the previous section, HUD data showed that, in
terms of dollars awarded, the very smallest cities showed a large percent-
age increase in dollars won in the CDBG program in the first three program
years, when compared to categorical grant programs. The largest category
of cities under 50,000 reduced their share by about one third. (Many
cities in this category were recipients of "hold-harmless" entitlement
grants.) Seventy-four percent of the SMSA and non-metropolitan discre-
tionary grants for Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976 went to recipients who had
1
no experience with HUD categorical grant programs.
1
HUT). Third Annual Report. p. 279.
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Average Grant Size of Grants in the Small Cities Program
In the first five years of program experience, Small Cities grants,
on average, increased in size, more than triple from 1975 to 1979.
As shown in Table 2.15, non-metropolitan grants were consistently
larger than metropolitan discretionary grants for the first three years.2
Table 2.15
Average Size of Grants by Program Category and
Fiscal Year
(Dollars in Thousands)
Program Category FY 1975 FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979
Entitlement $1,587 $1,793 $2,025 $2,135 $2,093
Small Cities 141 175 233 400 438
Secretary's Fund 610 568 999 241* 282*
Financial Settlement 793 649 2,326 2,841 1,765
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office
and Accounting; and, Community Planning and Development,
Management, Data Systems and Statistics Division.
of Finance
Office of
Average Discretionary Balance Grant
Fiscal
Year SMSA Balances Nonmetropolitan Balances
1975 $ 87,500 $168,800
1976 129,500 199,900
1977 168,000 244,900
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Community
Planning and Development, Office of Management, "Management
Information System."
Third Annual Report. p. 282.
2 Data were only available for 1975-1977.
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Number of Grants
The number of Small Cities grants awarded has remained relatively
constant, as shown in Table 2.16. The largest reduction from year-to-year
was in Fiscal Year 1978, when the national Project Selection System was
introduced.
Table 2.16
Number of Approved Grants by Program Category and
Fiscal Year As of December 31, 1979
Program Category FY 1975 FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979
Entitlement 1,321 1,312 1,313 1,301 1,290
Small Cities 1,831 1,965 1,878 1,563 1,809
Secretary's Fund - 44 . 93 51 272 170
Financial Settlement 63 77 43 35 36
Total 3,259 3,447 3,285 3,171 3,305
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and- Urban Development, Office of Finance
and Accounting; and, Community Planning and Development, Jffice of
Management, Data Systems and Statistics Division.
Fifth Annual Report. p. 1-17.
Availability of Funds
Annual Small Cities funds, as shown in Table 2.17, increased from
$259.0 million in Fiscal Year 1975 to $840.2 million in 1979, or an in-
crease of about 210 percent, while total CDBG funds grew by 54 percent.
Metropolitan funds increased at a greater rate, by 300 percent, than did
non-metropolitan funds during the same period, at 180 percent.
As a share of total annual funds, the Small Cities program grew
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from 1975 to 1979. Small Cities funds accounted for 10.6 percent of the
total CDBG allocation in 1975; in 1979 that share was 21.4 percent. During
that period, metro funds increased from 2.4 percent to 6.4 percent of total
CDBG dollars. Non-metropolitan funds almost doubled their share of the
total, going from 8.2 percent to 15.0 percent.
For the entire period, Small Cities funds accounted for 15.6 per-
cent of the total CDBG appropriation, with 4.4 percent going to the Metro
fund, and 11.2 percent to the Non-Metropolitan fund.
Rate of Expenditure by Small Cities Grantees
One HUD measure of performance by CDBG grantees is the "drawdown"
rate, that is, the rate at which grantees "draw down" or request disburse-
ments from their annual grant amount for local program expenditures.
Table 2.18 indicates the percentage of CDBG funds drawn down at the end of
1979, for each program category and fiscal year.
Table 2.11
Distribution of CDBG Funds* by Program Category and Fiscal Year
(Dollars in Thousands)
Program Category FY 1975 FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 Total
Entitlement $2,096,405 $2,352,888 $2,659,020 $2,777,593 $2,744,268 $12,630,174
Metro 1,835,763 2,087,534 2,405,405 2,619,318 2,667,401 11,615,411
Non-Metro 260,642 265,354 253,615 158,275 76,867 1,014,75$
Small Cities 259,058 345,274 438,005 627,907 804,182 2.,47/4,476
Metro 59,738 91,596 113,823 189,912 241,561 696,630
Non-Metro 199,320 253,678 324,182 437,995 562,621 1,777,796
**
Secretary's Fund 26,903 52,978 50,960 94,499 101,994 327,334
Financial Settlement 49,987 49,980 100,000 100,000 100,000 399,9
Total 2,432,353 2,801,120 3,247,988 3,600,000 3,750,260 15,831,7Z1
Lapsed 646 880 12 0 0 1, 38
****
.$2,432,999 $2,802,000 $3,248,000 $3,600,000 $3,750,260 $15,833,439
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Finance and Accounting.
*
**
Does not reflect initial distribution contained in HUD budget submissions. Amounts initially allocated
for entitlement grants that are not applied for or disapproved are subsequently allocated to the Small
Cities Program as well as statutory pro rata reductions.
Includes appropriations of $127 million for Model Cities and $197 for Urban Revneal which were
transferred to the CDBG program, but excludes $117 million of transition funds that were uncommitted.
*** Includes $260,000 transferred from other Federal agencies.
Table 2.18
Drawdown Rates by Grant Category and Fiscal Year
As' of December 31, 1979
Program Category
Entitlement
Metro
Nonmetro
Small Cities
Metro
Nonmetro
Secretary's Fund
Financial Settlement
Total
FY 1975
99.6
99.6
99.6
97.9
95.7
98.6
90.5
97.0
99.3
FY 1976
99.1
99.2
98.6
95.7
95.1
96.0
77.8
83.4
98.2
FY 1977
93.5
94.0
88.4
86.2
81.7
87.7
59.3-
69.9
91.2
FY 1978
49.9
49.7
53.6
54.4
48.2
57.0
45.7
56.9
50.8
FY 1979
5.0
4.7
12.6
5.4
4.7
5.7
13.9
20.7
5.5
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Finance and Accounting.
,~~I _TF , --_... . _ . - I
1-n
Total
67.0
65.6
82.8
54.6
49.4
56.7
52.3
H64.7
64.7
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Activities Funded
In the first program year, HUD reported the following pattern of
grantee activities:
SMSA sample recipients placed greatest emphasis
upon housing activities, followed closely by water
system activities. Like the nonmetropolitan cities
with less than 1,000 population, however, the
smallest SMSA discretionary cities concentrated
their CDBG dollars on water activities (62 percent)
Compared to nonmetropolitan cities over 1,000 pop-
ulation, SMSA cities over 1,000 placed very limited
emphasis upon sewer system activities. Both SMSA
and nonmetropolitan cities over 1,000 population
emphasized housing. The greatest emphasis upon
housing among SMSA cities occurred in the 10,000-
24,999 population stratum where 34 percent of
the funds were budgeted for this purpose. SMSA
cities greater than 25,000 population invested
heavily in public facilities (28 percent), followed
closely by water system activities (25 percent)
and housing (21 percent) .3
Table 2.19
PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE SMSA AND NONMETROPOLITAN CITIES' DISCRETIONARY
BALANCES BUDGETED FOR FOUR ACTIVITY AREAS
POPULATION STRATA
< 1,000 1,000-9,999 10,000-24,999 25,000 +
C
0
0
EC0ZU)
CL
0
EC0
z
<
U)
0
0
EC0Z
U)
U)
C
co
0CL
0
E
0
z
< ,
o
Water 62% 1 57% 23% ' 26% 3% 14% 25% 12%
Sewer 11 6 5 19 7 '32 4 10
>II
Housing 8 2 26 19 34 17 21 24
Public 9 19 6 6 1 7 28 '12
Facilities
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing & Urban C velopment, Community Planning and Development, Office of Evaluation.
Based upon analysis of applications fr1 199 sample communities receiving SMSA balances and 275 sample com-
munities receiving nonmetropolitan bal :es for Fiscal Year 1975.
3
HUD. Second Annual Report. p. 105.
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By 1977, activities funded had shifted markedly from public work,
4
facilities and site improvements to rehabilitation loans and grants.
Table 2.20
Activity Shifts by Budget Line Item
SMSA NONMETROPOLITAN
BALANCES BALANCES
(PERCENT) (PERCENT)
Fiscal Budget Line Budget Line Budget Line Budget Line
Year Item 2 Item 5 Item 2 Item 5
1975 54% 13% 68% 7%
1976 58 15 64 11
1977 41 28 50 21
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Community
Planning and Development, Office of Management, "Management
Information System."
Third Annual Report p. 285.
In the 1978 Small Cities grant competitions, applicants who pro-
posed redeveloping and housing rehabilitation projects had well above
average success rates in every competition. Redevelopment projects al-
ways had the highest success rates with housing rehabilitation close be-
hind. Water and sewer projects, under the Project Selection System, had
well below average success rates in every competition.5 Figure 2.2 in-
4
HUD. Third Annual Report. p. 285.
William G. Moss and Cameron Huff. An Evaluation of the Small Cities Pro-
gram: Who Applies, Who Wins. Cambridge: Urban Systems Research and
Engineering, Inc., (forthcoming). p. 165.
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Figure 7-12
PTRCENT OF APPLICANTS THAT ARE 3UCCESSFUL, BY
PROJEC7 TYPE AND COMPETITION
All Ccmpetitions
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TABLE 20.18
PERCEN'IAGE OF SAMPLE SMSA AND MONMETROPOLITAN
DISCRETIONARY BALANCES BUDGETED FOR FIVE ACTIVITY GROUPINGS,
FY 1975 and EY 1976
SS t I e s
1000-9999
10.000-24,999
>25,000
Nonmetropolitan C
1650 o
1000-999
10,000-24999
T 25,000
SMSA Counties
u.e/~......... Cnmhin.,I DohAk In~n~ A (r~nt~ Publ ic Fac ili tle s De ve lopmen t/fRede ve lopinen t Ot
1975 1976 1975 1976 1975 1976 175 6 1975
66.6 43.3 0 10.5 16.9 7.5 1.2 15.4
28.9 36.5 16.0 9.5 20.9 10.1 9.1 14.6 25.10
11.1 20.4 7.6 16.2 5.6 5.6 31.7 17.7 44.0
28.2 21.1 0 30.5 28.4 6.0 23.6 26.0 19.6
ities
6  I. /Z eIDhn A D h  n rc 1 rr n S P b ic F c l t e
73.6
49.4
44.5
20.6
28.3
50.2
41.2
8.0
7.7
14.0
1.0
6.2
4.8
14.3
6.2
10.7
4.8
31.5
7.5 14.3
8.3
5.7
6.4
10.3
16.6
6.0
2.0
4.0
2.9
20.4
11.65
26.4
19.9
9.7
12.2
39.3
29.9
7.8
27.2
17.9
34.9
37.9
her
1979
38.6
29.3
40.1
16..4
32.0
33.9
43..9
28.0
43..
NonmegLopolitan Counties
1000-9999 14.2
10.000-24999 54.1
> 25,000 33.7
42.6
48.10
31.8
19.4
9.0
5.4
10.2
3.3
17.4
39.7
5.6
14.5
14.9
11.8
10.6
7. 1
8.4
11.0
Source: U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Community Planning and Development, Office of Evaluation.
1.9
2.3
6.2
19.6
22.9
35.4
M0.4
34,T
34.
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dicates the percent of preapplicants that were successful by project type
and competition.
Per Capita Distribution of Small Cities Aid
Additional information is available on per capita distribution of
the total Small Cities allocations for Fiscal Years 1977, 1978 and 1980
(estimated) as shown in Table 2.22. Levels of per capita aid for non-
metropolitan discretionary grants were consistently higher than for the
metropolitan discretionary funds. However, for both categories of dis-
cretionary aid, per capita funds available were about half that available
to metropolitan cities as a whole. Non-central cities with population
over 50,000 had a per capita level comparable to non-metropolitan commun-
ities eligible for discretionary grants.
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Table 2.22
Per Capita Distribution of CDBG Allocation by Type of Recipient
Fiscal Year and Formula
1977 Actual 1978 Actual 1980
Allocation Allocation Projected
Type of Recipient (1974 Formula (Dual Formula Allocation
and Hold and Hold (Dual
Harmless) Harmless)** Formula) ***
SMSA $16.11 $17.87 $19.10
Metropolitan Cities (559) 23.82 26.56 68.36
Central Cities (381) 25.79 28.59 30.48
Non-Central Cities over
50,000 Population (178) 14.39 16.64 18.22
Remainder of SMSA 7.94 8.54 9.12
Urban Counties (Entitled)**** 9.94 11.27 13.37
SMSA Balance (Discretionary) 6.39 6.64 5.81
Non-SMSA (Discretionary) 9.70 10.17 11.74
U.S. Total 14.34 15.75 17.57
* The $3.148 billion appropriation in fiscal year 1977 was distrib-
uted on the basis of the 1974 single formula and hold harmless
averages.
** The $3.5 billion appropriation in fiscal year .1978 was distributed
on the basis of the dual formula and hold harmless averages.
Hold harmless credit in fiscal year 1978 was equal to two-thirds
of the excess of the hold harrhless amount over the basic dual
formula amount.
* These are full formula (i.e., no hold harmless) amounts based on
a projected 1980 appropriation of $3.8 billion.
** Data not available for breakdown of hold harmless between urban
counties and the SMSA balance.
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developnent , Office of
Policy Developnent and Research, Office of Economic Affairs,
Econanic Developnent and Public Finance Division.
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Evaluations of the Project Selection System
Preliminary evaluations have criticized the performance of the Pro-
ject Selection System on a variety of grounds.
One study found significant differences in need between metropolitan
and non-metropolitan small cities. Looking at rural areas, the study
indicated that poverty is a better measure than community age to allocate
non-metropolitan small cities funds to areas of greatest needs, while im-
plying that other measures might better target need to metropolitan small
cities. While the report was particularly concerned with alternative
formulas for division of small cities funds among states, its findings
seem relevant to the community-wide measures of housing need and poverty
used in the PSS: a single set of needs measures may be insufficient to
consistently target aid to neediest cities, given the diverse development
needs of small cities.
HUD study of the System's implementation in Washington State recom-
mended numerous changes in the allocation system and in the PSS. Changes
to the PSS were to include: lowering the level of grant ceilings (the PSS
regulations gave Area Offices discretion in setting the maximum amount a
community could compete for); creating separate competitions in each state
based on population categories, with proportional allocation of state
pools to each category, in order to reduce the unfairness of very small
communities (say, under 1,000) having to compete with cities forty or fifty
1-
HUD. Report on the Allocation of Community Development Funds to Small
Cities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. pp 63-64.
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times their size; increasing the ratio of single purpose to multi-purpose
grants awarded (the PSS regulations stipulated that 65 to 75 percent of
the Non-Metro Balance Funds in a State were to be awarded in the compre-
hensive grant competitions); and eliminating the absolute poverty and
housing needs criteria from the rating system, since they unfairly biased
the PSS toward larger cities. 2
Still another study found numerous deficiencies in the point system:
funds do not go to the neediest communities; proposed programs with high
benefit to low- and moderate-income persons are not funded; the opportunity
for funding varies tremendously across Area Offices, since the number of
potential applicants per aid dollar, and thus the intensity of competitions,
differs greatly across Area Offices; the point system by itself does not
curtail Area Office discretionary power, as measured by the differences in
rankings using only the needs measures as compared to the actual rankings
with the full point system; community flexibility in program design and
funding opportunities for non-housing programs are discouraged by the point
system; and funding outcomes in terms of types of program vary considerably
3
across Area Offices despite the point system.
The final study to be reviewed examined in detail the outcomes of
the 1978 Small Cities Program Grant Competitions. William G. Moss, as
part of a national evaluation of. the Small Cities Program, analyzed HUD's
scoring system and who are the winners and losers in the Small Cities CDBG
2 HUD. Small Cities '79: A Study of the Small Cities Block Grant Preappli-
cation Cycle in Washington State During Fiscal Year 1979. (Draft).
-3
Andrew M. Isserman. Allocation of Community Development Funds Among
Small Cities: A Partial Evaluation. (Draft). p. 1.
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Program. His summary and conclusions are presented below:
In this study we have analyzed the decisions of eligible
jurisdictions with respect to their participation in
the Small Cities CDBG program and the decisions of HUD
personnel with respect to which applicants for CDBG
grants are and are not funded. We have also analyzed
the operations of the Project Selection System to
compare the theoretical or intended operation of the
point system with its actual operation. Two findings
recur in almost every aspect of the study: size and
previous experience are important determinants of
program participation, project selection, and the
chances of being funded.
Who Applies
Of all eligible jurisdictions, 89 percent are munici-
palities and 11 percent are counties. There are sig-
nificant regional variations; counties are relatively
more numerous in the South and West and relatively
less numerous in the North and North Central regions.
Twenty-five percent of eligibles apply. The highest
rates of applications are in the South followed by the
West, and the lowest are in the North and North Central
regions.
Over 75 percent of applicants are nonmetropolitan jur-
isdictions and between 80 and 90 percent are municipal-
ities. In the descriptive analysis application rates
(the proportion applying) are positively related to
jurisdiction size measured by 1976 population, 1970
poverty population, and the number of inadequate
housing units. Also previous experience with block
grant application and other HUD funding programs are
very important in explaining the decision to apply.
The latter experience is represented by hold-harmless
status. The effect of experience on the probability
of applying is also exceedingly important in the
multivariate analysis. Hold harmless status increases
the probability of applying from between 40 and 50
percentage points. However, the effect of size is
less clear, although it may be represented by the ef-
fects of the poverty population size.
4
William G. Moss and Cameron Huff. An Evaluation of the Small Cities
Program: Who Applies, Who Wins. Cambridge: Urban System Research and
Engineering, Inc., (forthcoming).
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Who Applies for What
The percent of eligible jurisdictions applying for
Single-Purpose grants is larger than that applying
for Comprehensive grants in metropolitan and non-
metropolitan competitions. This is in marked con-
trast to estimates of the allocation of grant funds.
We estimate that there are approximately 2.3 dollars
allocated to Comprehensive competitions for every
dollar allocated to Single-Purpose competitions.
However, the ratio of Comprehensive to Single-Purpose
applicants varies from 0.3 to 0.45.
The effects of size and experience are also evident
here. Applicants to Single-Purpose competitions are
smaller and those to Comprehensive competitions are
larger than average for all CDBG grant applicants.
This outcome and the effects of previous experience
are also confirmed in the multivariate analysis of
the probability of applying for a Comprehensive
grant. The effects of hold harmless are especially
large; hold harmless status increases the probability
of applying for a comprehensive grant by about 50
to 60 percentage points after holding constant the
effects of other influences.
Finally, the types of projects proposed varies with
the type of competition and characteristics of appli-
cants. Smaller applicants with less previous exper-
ience tend to apply for water and sewer projects and
service facilities, and these occur relatively more
often in Single-Purpose competitions. In constrast,
larger jurisdictions tend to apply more often for
redevelopment and housing rehabilitation projects,
and these occur more often in Comprehensive competi-
tions. The success rate also tends to be somewhat
higher in the latter project types.
Who Wins
Applicants to Comprehensive competitions have a higher
probability of being funded than those to Single-Purpose
competitions, and the difference is about the same as
the allocation of funds. Again, previous experience
is an important influence increasing.the probability
of being funded. On average, winners are larger than
losers. But the effect of jurisdiction size on this
probability is not as evident when other characteris-
tics of applicants and competitions are taken into
account in the multivariate analysis.
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Success rates in the North Central and South are
higher than the North and West in nonmetropolitan
Single-Purpose competitions when other influences
are held constant. Success rates are also greater
than average in the North Central in the metropol-
itan Comprehensive competitions, other things held
constant.
PSS Scoring
Finally, we find that the nominal or official
weights used in the PSS scoring system are different
from the actual or effective weights. The four
needs factors are significantly less important
in practice, and the factors for program impact
and the benefits to low- and moderate-income in-
dividuals are more important in practice.
This is interesting because the four needs fac-
tors are nominally biased in favor of absolute jur-
isdiction size; the absolute poverty population and
numbers of inadequate housing units are given much
greater nominal weight in the scoring system than
the percent poverty population and percent inade-
quate housing. Our findings suggest that the ef-
fects of jurisdiction size on success in the Small
Cities CDBG Program is more indirect. It effects
the willingness to apply and the type of partici-
pation.
Previous experience is awarded points in Compre-
hensive competitions in the amount of 25 points for
hold harmless status. Our analysis of the point
system implies that this has very little effect on
the rankings of applicants and therefore little
direct effect on the likelihood of being funded.
However, our other findings suggest that the ef-
fect of experience is strong.
This presentation of the evaluations of the Small Cities Project
Selection System of 1978 concludes this chapter on outcomes of the Small
Cities Program allocation process.
5
Ibid. pp. 184-187.
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